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Displaying 111 - 120 of 6638
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IN - Rehabilitation, wildlife - 312 IAC 9-10-9 Wild animal rehabilitation permit | 312 IAC 9-10-9 | 312 IN ADC 9-10-9, 9.5 | This Indiana regulation sets for the requirements to obtain a permit to possess wild animals for rehabilitation. | Administrative | |
| Dead baby night monkey lies in a tray meant for collecting feces from a cage | Slideshow Images | ||||
| NV - Wildlife - Chapter 504. Wildlife Management and Propagation. | NAC 504.471 | This administrative provision restricts the shipment, transportation and exportation of wildlife subject to limited exceptions. | Administrative | ||
| RI - Lien - § 34-48-1. Lien on animals for their keep--Transfer of abandoned animals | Gen. Laws, 1956, § 34-48-1 | RI ST § 34-48-1 | This Rhode Island law states that when an agreement has been made between the owner of any animals regarding the price of keeping, the animals shall be subject to a lien for the price of the keeping in favor of the person keeping the animals. The person may detain the animals until the debt is paid and, if not paid within 30 days, he or she may sell the animals at public auction after giving written notice to the owner of the time and place of the sale at least six days before the sale. Additionally, a kennel, as defined in § 4-19-2, or a veterinary hospital which boards or grooms animals for nonmedical purposes, may transfer any abandoned animal in its custody to a Rhode Island licensed nonprofit animal rescue, animal shelter, society for the prevention of cruelty to animals, or adoption organization as defined. | Statute | |
| MA - Lost Property - Chapter 134. Lost Goods and Stray Beasts | M.G.L.A. 134 § 1 - 7 | MA ST 134 § 1 - 7 | This section comprises Massachusetts' Lost Goods and Stray Beasts Act. | Statute | |
| US - Wildlife - Chapter 23. National Wilderness Preservation System. | 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1131 - 1136 | Under this Act, Congress established a National Wilderness Preservation System to be composed of federally owned areas designated by Congress as "wilderness areas", and these shall be administered for the use and enjoyment of the American people in such manner as will leave them unimpaired for future use and enjoyment as wilderness, and so as to provide for the protection of these areas, the preservation of their wilderness character, and for the gathering and dissemination of information regarding their use and enjoyment as wilderness; and no Federal lands shall be designated as "wilderness areas" except as provided for in this chapter or by a subsequent Act. | Statute | ||
| SIRMANS v. THE STATE | 244 Ga. App. 252 (2000) |
Criminal defendant was convicted of four counts of animal cruelty and one count of simple assault. The motion to suppress was properly denied, because the search was authorized under the "plain view" doctrine and any objections regarding photographs were subsequently waived when they were tendered into evidence without objection. The trial court did not have authority to deprive defendant of animals which the State failed to demonstrate were neglected or abused, because such animals were not contraband or evidence of a crime. |
Case | ||
| Haberman v. United States | 26 Cl. Ct. 1405 (1992) | 38 Cont.Cas.Fed. (CCH) P 76,420 |
The U.S. Claims Court upheld its jurisdiction over an action brought by individuals who had their Private Maintenance and Care Agreements (PMCA) revoked by the Bureau of Land Management and their adopted wild horses repossessed when the agency learned that the individuals intended to sell the horses to slaughter once they obtained full legal title to them under the Wild and Free-Roaming Horse and Burro Act. The court found that the PMCA agreement constituted a contract between the government and the adopter, and thus that the Claims Court had jurisdiction to hear the case. Though the court noted that individual adopters would have to overcome the suggestion that they violated the terms of the PMCA by intending to sell the horses to slaughter. |
Case | |
| Sentencia 10013-103027-2023-00229-00 (0327) | Tribunal Superior de Bogotá, Sala Mixta, Sentencia del 6 de octubre de 2023, Rad. 10013-103027-2023-00229-00 (0327) | This is the case of “Simona,” the dog in a family that went through a divorce in 2021. The husband, acting as the plaintiff, filed a lawsuit in the third Family Court to establish a visitation arrangement for their beloved companion, “Simona,” who lived with his ex-wife. The plaintiff argued that Simona was an integral part of their family and that both Simona and him had been emotionally impacted since the separation, as the defendant contended that visitations were distressing for Simona. The plaintiff further contended that Simona used to sleep with him and watch movies, but since she could no longer do so, Simona had become depressed and refused to eat. The family court dismissed the case, stating that it fell under the civil court’s jurisdiction. The Superior Tribunal of Bogotá resolved the jurisdictional conflict between the third Family Court and the twenty-seventh Civil Circuit Court. | Case | ||
| Colorado Wild Horse v. Jewell | 130 F. Supp. 3d 205 (D.D.C. 2015) | 2015 WL 5442639 (D.D.C., 2015) | Finding the number of horses too high to maintain ecological balance and sustain multipurpose land use in Colorado's White River Resource Area, the US Bureau of Land Management (BLM) invoked its authority under the Wild Free–Roaming Horses and Burros Act (“Wild Horses Act”), to declare those horses to be “excess animals” and scheduled to remove them from the land. Plaintiffs—organizations challenged BLM's “excess” determinations and its decision to remove these horses. They asked the district court to enjoin BLM's planned gather. Because the Wild Horses Act authorized BLM's excess determination and BLM appeared to have used reasonable methods to estimate the total wild-horse population, the Court found that Plaintiffs were unlikely to prevail on their Wild Horses Act claims. And because the record reflected that BLM considered the cumulative effects of the proposed gather and permissibly relied on the Environmental Assessment written for a previous East Douglas HMA gather, the Court found that Plaintiffs were also unlikely to prevail on their National Environmental Policy Act claims. The Court further found that Plaintiffs were unlikely to suffer irreparable harm as a result of the gather and that the balance of equities and the public interest weighed in favor of BLM. Accordingly, the Court denied Plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary Injunction. | Case |