Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| People v. Preston | 300 N.W. 853 (Mich. 1941) | 299 Mich. 484 (Mich. 1941) |
Defendant was convicted of wilfully and maliciously killing three cows. The issue considered on review was: "Are the circumstances and testimony here, aliunde the confession of the respondent, sufficient to create such a probability that the death of the cattle in question was intentionally caused by human intervention and to justify the admission in evidence of the alleged confession of the respondent?" The court held that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction. |
Case | |
| OK - Importation - Subchapter 25. Wildlife Classified as Domesticated and Exempt | OK ADC 800:25-25-1 - 3 | OAC 800:25-25-1 - 3 | The purpose of this Subchapter is to establish a list of wildlife that are to be considered domesticated and, therefore, exempt from licensing and permit requirements of the Department. | Administrative | |
| Deardorff v. Farnsworth | 343 P.3d 687, review denied, 358 Or. 145 (2015) | 268 Or.App. 844 (2015) |
In this case, the Oregon Court of Appeals was reviewing whether or not the trial court erred in holding that an insurance company was estopped from relying on an exclusion in an insurance policy. The plaintiffs in this case were transporting horses in California that were owned by other when the trailer carrying the horses caught fire. The insurers for the horse owners compensated the horse owners and then filed an action against plaintiffs. As a result, plaintiffs charged the defense of the action to their insurer, OMI. OMI refused to provide a defense for the plaintiffs, arguing that it was not covered in the insurance policy. Plaintiffs filed an action against OMI to recover the costs arguing that they were verbally told that this would be covered in the policy. The trial court ordered summary judgment for the plaintiffs, holding that OMI was estopped from denying liability because it had breached its contract with plaintiff. Ultimately, the court of appeals reviewed the issue and determined that the trial court had erred in its decision. The court of appeals found that based on applicable case law, estoppel cannot be used to negate an express exclusion in an insurance policy. As a result, the court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case. |
Case | |
| Revista Brasileira de Direito Animal Volume 18 |
SUMÁRIOEDITORIAL Heron Gordilho............... Direito Animal Comparado/Comparative Animal Law |
Policy | |||
| ME - Endangered Species - Subchapter 3. Endangered Species; Management and Research. | 12 M. R. S. A. § 12801 - 12810 | ME ST T. 12 § 12801 - 12810 | Maine revised its endangered species law in 2019. "Take" means the he act or omission that results in the death of any endangered or threatened species. There are two types of offenses based on whether the conduct is negligent or intentional. Negligent acts concerning an endangered species result in a Class E crime with a fine of $1,000 which may not be suspended. Intentional acts concerning an endangered species result in a Class D crime with a fine of $2,000 which may not be suspended. Each type of taking lists what is prohibited with regard to endangered species, including hunting, possessing, and feeding/baiting. Section 12810 also covers offenses against delisted species (of which the bald eagle is specifically listed). | Statute | |
| FL - Endangered - Endangered and Threatened Species Act | West's F. S. A. § 379.2291 - 2311 | FL ST § 379.2291 - 379.2311 (formerly FL ST § 372.072 - 074) | These Florida statutes define endangered and threatened species and provide the State's intent to protect these species. Under statute, the intentional killing or wounding of a listed species incurs a third degree felony. Interestingly, the state has a reward program for the arrest and conviction of those who violate state endangered species laws. | Statute | |
| People v. Hock | 919 N.Y.S.2d 835 (N.Y.City Crim.Ct., 2011) | 2011 WL 1225699 (N.Y.City Crim.Ct.) |
Defendant was denied his motion to set aside convictions under New York animal cruelty statute. The Criminal Court, City of New York, held that the 90 day period for prosecuting a Class A misdemeanor had not been exceeded. It also held that the jury was properly instructed on the criminal statute that made it a misdemeanor to not provide an animal with a sufficient supply of good and wholesome air, food, shelter, or water. It would be contrary to the purpose of the law and not promote justice to require that all four necessities be withheld for a conviction. |
Case | |
| Pagel v. Yates | 471 N.E.2d 946 (Ill.App. 4 Dist.,1984) | 128 Ill.App.3d 897, 84 Ill.Dec. 180 (Ill.App. 4 Dist.,1984) |
Horse owner sued breeder for negligence and conversion after breeder returned the wrong mare. On issue of damages, Appellate Court held that evidence was insufficient to support the jury award because 1) evidence of value of mare’s offspring four years after conversion was irrelevant and prejudicial; 2) trial court's instruction to jury allowed recovery for the horse's unborn offspring as well as fair market value of horse in foal, which permitted a double recovery; and 3) owner could not recover his expenses after he learned of switch and made no effort to resolve the problem because he had duty to avoid further loss. |
Case | |
| Causa No. 09209202301263 | Causa No. 09209202301263, Unidad Judicial de Familia, Mujer, Niñez y Adolescencia Norte con Sede en el Cantón Guayaquil, Provincia del Guayas (2023) | Habeas Corpus on behalf of animals at the Narayana Aventura Park | Los demandantes interpusieron un Habeas Corpus argumentando la vulneración de los derechos a la libertad, vida, integridad, libre desarrollo del comportamiento animal y derecho a la salud de los animales alojados en el Narayana Aventura Park. El argumento principal se centró en el estado grave de desnutrición en el que se encontraban los animales, así como en las condiciones de confinamiento inadecuadas a las que estaban sujetos. El Narayana Aventura Park se presenta como un centro de rescate que alberga una variedad de animales exóticos, endémicos y domésticos. Su represéntate negó cualquier violación a los derechos de los animales, asegurando que se les proporcionaban las condiciones mínimas de bienestar requeridas por ley y contaban con todos los permisos necesarios. Tras un exhaustivo análisis del caso y una cuidadosa consideración de las leyes aplicables al caso, la juez decidió conceder el Habeas Corpus a favor de los animales alojados en el Parque reconociendo que si hubo un impacto significativo en los derechos de los animales bajo el cuidado del parque. La juez llegó a esta conclusión basándose en el Artículo 89 de la Constitución de Ecuador, así como en la jurisprudencia de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos y la Sentencia No. 253-20-JH/22 (Caso de Estrellita). No obstante, siguiendo las recomendaciones de los de la comisión de peritos en el caso, el tribunal permitió que los animales permanecieran en el parque y ordenó la readecuación de los espacios y las dietas de todos los animales del parque dentro de un plazo de tres meses tras el fallo de cuerdo a las sugerencias en dichos expertos. Es importante anotar que el demandado apeló esta decisión y actualmente está en proceso de revisión. | Case | |
| Daniels v. City of Ann Arbor (2015) | The attached document is the Verified Complaint for Declaratory and Equitable Relief in the case of Daniels v. City of Ann Arbor, Michigan for the protection of natural resources. Plaintiff Sally Daniels challenged the City of Ann Arbor's current "deer cull" of 100 deer from public parks and nature areas in the City by marksmen from APHIS. Plaintiff contends that this cull of deer, a natural resource held in the public trust, violates state law (the Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act (NREPA) and the DNR's Wildlife Conservation Order (WCO)). Specifically, Plaintiff argues that there has been no showing under NREPA that the deer have caused damage to horticultural or agricultural crops under either act contrary to state law. Plaintiff also states that the methods used - firearms with silencers, deer baiting, and the shooting of deer from vehicles - also violate the NREPA and/or WCO. | Pleading |