Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| MD - Wildlife - § 10-427. Organized killing contests prohibited | MD Code, Natural Resources, § 10-427 | MD NAT RES § 10-427 | This Maryland statute, enacted in 2021, states that a person may not sponsor, conduct, or participate in a contest organized in the State that has the objective of killing a coyote, fox, or raccoon for prizes or monetary rewards. A person is subject to a fine of $50 for each coyote, fox, or raccoon killed in violation of this law. | Statute | |
| Bal Harbour Village v. Welsh | 879 So.2d 1265 (Fl. 2004) | 879 So.2d 1265 (Fl. 2004) |
Defendant owned four dogs prior to the enactment of an ordinance prohibiting municipality residents from owning more than two dogs in one household. The municipality brought suit against Defendant for failing to comply with the ordinance. The trial court denied the municipalities prayer for permanent injunctive relief, but the Court of Appeals overruled the decision holding the ordinance could constitutionally be enforced under the police power to abate nuisance. |
Case | |
| US - Eagle - Endangered and Threatened Species; Bald Eagle Reclassification; Final Rule | Federal Register: July 12, 1995 (Volume 60, Number 133) | RIN 1018-AC48 |
The Fish and Wildlife Service reclassifies under the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (Act), as amended, the bald eagle (Haliaeetus leucocephalus) from endangered to threatened in the lower 48 States. The bald eagle remains classified as threatened in Michigan, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Oregon, and Washington where it is currently listed as threatened. The special rule for threatened bald eagles is revised to include all lower 48 States. This action will not alter those conservation measures already in force to protect the species and its habitats. The bald eagle also occurs in Alaska and Canada, where it is not at risk and is not protected under the Act. Bald eagles of Mexico are not listed at this time due to a recently enacted moratorium on listing additional taxa as threatened or endangered. |
Administrative | |
| IA - Veterinary - Veterinary Practice Code | I. C. A. § 169.1 - 56 | IA ST § 169.1 - 56 | These are the state's veterinary practice laws. Among the provisions include licensing requirements, laws concerning the state veterinary board, veterinary records laws, and the laws governing disciplinary actions for impaired or incompetent practitioners. | Statute | |
| Nutt v. Florio | 914 N.E.2d 963 (Mass. Ct. App., 2009) | 75 Mass.App.Ct. 482 (2009) |
This Massachusetts case involves an appeal of a summary judgment in favor of the landlord-defendant concerning an unprovoked dog attack. The dog, described as a pit bull terrier, was kept by a tenant of Florio's. The court found that, while the defendants cannot be held strictly liable by virtue the dog's breed, "knowledge of that breed and its propensities may properly be a factor to be considered in determining whether the defendants were negligent under common-law principles." Reviewing the record de novo, the court held that this question and the defendant's knowledge of the dog's propensities, created a genuine issue of material fact. The order of summary judgment for defendant was reversed and the case was remanded. |
Case | |
| In re: JACK D. STOWERS, DOING BUSINESS AS SUGAR CREEK KENNELS | 56 Agric. Dec. 279 (1996) | 1996 WL 881664 (U.S.D.A.) | Willfulness is not required for cease and desist orders or for monetary fines; it is only required for license revocation if agency has not given respondent written notice of violations and opportunity to come into compliance with regulations. (Chief Administrative Law Judge Victor W. Palmer imposed a civil penalty of $15,000.00, issued a cease and desist order, and revoked Respondent's license after finding that Respondent: failed to allow department officials to inspect its facility; failed to maintain complete and accurate records of the acquisition, disposition, and identification of dogs; failed to properly identify dogs; failed to hold dogs for the required period of time; offered dogs for transportation in enclosures that did not conform to structural strength and space requirements; failed to construct and maintain primary enclosures for dogs that protect the dogs from injury; failed to deliver health certificates for dogs transported interstate; failed to provide adequate veterinary care; and obtained random source dogs from individuals who had not bred and raised the dogs on their own premises.) | Case | |
| Wilkison v. City of Arapahoe | 926 N.W.2d 441 (Neb.,2019) | 302 Neb. 968 (2019) | Brooke Wilkison (Brooke) got an American Staffordshire Terrier (pit bull) in 2015. In 2016, the city of Arapahoe passed an ordinance regarding dangerous dogs which contained a restriction on owning a Rottweiler or an American Staffordshire Terrier within city limits. The ordinance allowed for dogs licensed prior to January 1, 2017 to be grandfathered in as acceptable. Brooke did not have his dog licensed prior to the that date. Law enforcement told Brooke he could not keep the dog. Brooke filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment and an injunction to prevent Arapahoe from implementing and enforcing the ordinance. The trial court found for Brooke and Arapahoe appealed. Arapahoe's first assignment of error is that the court erred by applying the Fair Housing Act (FHA) to the ordinance. The Court found that Arapahoe was not exempt from the strictures of the FHA. Arapahoe's second assignment of error was that the Court erred by enjoining enforcement of the ordinance against Brooke because Brooke's accommodation is not reasonable and necessary. The Court found that Brooke failed to meet his burden of proof that his requested accommodation is necessary for him to receive the same enjoyment from his home as a non-disabled person would receive. Brooke already owned another dog and the ordinance only covered certain dog breeds. Brooke's other claims for relief were remanded to the district court. In conclusion, the district court erred in entering a declaratory judgment and enjoining Arapahoe from enforcing the ordinance as applied to Brooke. | Case | |
| WV - Licenses - § 7-7-6d. Collection of head tax on dogs; duties of assessor and sheriff; | W. Va. Code, § 7-7-6d | WV ST § 7-7-6d | This West Virginia statute provides that it is the duty of the county assessor at the time of assessment of the personal property within such county, to assess and collect a head tax of one dollar on each male or spayed female dog and of two dollars on each unspayed female dog. In addition to the above, the assessor and his deputies shall have the further duty of collecting any such head tax on dogs as may be levied by the ordinances of each and every municipality within the county. The tax also serves the function of providing a registration for the dog. Any person who refuses to pay the tax after a specified period may have his or her dog seized, which may then be sold or eventually destroyed. | Statute | |
| US - Apes - Great Apes Conservation Act of 2000 | 16 USC 6301 - 6305 | The law assists in the conservation of great apes by supporting and providing financial resources for the conservation programs of countries within the range of great apes. Under the law, Great apes include the chimpanzee, gorilla, bonobo, orangutan, and gibbon. The law authorizes the Secretary of the Interior, through the Director of the Fish and Wildlife Service, to award grants to entities that will promote the conservation of great apes in the wild. The authorization for appropriations is $5 million per year through 2005 with 3% or $80,000, whichever is greater, expended to administer the grants program. | Statute | ||
| COLUMBUS R. CO. v. WOOLFOLK | 58 S.E. 152 (Ga.1907) | 128 Ga. 631, 10 L.R.A.N.S. 1136, 119 Am.St.Rep. 404 (1907) |
In this Georgia case, Woolfolk brought a suit to recover the value of a dog that he alleged was willfully and wantonly killed by the running of a street car on defendant's line of road. The defendant demurred specially to the paragraph that alleged the value of the dog to be $200. Defendant argued that the measure of damages could not be based on the value of the dog because dogs have no market value. The court disagreed, first noting that, by the common law a dog is property, for an injury to which an action will lie and the modern trend is to value dogs in the same way other domestic animals are valued. Further, the court found a "better rule" for ascertaining the measure of damages: “The value of a dog may be proved, as that of any other property, by evidence that he was of a particular breed, and had certain qualities, and by witnesses who knew the market value of such animal, if any market value be shown. Judgment affirmed.
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