Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| NY - Exotic Pets - Chapter 69 Of the Consolidated Laws. | McKinney's Agriculture and Markets Law § 370 | NY AGRI & MKTS § 370 | This New York law provides that any person who owns or possesses a wild animal or reptile capable of inflicting bodily harm upon a human being, who fails to exercise due care in safeguarding the public from attack by such wild animal or reptile, is guilty of a misdemeanor. The punishment for violation is imprisonment for not more than one year, or by a fine of not more than five hundred dollars, or by both. The second part of the law imposes strict liability upon owners of dangerous wild animals. | Statute |
| U.S. v. McDougall | 25 F.Supp.2d 85 (N.D.N.Y. 1998) |
Defendants Goodfriend and Benney, commercial fishermen licensed pursuant to the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation ("DEC"), are charged with catching and failing to return substantial quantities of eel and walleye from Lake Ontario and New York waters in violation of New York law that prohibits commerce in these fish because of health and conservation concerns. Aware of the ban prohibiting the sale of eel and walleye taken from these waters, Goodfriend and Benney subsequently sold the eel and walleye to a host of fish wholesalers and retailers, located within and outside New York. Defendant truck driver's alleged filing of false Canadian customs forms relating to eel and walleye he was transporting from the U.S. to his Canadian employer were violations of the Lacey Act, regardless of whether these acts violated Canadian law. |
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| Webb v. Avon | [2017] EWHC 3311 | This case addressed the power of the court to make a contingent destruction order under Section 4B of the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991 (as amended). These orders allow dangerous dogs to be released and kept under strict conditions. The court held that the 19991 Act is not clear as to the breadth of who these conditions apply to, but considered that dangerous dogs may only be released to their owners or other persons properly identified as being in charge. The case was remitted to the Crown Court for further determination. The court also addressed other aspects of the 1991 Act along with the Dangerous Dogs Exemption Schemes (England and Wales) Order 2015. | Case | |
| Com. v. Kneller | 971 A.2d 495 (Pa.Super.,2009) | 2009 WL 215322 (Pa.Super.), 2009 PA Super 18 | Defendant appealed a conviction for criminal conspiracy to commit cruelty to animals after Defendant provided a gun and instructed her boyfriend to shoot and kill their dog after the dog allegedly bit Defendant’s child. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania reversed the conviction, finding the relevant animal cruelty statute to be ambiguous, thus requiring the reversal under the rule of lenity. Concurring and dissenting opinions were filed, in which both agreed that the statute is unambiguous as to whether a dog owner may destroy his or her dog by use of a firearm when that dog has attacked another person, but disagreed as to whether sufficient evidence was offered to show that the dog in fact attacked another person. (See Supreme Court order - Com. v. Kneller, 978 A.2d 716, 2009 WL 5154265 (Pa.,2009)). | Case |
| State v. Cochran | 365 S.W.3d 628 (Mo.App. W.D., 2012) | 2012 WL 1499893 (Mo.App. W.D.) |
Prompted by a phone call to make a return visit to the defendant's house, the Missouri Department of Agriculture and Animal Control were asked, by the defendant, to wait at the door. After waiting by the door for some time, the officers discovered the defendant in the backyard, where she housed at least eleven dogs, trying to remove dog excrement from a pen and trying to remove ice from dog bowls. After further investigation, the defendant was charged with one count of animal abuse and with one count of violating a city ordinance for failure to vaccinate. At the trial, the defendant was convicted on both accounts. On appeal, however, the defendant was found guilty of animal abuse, but was cleared from the ordinance violation. |
Case |
| RI - Equine Activity Liability - Chapter 21. Exemption from Liability Arising from Equine Activities | Gen. Laws, 1956 § 4-21-1 to 4 | RI ST § 4-21-1 to 4 | This Rhode Island section provides that an equine professional, or any other person, shall not be liable for an injury to or the death of a participant resulting from the inherent risks of equine activities unless the equine activity sponsor, professional or other person are demonstrated to have failed to exercise due care under the circumstances towards the participant. Liability is not limited by this statute where the equine professional knowingly provided faulty tack or equipment, failed to make reasonable and prudent efforts to determine the ability of the participant to engage safely in the equine activity, owns or otherwise is in lawful possession of the land or facilities upon which the participant sustained injuries because of a known, dangerous latent condition, or if he or she commits an act or omission that constitutes willful or wanton disregard for the safety of the participant or intentionally injures the participant. | Statute |
| NC - Licenses - Chapter 160A. Cities and Towns. | N.C.G.S.A. § 160A-212 | NC ST § 160A-212 | This North Carolina statute provides that a city shall have power to levy an annual license tax on the privilege of keeping any domestic animal, including dogs and cats, within the city. However, this section shall not limit the city's authority to enact related ordinances. | Statute |
| Rivero v. Humane Soc. of Fayette County | Slip Copy, 2009 WL 18704 (W.D.Pa.) | Plaintiffs brought action against Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging Defendants violated their First and Fourth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution after Defendant dog control officers removed Plaintiffs’ dog from their home during an investigation into a report of a dead dog. The United States District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania granted Defendant Township’s motion for partial summary judgment, finding that Plaintiffs’ allegations, standing alone, do not state a claim against Defendant-Township, and that Plaintiffs failed to provide any factual support for their state law claims. | Case | |
| Eureka Township v. Petter | Not Reported in N.W.2d, 2017 WL 3863144 (Minn.Ct.App. 2017) | 2017 WL 3863144 | In this case, the Township brought action against property owners to enjoin the owners from possessing exotic animals on the property, operating an animal exhibition on the property, and operating a business pelting exotic animals on the property. The District Court invalidated the township's exotic animal ordinance as conflicting with state statute, determined that an animal exhibition was not a permissible use under the township's zoning ordinance, and permanently enjoined the owners from operating an animal exhibition and conducting any retail sales, except for horticultural products produced on the property. This court held that the exotic animals ordinance did not conflict with state statute nor was it preempted. Further, this court held that the property owners' grandfathered possession and exhibition of exotic animals was limited to one wolf; animal control officer exception to exotic animal possession was limited to temporary possession of exotic animals in conjunction with owner's work as an animal control officer; township was not estopped from enforcing its exotic animal ordinance; and interpreting zoning ordinance's language to require sale of horticultural products from the land itself was not inherently unreasonable. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded; motion dismissed. | Case |
| Johnson v. Douglas | 734 N.Y.S.2d 847 (Mem) (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept. 2001) | 289 A.D.2d 202 (2001) |
Plaintiff appealed an order denying her claim to emotional distress damages presumably for the death of her dog. The court held that it is well established that a pet owner in New York cannot recover damages for emotional distress caused by the negligent killing of a dog. |
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