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Displaying 41 - 50 of 6638
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| LA - Dog - Consolidated Dog Laws | LSA-R.S. 13:5544 - 45; LSA-R.S.3:2451 - 2778; LSA-R.S. 56:124.1, 141; LSA-R.S. § 40:1269.1 - 4; LSA-R.S. 49:165 | These statutes comprise Louisiana's dog laws. Included among the provisions are dangerous dog laws, impoundment provisions, and the relevant licensing requirements. | Statute | |
| Sentencia T-760, 2007 | Sentencia T-760/07 | The Plaintiff brought an action of ‘tutela’ (Constitutional mechanism that is preferential and summary created for the purpose of protection of fundamental rights) against Corporación Autónoma Regional de Caldas ‘CORPOCALDAS’, arguing that ‘CORPOCALDAS’ had violated the fundamental rights to health, personal integrity, life and human integrity of the Plaintiff’s wife, who became severely depressed when the Defendant confiscated an amazonian parrot she kept as her pet. The Plaintiff argued that the parrot was the only company the Plaintiff’s wife had for over five years, and that the confiscation of their parrot, was a violation of the Plaintiff's wife's fundamental rights. Furthermore, the Plaintiff argued that his wife was 65 years old, had raised the parrot that was never abused or neglected and who was allowed to move freely as her wings were never trimmed. The Plaintiff sought the the return of the parrot by the environmental authority ‘CORPOCALDAS’ to his wife, as well as the granting of the parrot’s title to her. The Court was able to find that the Plaintiff’s wife’s health was indeed diminished after the confiscation of the bird and the she had to undergo treatment as a result of it. However, the court found that the Plaintiffs were unable to provide evidence tending to prove that they had acquired the animal in a legal manner, as no permit, hunting license, or evidence that the parrot was obtained from a legal breeder were provided. The court determined that CORPOCALDAS did not overstep its responsibilities, as it is its duty to protect the wild fauna of the nation. Touching on the issue of whether the the fundamental rights of the plaintiff had been violated, the court concluded there was not such violation, as the environmental authority’s action was legal, reasonable, necessary and legitimate, and the Plaintiff did not obtained the parrot in accordance with the requirements legally established. In this case, the collective right to a healthy environment prevailed over the personal interest of the Plaintiff. The Constitutional Court affirmed the judgment of the ‘Juzgado Segundo Laboral del Circuito de Manizales’. | Case | |
| OR - Domestic Violence - 107.718. Court order when petitioner in imminent danger of abuse (allows pets) | O.R.S. § 107.718 | OR ST § 107.718 | Under this Oregon law, if requested by a petitioner who has been the victim of domestic abuse, the court may enter an order to protect a companion or therapy animal. This includes an order to "[p]revent the neglect and protect the safety of any service or therapy animal or any animal kept for personal protection or companionship, but not an animal kept for any business, commercial, agricultural or economic purpose." | Statute |
| MO - Dogs - Consolidated Dog Laws | V.A.M.S. 253.185; 270.010; 272.050; 273.010 - 405; 77.510; 80.090; 322.010 - 080; 10.112 - 113 | MO ST 253.185; 270.010; 272.050; 273.010 - 405; 77.510; 80.090; 322.010 - 080; 10.112 - 113 | These Missouri statutes comprise the state's dog laws. Among the provisions include laws for impounding loose dogs, licensing, rabies control, and the Animal Care Facilities Act, which regulates commercial breeders/pet shops. | Statute |
| United States v. Charette | 893 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir., 2018) | 2018 WL 3117903, 18 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6479 (9th Cir. June 26, 2018) | Defendant Charette was convicted by bench trial of taking a grizzly bear behind his home in Montana in violation of the federal Endangered Species Act. On appeal, defendant challenges his conviction on three grounds: (1) there was insufficient evidence to infer that he did not have a permit to take the grizzly bear; (2) his request for a jury trial was improperly denied; and (3) the lower court incorrectly analyzed his self-defense claim under an objective standard as opposed to the correct subjective standard. On appeal here, the court observed that the plain language of the ESA and legislative history makes it clear that permits and exceptions under the ESA are affirmative defenses, and not elements of the crime. In this case, Charette had the burden of proving the existence of a valid permit, which he did not do at trial. The court also quickly dispensed with the Sixth Amendment jury trial issue, finding that the taking of a grizzly bear is a petty offense. As to defendant's last argument on his self-defense claim, this court did find that the trial court erred in applying an objectively reasonable standard. This error was not harmless because it affected defendant's decision to testify as to his subjective belief in the need for self-defense. As a result, this court reversed the district court's decision, vacated defendant's conviction, and remanded the case for further proceedings. | Case |
| Mahtani v. Wyeth | Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2011 WL 2609857 (D.N.J.) |
After some plaintiffs alleged their dogs suffered harmed as a result of using a tick and flea treatment medication, while others alleged the product was ineffective, plaintiffs sought to gain class certification in their lawsuit against a pharmaceutical company. Since the district court found that individual inquiry into questions of fact predominated over inquiry into facts common to class members regarding the plaintiffs’ New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, Unjust Enrichment and Breach of Warranty claims, the plaintiff’s motion for class certification was denied. |
Case | |
| IA - Dog License - 351.27. Right to kill tagged dog | I. C. A. § 351.27 | IA ST § 351.27 | This Iowas statute makes it lawful for any person to kill a dog, wearing a collar with a rabies vaccination tag attached, when the dog is caught in the act of worrying, chasing, maiming, or killing any domestic animal or fowl, or when such dog is attacking or attempting to bite a person. | Statute |
| MO - Liberty - Breed - Sec. 4-24. - Keeping of pit bull dogs prohibited. | LIBERTY, MO., CITY CODE §§ 4-24 - 4-25 (2010) |
In Liberty, Missouri, it is be unlawful to keep, harbor, own or possess any pit bull dog, with exceptions for pit bull dogs already residing in the city. Such dogs may remain as long as the owner complies with certain requirements, such as proper registration, proper confinement, the use of a leash and muzzle, the posting of "Beware of Dog-Pit Bull," keeping $50,000 liability insurance, and taking identification photographs. Any dog found to be the subject of a violation may be subject to seizure and impoundment. |
Local Ordinance | |
| Hatfield v. Bd. of Supervisors of Madison Cty. | 235 So.3d 18 (Miss. Aug. 10, 2017) | 2017 WL 3452426 (Miss. Aug. 10, 2017) | This Mississippi Supreme Court decision considers the construction of a zoning ordinance that prohibits the "keeping or raising poultry" in the "R-1 Residential District" of Madison County. The property owner, Hatfield, was found to be violating R-1 by the Madison County Board of Supervisors after county officials found around 60 "ducks, geese and other fowl" on this property. Hatfield appealed this decision to the Circuit Court as arbitrary and capricious based on an unconstitutionally vague ordinance section. The Circuit Court, as the reviewing appellate body for the ordinance violation, found the Board's decision was supported by evidence and not arbitrary or capricious. On appeal by Hatfield, the Supreme Court first observed that there are two districts in appellant's subdivision: Agricultural and Residential. In the Agricultural Districts, breeding, raising, and feeding fowl is an expressly permitted use. Appellant lives the zoned Residential Estate District. While the R-1 zoning allows "livestock" and "grazing livestock" on tracts of land one acre or greater, it does not allow the breeding, raising, and feeding chickens, ducks, or other fowl as a permitted use. Hatfield suggested that grazing/livestock section (Section 601) could be interpreted to include poultry, fowl, and/or birds. However, the Supreme Court found that position unreasonable since the examples listed in the code section are "obviously limited to large, four-legged, hoofed animals." This is further supported by the fact raising fowl is expressly permitted in one district, but not the other. Thus, the Ordinance was sufficiently clear and not manifestly unreasonable. The circuit court's decision was affirmed. | Case |
| Journal of Animal Law Table of Contents Volume 4 |
Published by the students of Michigan State University College of LawJournal of Animal Law Vol. IV (2008)The table of contents is provided below. |
Policy |