Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| AU - Rural Lands Protection Act 1998 (NSW) | Rural Lands Protection Act 1998 |
An Act to provide for the protection of rural lands; to provide for the establishment of the State Policy Council of Livestock Health and Pest Authorities and the constitution of livestock health and pest authorities and the State Management Council of Livestock Health and Pest Authorities and for the functions of those bodies; to regulate travelling stock reserves, stock watering places and the transportation of stock by vehicle; to provide for the control of certain pests; and for other purposes. |
Statute | |
| Haviland v. Butz | 543 F.2d 169 (D.C. Cir. 1976) | 543 F.2d 169, 36 A.L.R. Fed. 615, 177 U.S.App.D.C. 22 |
This case addresses whether the Secretary of Agriculture intended to include “animal acts” under the AWA. Animal acts are any performance of animals where such animals are trained to perform some behavior or action or are part of a show, performance, or exhibition. Defendant presented an animal act with dogs and ponies to paying audiences and occasionally appeared on commercial television. Defendant asserted that he did not “exhibit” animals simply by showing dogs and ponies and argued that the Secretary unconstitutionally added “animal acts” to the AWA. The court held that the inclusion of “animal acts” was authorized as“[t]he words ‘includes’ and ‘such as’ [in the AWA] point convincingly to the conclusion that the listing of types of exhibitions in the statutory text was intended to be but partial and illustrative.” |
Case |
| Humane Society v. Merriam | 2007 WL 333309 (D.Minn.) |
Minnesota allowed trapping and snaring activities. Plaintiffs sued the state, arguing that this policy was causing the death of some endangered Canada lynx, in violation of the Endangered Species Act. The plaintiffs and defendants had the case dismissed after they agreed that Minnesota would seek a permit from the Fish and Wildlife Service under the Endangered Species Act, and that conservation measures would be taken for the protection of the lynx. |
Case | |
| England, Wales & Scotland - Wildlife, badgers - Protection of Badgers Act 1992 | 1992 CHAPTER 51 | This Act prohibits the deliberate killing, injuring or capturing of a wild badger; and any interfering with badger setts (and the attempt to do so). General exemptions are provided, and licenses may be issued for the taking and killing of badgers (for example, as obtained for recent badger culls). | Statute | |
| WY - Cruelty - Consolidated Cruelty Statutes | W.S.1977 § 6-3-1001 - 1010; § 6-4-601 | WY ST § 6-3-1001 - 1010; § 6-4-601 | This compilation of laws contains Wyoming's anti-cruelty provisions that were amended in 2021. Under the new laws, a person commits cruelty to animals if the person knowingly overrides an animal or drives an animal when overloaded; intentionally or knowingly, unnecessarily injures or beats an animal; or knowingly carries an animal in a manner that poses undue risk of injury or death. Additionally, a person has the charge or custody of any animal under circumstances that manifest "extreme indifference" to the animal's safety, health or life, and fails to provide it with listed necessities, abandons the animal, fails to provide the animal with appropriate care in the case of immediate and obvious serious injury or illness also commits cruelty to animals. Other prohibitions include animal fighting, shooting or poisoning livestock or domestic animals on property where the animal is authorized to be. A first offense of cruelty to animals or of a violation of W.S. 6-3-1003 is a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more than six months, a fine of not more than $750.00, or both, with enhanced penalties for subsequent convictions. Felony cruelty to animals occurs when a person commits cruelty to animals as defined in W.S. 6-3-1002(a)(v) through (ix), that results in the death or required euthanasia of the animal; or (ii) knowingly, and with intent to cause death or undue suffering, beats with cruelty, tortures, torments or mutilates an animal. Such acts incur permanent forfeiture of the animal at issue and imprisonment for not more than two years and/or a fine of up to $5,000. With either misdemeanor or felony convictions, the court may order forfeiture of the animals involved, payment of reasonable costs of animal impoundment, and restraints on future ownership of animals. A bestiality law was also enacted in 2021 that prohibits actors from engaging in sexual acts with animals. Violation is a misdemeanor with punishment of up to one year imprisonment and/or a fine of up to $1,000. | Statute |
| AK - Veterinary - Chapter 98. Veterinarians. | AS § 08.98.010 to 250 | AK ST § 08.98.010 to 250 | These are the state's veterinary practice laws. Among the provisions include licensing requirements, laws concerning the state veterinary board, veterinary records laws, and the laws governing disciplinary actions for impaired or incompetent practitioners. | Statute |
| Sarah, Keeli, Ivy, Sheba, Darrell, Harper, Emma, Rain, Ulysses, Henry Melvyn Richardson, Stephany Harris, and Klaree Boose, plai | In this case, plaintiffs are non-human primates and humans interested in their welfare. The primates were formerly part of a research program run at Ohio State University for cognition research (the OSU Chimpanzee Cognition Center). After funding ran out, OSU sold the chimpanzees to Primarily Primates Inc. (“PPI”), who held themselves out to be non-profit that acts a sanctuary for retiring animals. However, plaintiffs allege that the conditions in which the chimpanzees were housed were inadequate and proper care was not provided to the primates (several of the animals died in transit and at the facility). Plaintiffs sued for breach of contract or, in the alternative, a declaratory judgment that would transfer the animals to a new sanctuary because defendants’ actions are unlawful under Texas laws. Plaintiffs also sought a temporary restraining order that would allow a team of independent caretakers and veterinarians to assess the current conditions at PPI and prevent them from accepting any new primates, among other things. | Pleading | ||
| U.S. v. Lewis | 240 F.3d 866 (10th Cir. 2001) | 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 859; 2001 Colo. J. C.A.R. 600 |
A jury convicted defendant of one count of violating the Lacey Act, 16 U.S.C.S. §§ 3371-3378. The jury found that defendant had violated Oklahoma law by capturing wild elk, holding them captive, and organizing at least one commercial elk hunt, without a license for those activities. The court affirmed. Violation of a state hunting law was an adequate basis for a Lacey Act prosecution. There was sufficient evidence to prove that the Oklahoma statute regarding commercial hunting licenses applied to defendant, and that defendant had knowledge of the statute's requirements. |
Case |
| Wells v. Brown | 217 P.2d 995 (Cal.App.4.Dist. 1950) | 97 Cal.App.2d 361 (1950) |
In this California case, damages were assessed beyond the purchase price of a dog involved in a hit and run case where the defendant negligently ran over and killed a 15 month old pure-bred Waeimaraner. After the defendant ran over the dog, he shot the dog and buried it. The next morning he contacted the veterinarian listed on the collar, as well as the owner of the dog. The court upheld the jury verdict of $1,500 since the purchase price was determined to not reflect the market value at the time of the dog’s death. |
Case |
| SAM LAMBERT & ANDRIA LAMBERT v. SALLY MORRIS & STEVE HAIR | --- S.E.2d ----, 2018 WL 6314142 (N.C. Ct. App. Dec. 4, 2018) | Plaintiffs Sam Lambert and Andria Lambert appeal the trial court's granting of summary judgment in this lost dog case. Specifically, plaintiffs filed an action against defendants Sally Morris and Steve Hair alleging conversion, civil conspiracy, unfair and deceptive trade practices, and intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress, as well as injunctive relief and damages related to the disappearance of their dog, Biscuit. Biscuit went missing in August of 2015. After searching for Biscuit for several days, plaintiffs contacted the local animal control and posted Biscuit as a lost dog on animal control's unofficial Facebook page. Over a month later, a citizen brought Biscuit (who had no microchip or collar on) to animal control where she was placed in a holding cell. After the 72-hour hold, Biscuit was transferred to the Humane Society. Biscuit was spayed and examined by a veterinarian, and a picture was posted on the Humane Society website. At the vet exam, tumors were discovered in Biscuit's mammary glands and so surgery was performed, some of it paid for by defendant Hair. Hair eventually adopted Biscuit. Almost a year later, plaintiffs found an old picture of Biscuit on the Humane Society Facebook page and attempted to claim Biscuit. Defendant Hair learned of this and requested that plaintiffs reimburse for veterinary expenses, to which they agreed. After some discussion, Hair learned plaintiffs had over 14 dogs and refused to return Biscuit without a home inspection. That caused a heated discussion and the meeting between plaintiffs and defendant ended without the dog returning. About a month later, plaintiffs filed suit against defendants, whereupon defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. On appeal here, the court first noted that, per state law, an animal shelter hold a lost or abandoned dog for at least 72-hours. Here, animal control satisfied its legal duty by keeping Biscuit in custody for the required holding period before transferring her to the Humane Society. Thus, plaintiffs lost any ownership rights to Biscuit after the 72-hour mark. Moreover, almost a month had passed between the time Biscuit was taken in by animal control and the formal adoption by defendant Hair at the Humane Society. As a result, the court found that Hair was the rightful owner of Biscuit and was entitled to negotiate with plaintiffs as he saw fit. Thus, no genuine issues of material fact existed for plaintiffs at trial. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to defendants and dismissing plaintiffs’ claims. | Case |