Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Animal Legal Defense Fund v. United States Department of Agriculture | 2016 WL 7235624 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2016) |
Foie gras is a food product made from the liver of a duck or goose. To create it, the duck or goose is force-fed a special mix of food which causes a large buildup of fat in the bird's liver. This gives the product its signature taste. Plaintiffs, Animal Legal Defense Fund, comprised of four animal rights organizations and three individuals. The Defendant, United States Department of Agriculture, comprised of the Food Safety and Inspection Services (FSIS), and two individuals. Plaintiff Animal Legal Defense Fund asked Defendant (FSIS) to initiate rulemaking under the Poultry Products Inspection Act (PPIA) “to exclude Foie gras from the food supply as an adulterated and diseased product.” They argued that the force-feeding process could cause infections and illnesses for the animals and the consumption of the birds could trigger the onset of illness and disease in humans. FSIS denied the petition to ban the food product. The Plaintiff Animal Legal Defense Fund then filed this action for judicial review. Defendant FSIS argued that the Plaintiffs lacked Article III standing, that the PPIA does not protect the interests asserted by the animal rights organizations, and that in any event, FSIS acted within its discretion in denying the petition. The United States District Court, C.D. California concluded that the Plaintiff, Animal Legal Defense Fund had standing to bring this action and that their interests fell within the “zone” of interests protected by the PPIA. However, the Court also held that Defendants, United States Department of Agriculture, did not act arbitrarily, capriciously, or contrary to law in denying the petition. Accordingly, the Court Granted the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, and Denied Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment. |
Case | ||
| Romero v. Bexar County | 993 F.Supp.2d 658 (W.D. Tex. 2014) | Several reports to the police were made that a man had threatened several individuals with a firearm. In responding to the calls, the police identified the plaintiff pet owner as the allegedly armed man. Officers then proceeded to the plaintiff’s home and acknowledged that they saw a “Beware of Dogs” sign, but still entered the fenced-in premises. Upon entering the yard, four dogs approached and one of the officers shot and killed one of the dogs. The plaintiff brought suit against the officer and municipality and alleged violations of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. In evaluating the officer’s claim of qualified immunity, the court held that the officer’s actions were objectively reasonable, considering he had reason to believe the plaintiff may be armed and dangerous and claimed “several large dogs ran out aggressively charging, barking and growling.” The officer’s relation of events was backed up by his fellow officer on the scene. | Case | ||
| US - Marine Mammals - Taking of Marine Mammals Incidental to Commercial Fishing Operations | 1999 WL 379911 (F.R.) |
NMFS proposes regulations to implement provisions of the International Dolphin Conservation Program Act (IDCPA). These regulations would allow the entry of yellowfin tuna into the United States under certain conditions from nations signatory to the International Dolphin Conservation Program (IDCP) that otherwise would be under embargo. |
Administrative | ||
| IA - Ordinances - 331.381. Duties relating to services | I. C. A. § 331.381 | IA ST § 331.381 | This Iowa statute states that the county board shall provide for the seizure, impoundment, and disposition of dogs in accordance with chapter 351. | Statute | |
| Com. v. Linhares | 957 N.E.2d 243 (Mass.App.Ct., 2011) | 80 Mass.App.Ct. 819 (2011); 2011 WL 5517133 (Mass.App.Ct.) |
Defendant intentionally hit a duck with his car and was convicted of cruelty to animals. The conviction was upheld by the Appeals Court because all that must be shown is that the defendant intentionally and knowingly did acts which were plainly of a nature to inflict unnecessary pain. Specific intent to cause harm is not required to support a conviction of cruelty to animals. |
Case | |
| Humane Society of the United States v. Kempthorne | 579 F.Supp.2d 7 (D.D.C. 2008) | 68 ERC 1146 (2008) |
Environmental and wildlife organizations brought challenge under the Endangered Species Act [ESA] against a final rule promulgated by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service [FWS] designating the Western Great Lakes distinct population segment of gray wolves and simultaneously delisting it from the ESA. The court vacated and remanded the Rule to the Fish and Wildlife Service because the ESA was ambiguous about whether it authorized the FWS to simultaneously designate and delist a distinct population segment. There was no Chevron deference due. |
Case | |
| White v Diocese of Buffalo, N.Y | 138 A.D.3d 1470 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016) | 2016 WL 1710974 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016) | Plaintiff, Rosemary White brought action against the Defendant, Sacred Heart Roman Catholic Church seeking damages for injuries she sustained when she was bitten by a priests’ dog, at premises owned by the church. White brought the action claiming negligent supervision and retention of the priest who owned dog. The church moved to dismiss, and White moved for summary judgment. The New York Supreme Court, Erie County, granted the church's motion for dismissal, and denied White’s motion. White appealed and the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, held that the church was not liable for negligent supervision or retention of the priest. The Appellate Division, reasoned that the Supreme Court, Erie County, properly granted the church’s motion to dismiss White’s complaint for failure to state a cause of action. The Court stated that to the extent White alleged a theory of negligent supervision and retention of the priest in her bill of particulars, the “purpose of the bill of particulars is to amplify the pleadings . . . , and [it] may not be used to supply allegations essential to a cause of action that was not pleaded in the complaint.” Therefore, the order from the Supreme Court was affirmed. | Case | |
| KY - Lien, veterinary - 376.470 Veterinarian's lien | KRS § 376.470 | KY ST § 376.470 | This Kentucky law states that any licensed veterinarian who performs professional services for an animal, by contract with, or by the written consent of, the owner or authorized agent shall have a lien on the animal to secure the cost of the service provided. The priority for the liens filed under this law is based upon when the first lien was filed. | Statute | |
| US - Funding State - Pittman-Roberson Act (Chapter 5B. Wildlife Restoration) | 16 USC 669 - 669l | The Pittman-Robertson Wildlife Restoration Act authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to cooperate with the States, through their respective State fish and game departments, in wildlife-restoration projects. However, no money shall be expended until the state in question assents to the provisions of this chapter and has passed laws for the conservation of wildlife, which includes a prohibition against the diversion of license fees paid by hunters for any other purpose than the administration of the fish and game department. | Statute | ||
| Gibson v. Rezvanpour | 601 S.E.2d 848 (Ga. 2004) | 268 Ga. App. 377 (Ga. 2004) |
The prospective buyer of a home was bitten by the homeowner's dog. The prospective buyer filed a claim against the homeowners, real estate agents, real estate brokers and the real estate agency. The State Court entered summary judgment in favor of Defendants and the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. |
Case |