Results
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Author | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
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Baldwin v. Fish and Game Commission of Montana | 98 S.Ct. 1852(1978) | 436 U.S. 371 (1978) |
Appellants brought this action for declaratory and other relief claiming that the Montana statutory elk-hunting license scheme, which imposes substantially higher (at least 7 1/2 times) license fees on nonresidents of the State than on residents, and which requires nonresidents (but not residents) to purchase a "combination" license in order to be able to obtain a single elk, denies nonresidents their constitutional rights guaranteed by the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Art. IV, § 2, and by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court held that the Privileges and Immunity Clause is not implicated, as access to recreational hunting is not fundamental and Montana has provided equal access for both residents and non-residents. Further, the statutory scheme does not violate the Equal Protection Clause because the state has demonstrated a rational relationship between the increased fee to non-residents (i.e., protection of a finite resource (elk) where there has been a substantial increase in non-resident hunters). |
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Bald & Golden Eagle Protection Act (BGEPA) | Rebecca Wisch |
Brief Summary of the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act
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Topical Introduction | ||
Balch v. Newberry | 208 Okla. 46, 253 P.2d 153, 35 A.L.R.2d 1267, 1953 OK 23 | 208 Okla. 46, 253 P.2d 153, 35 A.L.R.2d 1267, 1953 OK 23 |
In this Oklahoma case, plaintiff purchased a pointer dog for a payment of $800 cash, whom he purchased for breeding purposes. Plaintiff alleged, that for several years prior to March 24, 1947, defendant was engaged in the business of breeding and selling thoroughbred pointer bird dogs at Tulsa, Oklahoma, and that plaintiff had for many years been engaged in the business of operating kennels. In affirming the judgment for plaintiff, the court held that the purchase of a dog with the knowledge of the seller that it is bought exclusively for breeding purposes gives rise to a warranty of fitness for such purpose where the buyer relies upon the seller's skill and judgment that the dog is fit for such purpose. Where a sale of highly bred stud dog for breeding purposes is rescinded for breach of an implied warranty, because of sterility, the purchaser can recover what he paid under the contract and expenses necessarily incident to caring for the dog but he cannot, in addition, recover damages for the breach of the implied warranty of the dog's usefulness for breeding purposes. |
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Bal Harbour Village v. Welsh | 879 So.2d 1265 (Fl. 2004) | 879 So.2d 1265 (Fl. 2004) |
Defendant owned four dogs prior to the enactment of an ordinance prohibiting municipality residents from owning more than two dogs in one household. The municipality brought suit against Defendant for failing to comply with the ordinance. The trial court denied the municipalities prayer for permanent injunctive relief, but the Court of Appeals overruled the decision holding the ordinance could constitutionally be enforced under the police power to abate nuisance. |
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Baker v. SeaWorld Entertainment, Inc. | Slip Copy, 2019 WL 6118448 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 2019) | Plaintiffs brought a securities fraud class action against the collective Defendants, including Seaworld Entertainment, Inc. This action involved statements and omissions made by the Defendants following a 2013 documentary titled Blackfish. The issues centered on the attendance impact that the documentary had on Seaworld. Company-wide attendance declined in 2013 and 2014, however, several officials of the Company made statements that there was no attendance impact resulting from the documentary. Both Plaintiffs and Defendants moved to exclude the testimony of several experts. The Court ultimately affirmed its tentative rulings, denied Defendant’s motion to exclude the testimony of two of Plaintiff’s experts, granted Defendant’s motion to exclude the testimony of Dr. James Gibson, granted in part and denied in part Plaintiff’s motion to exclude the testimony of Dr. Craig Lewis, granted Plaintiff’s motion to exclude the testimony of Dr. Randolph Bucklin, and denied Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. | Case | ||
Baker v. Middleton (unpublished opinion) | No. 29D05-0605-SC-1055 (Ind. Super. Ct. Mar. 2, 2007) | unpublished opinion | In Baker , the defendant fed and watered four cats that lived in the neighborhood. These cats damaged the plaintiff’s home, destroying insulation, a vapor barrier, and duct work. The cats also urinated and defecated in the crawl space of the home. In the Superior Court, the plaintiff argued that a town ordinance and a county ordinance independently imposed a duty on the defendant to control the cats and prevent them from damaging the plaintiff's property. The court found, however, that since the defendant was participating in a Trap Neuter and Release program, the county ordinance could not serve as a basis for finding that the defendant was negligent in caring for the feral cats. The court went on to reject two alternative theories of negligence also proffered by the plaintiff. The plaintiff had therfore failed to establish that the defendant was negligent in her actions and judgment was entered in favor of the defendant. | Case | |
Baker v. McIntosh | 132 S.W.3d 230 (Ky. 2004) |
Visitor to horse farm brought action for negligence when he was injured by owners colt. Held: the owner had no duty to prevent the colt from falling against the trailer door, nor did he have a duty to warn the visitor of the potential for such an accident to occur. |
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Bailment and Veterinary Malpractice: Doctrinal Exclusivity, of Not? | Katie J.L. Scott | 55 Hastings L.J. 1009 (March, 2004) |
This Note argues that treating bailment and veterinary malpractice as mutually exclusive is neither necessary nor desirable. In doing so, it first gives an overview of animals' status as property, the doctrine of bailment, and veterinary malpractice. Second, the seminal case discrediting bailment in favor of veterinary malpractice, Price v. Brown, [FN6] is discussed. Finally, this Note explores the reasons why bailment and veterinary malpractice should not be treated as mutually exclusive, and why pet owners should be able to recover for negligence by a veterinarian under the doctrine of bailment. |
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Bailey v. Veitch | 814 N.Y.S.2d 459 (N.Y.A.D. 4 Dept.,2006) | 2006 N.Y. Slip Op. 03192 |
In this New York memorandum opinion, the Supreme Court, Appellate Division, held that fact issues remained as to whether injuries sustained by child were caused by dog, and whether defendants knew or should have known of dog's vicious propensities. At the time of the alleged bite, the four-year-old child was alone in a room with the dog and sustained a gaping laceration on her nose and multiple puncture wounds on her face. The court also determined there was an issue of fact as to whether the dog previously displayed vicious tendencies where the dog bit its owner's grandson on the hand two weeks prior to the instant incident. |
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Bacon (Litigation Guardian of) v. Ryan | 1995 CarswellSask 540 | [1996] 3 W.W.R. 215, 27 C.C.L.T. (2d) 308, 138 Sask. R. 297 |
The child plaintiff was bitten on the face by a pitbull owned by the defendants, requiring reconstructive surgery and two days hospitalization and causing permanent scarring. The dog had bitten the owner's young son two weeks earlier while he played near the dog's food dish'; they contemplated having the dog euthanized but decided against it. The plaintiff's mother had heard about the bite incident but brought her daughter of the same age as the owner's son to visit, placing her on the floor where the dog bit her shortly after. The judge held that the defendants knew of the dog's propensity to bite young children but kept it ''at their peril" (suggesting strict liability or scienter, which was not however mentioned); such fault was sufficient to make the owners 2/3 liable for the child's $12,000 plastic surgery costs, pain and mental anguish. The plaintiff's mother was held 1/ contributorily liable for letting her child visit and play on the floor near the dog, knowing of its propensity. |
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