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Title Citation Alternate Citation Agency Citation Summary Type
United States v. Hess 829 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2016) 2016 WL 3878221 (8th Cir.,2016) This case stems from a United States Fish and Wildlife Service's investigation into illegal trafficking of rhinoceros horns and ivory called "Operation Crash." Defendant James Hess, a taxidermist in Maquoketa, Iowa, agreed to sell a pair of lack rhinoceros horns in 2011 to another individual involved in the trafficking operation. As a result of his role, he was charged with one count of Lacey Act Trafficking for knowingly engaging in conduct involving the sale and purchase of wildlife with a market value exceeding $350 that was transported and sold in violation of the Endangered Species Act. Hess was ultimately sentenced to 27 months in prison followed by three years of supervised release. On appeal, Hess first argued that the District Court made an “unsustainable finding on the record presented” when it stated that Hess "helped establish a market for these black rhino horns, and that is a serious offense against the planet." Because Hess failed to object at sentencing, this issue was reviewed for plain error. This court found no plain error, as the record supported the statement that Hess' action contributed to furthering a market for black rhinoceros horns. As to defendant's argument that his sentence was unreasonable, the court found that he failed to overcome the presumption of reasonableness in his bottom of the guidelines sentencing range. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. Case
UK - Riding - Riding Establishments Act 1970 1970 CHAPTER 32

An Act to confer further powers on local authorities with respect to the licensing of riding establishments and to amend the Riding Establishments Act 1964.

Statute
American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals et al v. Ringling Brothers, et al,

This case involves the Ringling Brothers circus company’s mistreatment of elephants brought by the ASPCA. Plaintiffs alleged that the alleged routine beating, chaining, and other mistreatment amounted to an unlawful taking of an endangered species under the Endangered Species Act (ESA). Judge rejects defendants’ motion to dismiss and order the case to proceed.

Pleading
ME - Veterinary - Title 32. Professions and Occupations. 32 M. R. S. A. § 4851 - 4879 ME ST T. 32 § 4851 - 4879 These are the state's veterinary practice laws. Among the provisions include licensing requirements, laws concerning the state veterinary board, veterinary records laws, and the laws governing disciplinary actions for impaired or incompetent practitioners. Statute
US - Food Animal - Twenty Eight Hour Law 49 USC 80502 This Federal law addresses the transportation of animals, including those raised for food or in food production, across state lines. The statute provides that animals cannot be transported by "rail carrier, express carrier or common carrier" (except by air or water) for more than 28 consecutive hours without being unloaded for five hours for rest, water and food. Statute
Expte. N° HC-656/21 - Habeas Corpus en favor del Tortugo Jorge Expte. N° HC-656/21 Jorge is an 80-year-old turtle living in the Municipal Aquarium of Medoza, Argentina. In 2021, three animal lawyers filed a habeas corpus on behalf of Jorge, arguing a violation of the turtle’s right to his locomotive freedom and a violation of Mendoza’s law 7.887, 2018, which prohibits the exhibit of animals in circuses or other events. The lawyers stated that Jorge had to be relocated to a more natural environment where he could live the last years of his life, raising concerns for his age and health. After learning that the government is turning the aquarium into a biodiversity center and after consulting with several experts, the tribunal denied the Habeas Corpus as it found the controversy was moot. It also rejected the idea of releasing Jorge into the wild. However, it is important to mention that the tribunal did not oppose his relocation into a sanctuary so long as his physical integrity was protected. Case
Fortgang v. Woodland Park Zoo 387 P.3d 690 (Wash. Jan. 12, 2017) 2017 WL 121589, 187 Wash. 2d 509, 92846-1, 2017 WL 121589, at *1–11 (Wash. Jan. 12, 2017)

To address the Zoo's growing size and complexity, Defendant Woodland Park Zoo Society (WPZS) entered into an “Operations and Management Agreement” (Agreement) with the City of Seattle. The Agreement gave WPZS exclusive rights and responsibilities regarding many areas such as the care, sale, and purchase of the Zoo's animals. The Agreement also contained several provisions addressing public oversight of the Zoo.  Plaintiff Alyne Fortgang requested several categories of records, all pertaining to the Zoo's elephants. She filed the request under the Public Records Act (PRA), which requires every government agency to make records available for public inspection and copying.  The Zoo's director of Communications and Public Affairs responded to Fortgang's request by asserting that the PRA did not apply because WPZS was a private company. Fortgang filed a lawsuit and alleged that WPZS violated the PRA by refusing to disclose certain records. The trial court granted WPZS's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the action on the ground that WPZS was not an agency subject to PRA disclosure requirements. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court of Washington affirmed the Court of Appeals and held that the Telford test was the proper analytical framework for evaluating the private entity’s disclosure requirement. The Supreme Court reasoned that under the Telford analysis, WPZS was not the functional equivalent of a government agency. The court stated that although the second Telford factor was inconclusive, all the other factors weighed against PRA coverage: (1) WPZS did not perform an inherently governmental function by operating the Zoo; (2) the City did not exercise sufficient control over the Zoo's daily operations to implicate PRA concerns; (3) WPZS was created solely by private individuals and not  government action and (4) because operating a zoo is not a nondelegable, “core” government function, the case did not involve the privatization of fundamentally public services. The Court of Appeals' decision was affirmed.

Case
In re Kulka's Estate 18 P.2d 1036 (1933) 142 Or. 104

This action relates to a court order in an estate case.  The decedent left a legacy in the form of some timber reserves to the Human Society of Portland Oregon "to be used solely for the benefit of animals."  The executor refused to pay the legacy.  This is an appeal from a circuit court decision directing and authorizing Andrew Hansen, executor of the estate of Otto Kulka, deceased, to pay the petitioner a legacy from proceeds in the executor's hands.  The court affirmed the payment of the legacy.

Case
US - Marine Mammals - Endangered Fish and Wildlife; Notice of Intent to Prepare an Environmental Impact Statement 2005 WL 41294 (F.R.) FR Doc. 05-525

NMFS will be preparing an EIS to analyze the potential impacts of applying new criteria in guidelines to determine what constitutes a ``take'' of a marine mammal under the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) and Endangered Species Act (ESA) as a result of exposure to anthropogenic noise in the marine environment. This notice describes the proposed action and possible alternatives and also describes the proposed scoping process.

Administrative
In re: Jennifer Caudill 2013 WL 604009 (U.S.D.A. Feb. 1, 2013) Although the Complaint alleged that Caudill made false or fraudulent statements and/or provided false or fraudulent records to the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), the emphasis in the Complaint suggested that primary reliance was being placed upon the more general determination of unfitness. The Complaint alleged that Respondents (collectively, including Caudill) engaged in activities designed to circumvent an order of the Secretary of Agriculture in revoking the Animal Welfare Act exhibitor's license previously held by Lancelot Kollman Ramos, and have acted as surrogates for Ramos. Caudill and Kalmanson were alleged to continue to act as Ramos's surrogates, and to facilitate the circumvention of his license revocation order. An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found factual support for termination on the grounds of false statements and providing false documents to be lacking. The AJL also found little support for the conclusion that Caudill in any way was operating as a surrogate for Ramos. The ALJ did find that although Caudill had initiated discussions with Ramos concerning the purchase of his animals prior to the effective date of his license revocation, her subsequent consummation of the transaction after his license had been revoked constitutes a violation of 9 C.F.R. § 2.132. In the end, however, the evidence was insufficient to find that Respondent Caudill was unfit to hold an AWA license or that maintenance of a license by her would in any way be contrary to the purposes of the Act Case

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