Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| U.S. v. Taylor | 585 F.Supp. 393 (D.C. Me. 1984) |
The defendant moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that Maine section 7613 (related to the importation of fish bait species) places an impermissible burden on interstate commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. While the court noted there is nothing in either the statute or its legislative history which expresses the clear intent of Congress that the Lacey Act Amendments are meant to insulate state legislation from attack under the Commerce Clause, it found that the somewhat unique characteristics associated with Maine's wild fish population, the substantial uncertainties surrounding the effects these organisms have on fish and the unpredictable consequences attending the introduction of exotic species into Maine's wild fish population (including the introduction of fish parasites into the native population), the state clearly has a legitimate and substantial purpose in prohibiting the importation of live bait fish. |
Case | |
| CÓDIGO PENAL PARA EL DISTRITO FEDERAL | CÓDIGO PENAL PARA EL DISTRITO FEDERAL | Animal cruelty against any animal has been considered a crime Under the Criminal Code of Mexico City since 2014. Chapter IV contains the provisions regarding the crimes committed by acts of cruelty or mistreatment against non-human animals. Article 350 BIS establishes that "whoever intentionally mistreats or cruelly acts against any specimen of any animal species causing injury, damage, or alteration in their health will be punished with one to up to three years of imprisonment and three hundred to five hundred times the Units of Measure and Update. In addition, intentional acts of cruelty or mistreatment that cause the death of an animal will be punished with imprisonment from two years to up to six years and six hundred to twelve hundred times the Units of Measure and Update. The penalties will be increased by up to two-thirds in those cases where methods that cause serious suffering to the animal are used prior to the death. Methods that cause serious suffering are understood as all those that lead to non-immediate death and prolong the animal's agony. Using an animal for sexual purposes is punishable with one to three years in prison and five hundred to a thousand times the Units of Measure and Update. Enhanced Penalties: The sanctions stipulated in this article shall be subject to a one-half increase if, in addition to the acts mentioned above, the individual responsible or any other person captures visual evidence with the purpose of publicly disseminating these acts through any means. The same increase applies to the killing of a companion animal for purposes of human consumption." Other articles in this code concerning animals include Article 54. 76, 226 BIS, and 226 TER. | Statute | |
| Animal Law Index Volume 16, Part 2 |
Animal Law Review, Volume 16, Issue 2 (Spring 2010)
INTRODUCTIONINCORPORATING ANIMAL LAW INTO PRIVATE PRACTICE
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Policy | ||
| People for Ethical Treatment of Property Owners v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife | 57 F.Supp.3d 1337 (D. Utah 2014) | Plaintiff People for the Ethical Treatment of Property Owners (“PETPO”) filed the instant lawsuit against United States Fish and Wildlife Service, Daniel M. Ashe, in his official capacity as Director of the United States Fish and Wildlife Service, Noreen Walsh, in her official capacity as Regional Director of the United States Fish and Wildlife Service's Mountain Prairie Region, the United States Department of the Interior, and Sally Jewell, in her official capacity as Secretary of the Interior (collectively “Defendants”), challenging the constitutional authority of the federal government to regulate take of the Utah prairie dog on non-federal land under the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”). Friends of Animals (“FoA”) intervened as a Defendant. The case before the District Court rests on the parties' opposing motions for summary judgment. The District Court found that although the Commerce Clause authorized Congress to do many things, it did not authorize Congress to regulate takes of a purely intrastate species that had no substantial effect on interstate commerce. Congress similarly lacked authority through the Necessary and Proper Clause because the regulation of takes of Utah prairie dogs was not essential or necessary to the ESA's economic scheme. Therefore PETPO's Motion for Summary Judgment was GRANTED, with prejudice; Defendants' Cross–Motion for Summary Judgment was DENIED, with prejudice. Held 50 C.F.R. § 17.40(g) Unconstitutional | Case | |
| IA - Lost Property - Chapter 556F. Lost Property | I. C. A. § 556F.1 - 18 | IA ST § 556F.1 - 18 | This section comprises Iowa's Lost Property Act. The lost property provisions and procedures cover "any lost goods, money, bank notes, or other things of any description whatever, of the value of five dollars and over." | Statute |
| Hawaii v. Kaneakua | 597 P.2d 590 (Haw. 1979) |
Defendants stipulated that they were involved in cockfights and were prosecuted for numerous violations of § 1109(1)(d), part of Hawaii's cruelty to animals statute. The reviewing court found that the statute was not vague, and was sufficiently definite to satisfy due process with regard to the charge against defendants; nor was the statute overly broad as applied to defendants. |
Case | |
| CA - Horse slaughter - § 597o. Humane transportation of equine to slaughter; vehicle requirements; | West's Ann. Cal. Penal Code § 597o | CA PENAL § 597o | This statute outlines the requirements for transporting equine to slaughter, including, but limited to, proper ventilation, sufficient space for equine to stand, and the use of ramps and floors with nonskid surfaces. | Statute |
| Center for Biological Diversity v. Badgley | 335 F.3d 1097 (C.A.9 (Or.),2003) | 33 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,244, 3 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6393, 2003 Daily Journal D.A.R. 8066 |
The Center for Biological Diversity and eighteen other nonprofit organizations appealed the district court's summary judgment in favor of the United States Fish and Wildlife Service. The Center claimed the Secretary of the Interior violated the Endangered Species Act by making an erroneous, arbitrary, and capricious determination that listing the Northern Goshawk (a short-winged, long-tailed hawk that lives in forested regions of higher latitude in the northern hemisphere and is often considered an indicator species) in the contiguous United States west of the 100th meridian as a threatened or endangered species was not warranted. In the absence of evidence that the goshawk is endangered or likely to become endangered in the foreseeable future, the court found the FWS's decision was not arbitrary or capricious and affirmed the summary disposition. |
Case |
| Ecuador - Environmental - Organic Procedural Code | Ley 0 Registro Oficial Suplemento 506 de 22-may, 2015 | Ecuador's COGEP | This excerpt is from Ecuador's General Procedural. It contains provisions concerning the representation of nature. These provisions state that any person may file a lawsuit claiming damages on behalf of nature. More specifically, under the articles in Chapter II, nature can be legally represented by any person, entity, collectivity, or by the ombudsperson, who may also act on their initiative. Article 30 establishes who can be a plaintiff and a defendant. Nature is within the definition of these parties. | Statute |
| Smith v. State | 491 S.W.3d 864 (Tex. App. 2016), petition for discretionary review refused (Aug. 24, 2016) | 2016 WL 1444143, 14-15-00037-CR, 2016 WL 1444143, (Tex. App.--Hous. [14th Dist.] Apr. 12, 2016) | Defendant Jonas Smith was convicted of aggravated assault and appealed. He argued that the trial court (1) erred by denying his motion to suppress his warrantless arrest; (2) abused its discretion by failing to grant a mistrial after the Plaintiff referenced the Defendant’s previous incarceration; and (3) abused its discretion by allowing a child witness to testify with the assistance of a service dog. The Court of Appeal of Texas, Houston (14th Dist.)., held that: 1. The police officer had probable cause to believe that the defendant committed an act of family violence, which justified his warrantless arrest; 2. any prejudice resulting from the Plaintiff’s reference to Defendant's prior incarceration was cured by prompt jury instruction to disregard reference; 3. allowing the child witness to testify with the assistance of a service dog was not likely to prejudice the jury in evaluating the child's testimony; and 4.any error in allowing the witness to testify with the assistance of a service dog was harmless. The Court of Appeals reasoned that the defendant did not present any argument during the trial about the jury being prejudiced by the presence of the service dog. Therefore, there was nothing present for review at the appellate level. Also, the Defendant did not identify any harm from the use of a service dog. The Defendant’s conviction was affirmed. | Case |