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Displaying 11 - 20 of 6637
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AZ - Veterinary - Chapter 21. Veterinarians. | A. R. S. § 32-2201 - 2297 | AZ ST § 32-2201 - 2297 | These are the state's veterinary practice laws. Among the provisions include licensing requirements, laws concerning the state veterinary board, veterinary records laws, and the laws governing disciplinary actions for impaired or incompetent practitioners. | Statute | |
| US - AWA - House Report on 1970 Amendments to AWA | House Report No. 91-1651 |
By 1970 it was apparent that changes in the law would be required if the goal of humane treatment of animals was to be realized. There were four areas of significant change to the AWA in the 1970 amendments. |
Administrative | ||
| New Hampshire General Laws 1878: Trespasses, Malicious Acts, etc. | 1878 N.H. Laws 281 | The New Hampshire session laws from 1878, chapter 281, covers the state's cruelty to animals laws. Specifically, the law covers cruelty to animals and the treatment of animals during transportation. | Statute | ||
| MS - Veterinarian License - Chapter 39. Veterinarians. Mississippi Veterinary Practice Act. | Miss. Code Ann. § 73-39-77 | MS ST § 73-39-77 (formerly MS ST § 73-39-19) | This Mississippi statutes provides the terms under which a veterinarian can lose his or her license to practice veterinary medicine. | Statute | |
| ID - Exotic - Chapter 39. Importation or Possession of Deleterious Exotic Animals | I.C. § 25-3901 - 3905 | ID ST § 25-3901 - 3905 | In Idaho, all apes and other nonhuman primates are classified as “deleterious exotic animals,” which are dangerous to the environment, livestock, agriculture, or wildlife of the state. According to Idaho’s legislature, it is in the public interest to strictly regulate the importation and possession of those animals. | Statute | |
| State v. Hershey | 401 P.3d 256 ( Or. Ct. App.,2017) | 286 Or.App. 824 , 2017 WL 3045807 | In this Oregon case, defendant appeals his conviction of first-degree animal neglect. Specifically, defendant argues the denial of his motion to suppress evidence was erroneous. The evidence was obtained when the local sheriff (Glerup) entered defendant's property to administer emergency aid to defendant's cattle. During testimony in the motion to suppress, Glerup testified that he first received a call from defendant's neighbors who reported that the cattle appeared to be "starving." That neighbor even called defendant, who assured her that the cattle "were okay" and being cared for by a hired person. Sheriff Glerup called that individual who stated he had not been hired and defendant had been gone a week. The sheriff subsequently received a call that the cattle were in need of immediate aid and in poor condition. These conditions prompted the warrantless search. On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erroneously denied his motion to suppress where the state failed to establish that the warrantless entry was justified under an exception to the warrant requirement. In doing so, defendant contends that the case establishing that the emergency aid doctrine applies to animals (Fessenden) was wrongly decided. This argument was dispensed by the court because it was not properly preserved at trial. Alternatively, defendant argues that the state failed to satisfy the requirements for the emergency aid exception. In reviewing defendant's claim, the court noted that in Fessenden, the emergency aid doctrine justifies warrantless activity, “when law enforcement officers have an objectively reasonable belief, based on articulable facts, that the search or seizure is necessary to render immediate aid or assistance to animals . . ." In this case, the court found that the officer's belief that immediate aid was necessary where the cattle appeared to be "near death" was reasonable. Thus, the trial court did not err when it denied defendant's motion to suppress; defendant's conviction was affirmed. | Case | |
| Hyland v. Borras | 719 A.2d 662 (N.J.Super.A.D., 1998) |
Plaintiff Heather Hyland brought this action for damages after defendants' dog, an American bulldog, trespassed onto plaintiff's property and attacked her ten year old shih tzu, causing serious injuries to the dog. Defendants appeal the award of "repair costs" ($2,500) in excess of the dog's market value or "replacement cost" ($500). In upholding the award, the court distinguished companion animals from other personal property, finding that market value fails to take into account the owner's relationship to the animal. |
Case | ||
| Mejia v. State | 681 S.W.2d 88 (Tex. App. 1984). |
Rooster fighting case. Testimony from the defendant's witness, a sociologist that argued cockfighting is not generally thought of as an illegal activity, was irrelevant in cruelty to animals conviction. Statute is not unconstitutionally vague. |
Case | ||
| TX- Dangerous Animals - G. Caging Requirements and Standards for Dangerous Wild Animals. | 25 TX ADC § 169.131, 132 | 25 TAC § 169.131, 132 | This regulation establishes caging requirements and minimum standards of care for "dangerous wild animals," including: gorillas, chimpanzees, orangutans, baboons, lions, tigers, cheetahs, ocelots, cougars, leopards, jaguars, bobcats, lynxes, servals, caracals, hyenas, bears, coyotes, jackals, and all hybrids thereof. | Administrative | |
| United States v. Hess | 829 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2016) | 2016 WL 3878221 (8th Cir.,2016) | This case stems from a United States Fish and Wildlife Service's investigation into illegal trafficking of rhinoceros horns and ivory called "Operation Crash." Defendant James Hess, a taxidermist in Maquoketa, Iowa, agreed to sell a pair of lack rhinoceros horns in 2011 to another individual involved in the trafficking operation. As a result of his role, he was charged with one count of Lacey Act Trafficking for knowingly engaging in conduct involving the sale and purchase of wildlife with a market value exceeding $350 that was transported and sold in violation of the Endangered Species Act. Hess was ultimately sentenced to 27 months in prison followed by three years of supervised release. On appeal, Hess first argued that the District Court made an “unsustainable finding on the record presented” when it stated that Hess "helped establish a market for these black rhino horns, and that is a serious offense against the planet." Because Hess failed to object at sentencing, this issue was reviewed for plain error. This court found no plain error, as the record supported the statement that Hess' action contributed to furthering a market for black rhinoceros horns. As to defendant's argument that his sentence was unreasonable, the court found that he failed to overcome the presumption of reasonableness in his bottom of the guidelines sentencing range. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. | Case |