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Displaying 111 - 120 of 6649
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AZ - Cruelty - Consolidated Cruelty/Animal Fighting Statutes | A. R. S. § 12-1011; § 13-2910 - 12; § 13-1411 | AZ ST § 12-1011; § 13-2910 - 12; § 13-1411 | The Arizona section contains the state's anti-cruelty and animal fighting provisions. A person commits cruelty to animals if he or she intentionally, knowingly or recklessly subjects any animal under the person's custody or control to cruel neglect or abandonment, fails to provide medical attention necessary to prevent protracted suffering to any animal under the person's custody or control, inflicts unnecessary physical injury to any animal, or recklessly subjects any animal to cruel mistreatment, among other things. Animal is defined as a mammal, bird, reptile or amphibian. Exclusions include hunting and agricultural activities in accordance with those laws and regulations in Arizona. Intentionally attending a dogfight is a felony under this provision whereas attendance at a cockfight is a misdemeanor. | Statute | |
| State v. Butler | 175 N.H. 444, 293 A.3d 191 (2022) | 2022 WL 4488304 (N.H. Sept. 28, 2022) | Defendant Kevin Butler was convicted of criminal negligence after he left his dog inside a parked vehicle for 45 minutes when the temperature was over 90 degrees outside. The charge came after a neighbor noticed a dog in the vehicle that was "scratching at the windows and the door" and appeared to be in distress. After calling the police, an animal control officer removed the animal from the unlocked car and transported the distressed dog to a local veterinary clinic. At trial, the defendant testified that he was out running errands on a "very hot" day, and asked his son to get the dog out of the car as Defendant's hands were full. An important phone call distracted him from following up on the dog's removal and only after the police knocked on his door did he realize the dog must still be in the car. On appeal here, Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to establish the mens rea of criminal negligence for both charges. The State must prove that a defendant “fail[ed] to become aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct" and that this risk constitutes a gross deviation from conduct performed by a reasonable person. Here, the court found that the record supports the trial court's conclusion that the defendant failed to become aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the dog would overheat in the car and that his failure to perceive this risk constituted a gross deviation from reasonable care. The temperature was high that day, the car was parked in direct sunlight with all the windows up, and the dog was left for around an hour. The fact that Defendant relied upon his 8-year-old son to remove the dog under these circumstances constituted a gross deviation from reasonable care. This was not "mere inattention" as Defendant claimed. The conviction was affirmed. | Case | |
| Brower v. Evans | 257 F.3d 1058 (2001) |
The district court held that the Secretary's Initial Finding, triggering a change in the dolphin-safe label standard, was not in accordance with the law and constituted an abuse of discretion because the Secretary failed to (1) obtain and consider preliminary data from the congressionally mandated stress studies and (2) apply the proper legal standard to the available scientific information. We affirm. |
Case | ||
| NH - Commercial breeders - art Agr 1704. Operating Standards Relative to Commercial Kennels | NH ADC Agr 1704.01 - 10 | N.H. Code Admin. R. Agr 1704.01 - 10 | These New Hampshire regulations address minimum standards at commercial animal facilities. The regulations cover general aspects (i.e., housing must be structurally sound and maintained in good repair) as well as more specific aspects related to indoor heating/cooling and ventilation requirements. The sizing and construction of primary enclosures and minimal feeding requirements are described. | Administrative | |
| ME - Police Animal - § 164-B. Immunity from civil liability for assistance given to law enforcement dogs, search and rescue | 14 M.R.S.A. § 164-B | This Maine law gives immunity from damages to an emergency medical services person, a security services dog handler or a law enforcement officer who voluntarily, without the expectation of monetary or other compensation, renders first aid, emergency treatment or rescue assistance to a law enforcement dog, search and rescue dog or service dog that is unconscious, ill, injured or in need of rescue assistance unless it is established that the injury or the death was caused willfully, wantonly or recklessly or by gross negligence on the part of the emergency medical services person, security services dog handler or law enforcement officer. | Statute | ||
| Klobnak v. Wildwood Hills, Inc. | 688 N.W.2d 799 (Iowa 2004) | 2004 WL 2534344 (Iowa 2004) |
Plaintiffs brought suit against a ranch after their car struck two of the ranch's horses on the highway. The trial court dismissed holding no duty of care was breached by the ranch because Iowa no longer had a statute prohibiting animals from roaming. The Supreme Court of Iowa reversed reasoning that a duty of ordinary care still exists. |
Case | |
| Strong v. United States | 5 F.3d 905 (1993) |
The appeal in this case does not contest the denial of a permit to conduct dolphin feedings cruises. The position of the plaintiffs-appellees is that the Secretary of Commerce has no authority to consider feeding to be a form of harassment or to regulate it. The court disagreed with the plaintiffs-appellees and found it clearly reasonable to restrict or prohibit the feeding of dolphins as a potential hazard to them. |
Case | ||
| Crow Indian Tribe v. United States | 965 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 2020) | Several Indian tribes, environmental organizations, and animal-welfare groups filed suits claiming that Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) violated Endangered Species Act (ESA) and Administrative Procedure Act (APA) by issuing final rule “delisting” or removing grizzly bear population in Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem from threatened species list. The distinct population segment of the Yellowstone grizzly bear population has been so successful under the ESA that the FWS has been trying to delist it for almost 15 years, according to the court. This specific case was triggered by a 2017 D.C. Circuit case (Humane Society v. Zinke) that requires the FWS to address the impact that removing a DPS from protection under the ESA would have on the remaining listed species. At the time that ruling was issued, the FWS had already published a 2017 Rule that sought to delist the grizzly bear Yellowstone DPS. This then resulted in cross motions for summary judgment in district court. The district court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs and vacated the 2017 rule, remanding it to the FWS. This remand resulted in a second delisting rule by FWS that was again vacated and remanded by the district court, demanding consideration of several discrete issues by FWS. The FWS now appeals that remand for consideration that require the study of the effect of the delisting on the remaining, still listed, grizzly population in the coterminous 48 states, as well as further consideration of the threat of delisting to long term genetic diversity of the Yellowstone grizzly. In addition, states in the region of the DPS (Idaho, Montana, and Wyoming) as well as some private hunting and farming organizations have intervened on the government's behalf. On appeal, the Court of Appeals first found that it had authority to review the district court order and that the intervenors had standing to pursue an appeal. As to the order by the district court that the FWS needs to conduct a "comprehensive review" of the impact of delisting on the remnant grizzly population, the appellate court vacated that portion of the order using the phrase "comprehensive review." Instead, it remanded to the lower court to order a "further examination" on the delisting's effects. The court also agreed with the district court that FWS' 2017 Rule was arbitrary and capricious where it had no concrete, enforceable mechanism to ensure the long-term genetic viability of the Yellowstone DPS. Finally, the Court of Appeals agreed with the district court order to mandate a commitment to recalibration (changes in methodology to measure the Yellowstone grizzly bear population) in the rule since that is required by the ESA. The Court affirmed the district court’s remand order, with the exception of the order requiring the FWS to conduct a “comprehensive review” of the remnant grizzly population. | Case | ||
| MS - Facility, courtroom dog - § 99-43-101. Child witness standards of protection | Miss. Code Ann. § 99-43-101 | MS ST § 99-43-101 | Under Mississippi law, in any proceeding in which a child testifies, a child shall have the right to be enforced by the court on its own motion by an attorney in the proceeding to permit a properly trained facility animal or comfort item or both to be present inside the courtroom or hearing room. | Statute | |
| AK - Endangered Species - Endangered and Threatened Species | AS § 16.20.180 - 210 | AK ST § 16.20.180 - 210 | This Alaska statute provides that the state shall take measures to preserve the habitat of species or subspecies which, are threatened with extinction due to habitat loss, overutilization, disease, predation, or other human or natural factors. Species recognized as endangered or threatened also gain habitat protection on state lands. Taking of a listed species without permit incurs a misdemeanor. | Statute |