Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Center for Biological Diversity v. Kempthorne | 607 F.Supp.2d 1078 (D.Ariz.,2009) | 2009 WL 942862 (D.Ariz.) |
Cross motions for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ claim against Defendants, the Secretary of the Interior and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, alleging that the Secretary’s failure to designate critical habitat and prepare a recovery plan for the jaguar was unlawful under the ESA. The United States District Court, D. Arizona granted Plaintiffs’ motion in part and denied Plaintiffs’ motion in part, finding that Defendants’ determination that designation of a critical habitat would not be prudent must be set aside because it did not appear to be based on the best scientific evidence available as required by the ESA, and that Defendants’ determination not to prepare a recovery plan must also be set aside and remanded for further consideration because the determination was inconsistent with Defendants’ own policy guidance and long-standing practice concerning the distinction between foreign and domestic species. |
Case |
| Robinson v. Pezzat | 818 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2016) | 2016 WL 1274044 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 1, 2016) | Plaintiff filed suit against two police officers and the District of Columbia after the officers shot and killed her dog while executing a warrant to search her home. She brought a § 1983 claim, alleging that the officers seized her property in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court’s ruling for summary judgment, holding that a jury could find in favor of the plaintiff based on her witness testimony that the dog was lying down when it was first shot. Additionally, the court maintained summary judgment for the second police officer, McLeod, who shot and killed the dog after it bit Officer Pezzat and charged forward. | Case |
| MA - Exotic pet, breeding - Chapter 131. Inland Fisheries and Game and Other Natural Resources. | M.G.L.A. 131 § 23 | MA ST 131 § 23 | Massachusetts bans private possession of exotic pets, and requires licenses for those who deal and propagate wild species for other reasons. The Massachusetts director of the Division of Fisheries and Wildlife also issues a list of exempted species for which no permit is needed. | Statute |
| DE - Ordinances - Local ordinances (dogs) | 7 Del.C. § 1740 - Repealed by 77 Laws 2010, ch. 428, § 5, eff. July 1, 2010 | DE ST TI 7 § 1740 | [Repealed in 20210]. This Delaware statutes provides that nothing shall prevent a local municipality from enacting measures or a program for the control of dangerous or potentially dangerous dogs. | Statute |
| Dehart v. Town of Austin | 39 F.3d 718 (7th Cir. 1994) | 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 30106 |
The breeder was in the business of buying, breeding, raising, and selling of exotic and wild animals. The town passed an ordinance making it unlawful to keep certain wild animals, and the breeder filed suit challenging the constitutionality of a local ordinance. On appeal, the court affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the town because: (1) the ordinance was not preempted by the Animal Welfare Act; (2) the ordinance was not an impermissible attempt to regulate interstate commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause; and (3) the town did not deprive him of his property interest in his federal and state licenses without due process. |
Case |
| Marine Mammal Conservancy, Inc. v. Department of Agr. | 134 F.3d 409 (D.C. Cir. 1998) | 328 U.S.App.D.C. 253, 28 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,538 |
A nonprofit organization petitioned for review of the order of administrative law judge (ALJ) which denied organization's motion to intervene in administrative proceedings under Animal Welfare Act. The Court of Appeals held that the organization's failure to appeal administrative denial to judicial officer precluded judicial review of ALJ's actions. |
Case |
| Revista Brasileira de Direito Animal Volume 19 |
SUMÁRIOEDITORIALHeron Gordilho……………………………………………… |
Policy | ||
| ID - Endangered Species - Chapter 24. Species Conservation- Chapter 26. Fish and Game | I.C. § 36-2401 - 2405, 36–1101 | ID ST § 36-2401 - 2405, § 36–1101 | This Idaho law sets out the definitions related to state endangered species laws. It also establishes a delisting advisory team that is responsible for reviewing data related to state species proposed for delisting by the federal government. This team also submits management plans to the state fish and wildlife department. | Statute |
| CA - Euthanasia - § 597u. Animals; prohibited killing methods | West's Ann. Cal. Penal Code § 597u | CA PENAL § 597u | This statute prohibits the use by any person of carbon monoxide gas or an intracardiac injection of a euthanasia agent on a conscious animal to kill an animal. | Statute |
| Farm Sanctuary v. United States Department of Agriculture | 545 F. Supp. 3d 50 (W.D.N.Y. 2021) | Plaintiffs (nonprofit organizations working to protect animals, people, and environments from industrial animal agriculture) filed suit against the USDA and FSIS challenging the implementation of the Modernization of Swine Slaughter Inspection rule, 84 Fed. Reg. 52,300 (Oct. 11, 2019) ("Slaughter Rule”). Plaintiffs contend that the rule allows nearly all pigs in the U.S. to be slaughtered as "unlimited speeds," thereby posing risks to animal welfare and consumer safety. Plaintiffs' lawsuit was later amended to add a claim that challenges Defendants' failure to ban the slaughter of non-ambulatory or "downed" pigs in the rule. Defendants filed motions to dismiss on the grounds that Plaintiffs have no standing to sue. Plaintiffs contend that they have been injured by Defendants' implementation of the Slaughter Rule. Specifically, Plaintiffs argue that the authorization of the high-speed slaughter rule directly conflicts with their organizational missions and redirects resources to counteracting the Slaughter Rule instead of other activities like rescue of animals and advocacy. Some of the plaintiff organizations further allege that their members include consumers who eat pork products and are concerned about the increased health risks they face from consuming products from pigs who have not been adequately inspected as well as impacts to the environment from increased slaughter. In addition, Plaintiffs allege that the FSIS is not consistent in its treatment of downed pigs versus downed cattle, and that downed pigs are inhumanely forced to rise/stand for slaughter resulting in potential exposure to the public of disease and other public health risks. The court first took up Defendants argument that Plaintiffs lack both organizational and associational standing. The Court has reviewed the amended complaint in light of this Second Circuit precedent and finds that Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that they have been forced to divert resources from mission-critical activities to oppose the Slaughter Rule. In other words, Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that Defendants’ unlawful practices have impaired and frustrated their ability to engage in mission-related activities and caused a consequent drain on their limited resources, which “constitutes far more than simply a setback to the organization's abstract social interests" sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. Taking Plaintiffs allegations in their pleadings as true, the Court finds that the amended complaint contains allegations sufficient to support organizational standing. Having found that Plaintiffs have organization standing, the Court need not reach the issue of associational standing. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is denied. Finally, as to the 2020 Action concerning the downed pigs, the Court found that The Court reaches the same conclusion it did in the 2019 Action: that at this stage of the case, Plaintiffs have alleged organizational standing. The Court notes that several other Plaintiffs have submitted declarations from their members, which further explain how those organizations have sustained an injury-in-fact. Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that they provide additional services beyond mere issue advocacy, that these services have been impaired by Defendants’ actions, and that they have been forced to shift their resources away from those services to oppose the slaughter of downed pigs. Defendants' motions to dismiss were denied. | Case |