Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| NV - Dangerous Dog - Chapter 202. Crimes Against Public Health and Safety. | N. R. S. 202.500 | NV ST 202.500 | This Nevada statute defines a "dangerous dog," as a dog, that without provocation, on two separate occasions within 18 months, behaved menacingly to a degree that would lead a reasonable person to defend him or herself against substantial bodily harm, when the dog is either off the premises of its owner or keeper or not confined in a cage or pen. A dog then becomes "vicious" when, without being provoked, it killed or inflicted substantial bodily harm upon a human being. If substantial bodily harm results from an attack by a dog known to be vicious, its owner or keeper is guilty of a category D felony. Under the statute, a dog may not be declared dangerous if it attacks as a defensive act against a person who was committing or attempting to commit a crime or who provoked the dog. | Statute |
| CO - Commerce City - Breed - Chapter 4 - ANIMAL CODE. ARTICLE I. - GENERAL PROVISIONS. | COMMERCE CITY, CO., REVISED MUNICIPAL CODE §§ 4-1000 - 4-1005 (2011) |
Commerce City defines a pit bull or pit bull terrier as any dog that is an American pit bull terrier, American Staffordshire terrier, Staffordshire bull terrier, any dog displaying the majority of physical traits of any one (1) or more of the above breeds or any dog exhibiting those distinguishing characteristics that substantially conform to the standards established by the American Kennel Club (A.K.C.) or United Kennel Club (U.K.C.) for any of the above breeds. Commerce City has banned pit bulls with the exception of pit bulls who were in the city prior to November 2005. |
Local Ordinance | |
| WRIGHT v. CLARK | 50 Vt. 130 (1877) | 50 Vt. 130, 28 Am.Rep. 496 (1877) |
Defendant shot plaintiff’s hunting dog, and plaintiff sued for trespass. The dog was shot while in pursuit of a fox. Defendant shot at the fox, but accidentally hit the dog. The court held that, because the shooting was a voluntary act, he was liable for exemplary damages for “intentionally or wantonly” shooting the dog. |
Case |
| CA - Euthanasia - § 382.4. Succinylcholine or sucostrin; administration to dog or cat | West's Ann. Cal. Penal Code § 382.4 | In California, it is a misdemeanor for a person other than a licensed veterinarian, to administer succinylcholine, also known as sucostrin, to any dog or cat. | Statute | |
| Guardians v. United States Fish & Wildlife Service | 2018 WL 1023104 (D. Mont. Feb. 22, 2018) | Plaintiffs sued the United States Fish and Wildlife Service and its related entities on the grounds that they failed to comply with environmental and regulatory procedures in the administration and implementation of a federal export program that allows certain animal pelts and parts to be exported from the United States pursuant to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (“CITES”). Defendant-Intervenors intervened, and now seek to dismiss this action pursuant to Rules 12(b)(7) and 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on the grounds that the Plaintiffs have not joined and cannot join as indispensable parties certain states and Native American tribes. The court held that because the states and tribes are not “required” under Rule 19(a), dismissal is not appropriate. Accordingly, the court ordered that that Defendant-Intervenors' motion be DENIED. | Case | |
| RI - Dangerous Dog - § 4-13.1-9. Penalties for violation--Licensing ordinances and fees | Gen. Laws, 1956, § 4-13.1-9 | RI ST § 4-13.1-9 | This Rhode Island statute provides that a vicious dog may be confiscated by a dog officer and destroyed in an expeditious and humane manner after the expiration of a five day waiting period if an owner does not secure liability insurance, have his or her dog properly identified, or properly enclose/restrain the dog. If any dog declared vicious under Sec. 4-13.1-11, when unprovoked, kills, wounds, or worries or assists in killing or wounding any described animal, the owner shall pay a five hundred fifty dollar fine. The dog officer is empowered to confiscate the dog. The statute further provides that municipalities may enact vicious dog licensing ordinances and provide for impoundment of dogs that violate such ordinances. It also outlines other actions owners of vicious dogs must take, including the posting of vicious dog signs and the maintenance of proper insurance. | Statute |
| NC - Cruelty - Consolidated Cruelty Laws (Article 47) | N.C.G.S.A.§ 14-360 to 14-369; § 19A-1 - 70; § 114-8.7; § 160A-182, § 14-177; § 153A-127 | NC ST § 14-360 to 14-369; § 19A-1 - 70; § 114-8.7; § 160A-182, § 14-177; § 153A-127 | This section comprises the relevant North Carolina animal cruelty statutes. The anti-cruelty statute provides that if any person shall maliciously kill, or cause or procure to be killed, any animal by intentional deprivation of necessary sustenance, that person shall be guilty of a Class H felony. If any person shall maliciously torture, mutilate, maim, cruelly beat, disfigure, poison, or kill, or cause or procure to be tortured, mutilated, maimed, cruelly beaten, disfigured, poisoned, or killed any animal, every such offender shall for every such offense be guilty of a Class H felony. This section also makes promoting or conducting a cock fight a misdemeanor and promoting or conducting a dogfight a felony. Other prohibited acts include abandoning an animal, conveying any animal in a cruel manner, and restraining a dog in a cruel manner. This section also includes the civil remedy provisions. | Statute |
| Xu v. Chen | 2008 CarswellBC 1693 | 2008 BCPC 234 |
The Claimant's six-month old sheltie puppy, "Diamond,” suffered a serious limb injury outside the front yard of the family home. Claimant seeks to recover the veterinarian costs she incurred to treat the dog's injury against Defendants, the owners of the other dog that allegedly attacked claimant’s dog. The court found that there was evidence that Defendant was previously contacted by Animal Control as well as a neighbor about an incident where Angus lunged at another dog. The Claimant has established, on a balance of probabilities, that Angus had manifested a propensity to cause the type of harm occasioned that night. Claimant was 25% liable for the incident where she left Diamond in an unfenced yard that gave other dogs access. The court denied Xu’s claim of $5500 for future medical costs for the care of Diamond because there was no evidence what these would be and the dog was currently living with another family. |
Case |
| Roach v. Jackson County | 949 P.2d 1227 (Or. 1997) | 151 Or.App. 33 (1997) |
This is an appeal of a county board and circuit court decision ordering destruction of a dog for chasing livestock. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court decision and held that the dog must be killed in a humane manner. |
Case |
| Galindo v. State | --- S.W.3d ----, 2018 WL 4128054 (Tex. App. Aug. 30, 2018) | Appellant Galindo pleaded guilty to cruelty to nonlivestock animals and a deadly-weapon allegation from the indictment. The trial court accepted his plea, found him guilty, and sentenced him to five years in prison. The facts stem from an incident where Galindo grabbed and then stabbed a dog with a kitchen knife. The indictment indicated that Galindo also used and exhibited a deadly weapon (a knife) during both the commission of the offense and flight from the offense. On appeal, Galindo argues that the deadly-weapon finding is legally insufficient because the weapon was used against a "nonhuman." Appellant relies on the recent decision of Prichard v. State, 533 S.W.3d 315 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017), in which the Texas Court of Appeals held that a deadly-weapon finding is legally insufficient where the sole recipient of the use or exhibition of the deadly weapon is a nonhuman. The court here found the facts distinguishable from Prichard. The court noted that Prichard left open the possibility that a deadly-weapons finding could occur when the weapon was used or exhibited against a human during the commission of an offense against an animal. Here, the evidence introduced at defendant's guilty plea and testimony from sentencing and in the PSIR are sufficient to support the trial court's finding on the deadly-weapons plea (e.g., the PSI and defense counsel stated that Galindo first threatened his girlfriend with the knife and then cut the animal in front of his girlfriend and her son). The judgment of the trial court was affirmed. | Case |