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Displaying 1 - 10 of 6637
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CA - Slaughter - § 597.3. Live animal markets | West's Ann. Cal. Penal Code § 597.3 | CA PENAL § 597.3 | This California statute regulates live animal markets. Operators must ensure that no animal (frogs, turtles, and birds, but not poultry) sold for the purpose of human consumption) is cut, dismembered, butchered, or de-feathered while still alive. Operators must also provide that no animals are confined in such a way that could case injury, starvation, dehydration, or suffocation. Violation may result in a warning for the first offense and an infraction for a second offense. | Statute |
| Canada - Alberta - Alberta Statutes. Animal Protection Act | R.S.A. 2000, c. A-41, s. 1 | This set of laws from Alberta, Canada comprises the Animal Protection Act. The Act states that no person shall permit or cause an animal to be in distress. Specifically, a person who owns or is in charge of an animal must ensure that the animal has adequate food and water, must provide the animal with adequate care when the animal is wounded or ill, and must provide the animal with reasonable protection from injurious heat or cold as well as adequate shelter, ventilation and space. A person who contravenes this Act is guilty of an offence and liable to a fine of not more than $20,000 in addition to restrictions on owning animals for a specified period of time. The Act also outlines the power of both peace officers to take animals in distress into their custody and humane societies to provide care for seized animals. | Statute | |
| Creekstone Farms Premium Beef, L.L.C. v. Department of Agriculture | 539 F.3d 492 (D.C.Cir., 2008) | 2008 WL 3980533 (C.A.D.C.) | Plaintiff, a supplier of beef products, brought an action against Defendant, the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), after the USDA denied Plaintiff’s request to purchase Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) testing kits. The United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit found that the USDA has authority under the Virus Serum Toxin Act (VSTA) to regulate the use of biological products, the USDA’s interpretation of VSTA allowing the USDA to deny an import permit based on the product’s intended use was not inconsistent with the regulation and was therefore entitled to deference by the Court, the USDA’s interpretation of the word “treatment” as including diagnostic activities was entitled to deference, and that BSE testing is a diagnostic activity for purposes of VSTA. | Case |
| Brower v. Evans | 257 F.3d 1058 (2001) |
The district court held that the Secretary's Initial Finding, triggering a change in the dolphin-safe label standard, was not in accordance with the law and constituted an abuse of discretion because the Secretary failed to (1) obtain and consider preliminary data from the congressionally mandated stress studies and (2) apply the proper legal standard to the available scientific information. We affirm. |
Case | |
| State v. Fay | 248 A.3d 1191 (N.H. Dec. 2, 2020) | 173 N.H. 740, 2020 WL 7051326 (N.H. Dec. 2, 2020) | In this New Hampshire case, Christina Fay appeals her convictions on seventeen counts of cruelty to animals. In 2017, a search warrant executed at her residence resulted in the seizure of over 70 Great Danes. Police learned of the conditions at defendant's residence from defendant's prior employees, who gave accounts of floors covered in layers of feces, dogs being fed maggot-infested raw chicken, and dogs present with injuries/illness. After conducting an investigation, the investigating Wolfeboro's police officer (Strauch) partnered with HSUS because the department did not have the resources to handle a large-scale animal law seizure. Strauch did not include in his affidavit supporting the search warrant's issuance that HSUS would be assisting the police, and the warrant itself did not explicitly state that HSUS was permitted to assist in its execution. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress by violating two of her constitutional rights: her right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures and her right to privacy. As to the right to privacy argument, the court first noted that defendant grounded her argument in a recently enacted amendment to the state constitution. However, this new amendment, which states that an individual's right to live free from governmental intrusion in private or personal information is natural, essential, and inherent, did not apply retroactively to defendant. As to defendant's second argument that she had a right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, the court noted that it has not previously considered the extent to which it is constitutionally reasonable for the police to involve civilians when executing search warrants. The defendant argues that Strauch's failure to obtain express authorization for HSUS's aid from the magistrate who issued the search warrant was constitutionally unreasonable. The court found no instance in which a court has held that the failure to obtain express judicial authorization for citizen aid prior to the execution of a warrant rendered the subsequent search unconstitutional. While other courts have opined that is might be a "better practice" to disclose this matter when applying to the magistrate for a search warrant, failure to do so does not itself violate the Fourth Amendment. The pertinent inquiry is whether the search was reasonable in its execution, and any citizen involvement would be held to that scrutiny. The court concluded that the state did not violate the constitution by failing to obtain authorization for HSUS's involvement prior to the warrant's execution. Affirmed. | Case |
| Gonzalez v. South Texas Veterinary Associates, Inc. | Not Reported in S.W.3d, 2013 WL 6729873 (Tex. App. Dec. 19, 2013), review denied (May 16, 2014) | Plaintiff acquired an indoor/outdoor cat with an unknown medical and vaccination history. Plaintiff took cat to defendant for treatment and the cat received a vaccination. The cat soon developed a golf-ball-sized mass that contained a quarter-sized ulceration which was draining “matter” on the cat's right rear leg. When plaintiff returned the cat to the defendant, defendant diagnosed the cat with an infection, prescribed an antibiotic for treatment, and instructed Gonzalez to return if the cat's symptoms did not improve. When the cat's symptoms did not improve, plaintiff took the cat to another veterinarian who diagnosed the cat with vaccine-associated sarcoma. The cat had to be eventually euthanized. Acting pro se, the plaintiff filed suit, alleging that defendant failed to: (1) inform her of vaccine-associated sarcoma risk; (2) adhere to feline vaccination protocols; and (3) properly diagnose vaccine-associated sarcoma in the cat, which resulted in the loss of her life. On appeal, plaintiff asserted that the trial court erred by granting defendant's no-evidence and traditional motions for summary judgment. After examining the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff and disregarding all contrary evidence and inferences, the court concluded that the plaintiff brought forth more than a scintilla of probative evidence establishing the relevant standard of care to prove her malpractice claims. The trial court, therefore, erred by granting the no-evidence summary judgment. On the traditional summary judgment claim, the court held that that the defendant's evidence did not conclusively prove that a veterinarian complied with the applicable standard of care in light of another veterinarian's report to the contrary. The trial court, therefore, erred by granting defendant's traditional motion for summary judgment. The case was reversed and remanded. | Case | |
| The Convention on Biological Diversity in Portuguese |
A Convençno da Biodiversidade foi assinada no Rio de Janeiro em 1992, por 156 Estados e uma organizaçno de integraçno econômica regional. No período de 5 a 14 de junho de 1992. |
Treaty | ||
| AL - Horsemeat - 2-17-15. Sale, offer for sale, transportation, etc., | Ala.Code 1975 § 2-17-15 | AL ST § 2-17-15 | This Alabama statute states that no person, firm or corporation shall sell, transport, offer for sale or transportation or receive for transportation in intrastate commerce any carcasses of horses, mules or other equines or parts of any such carcasses or the meat or meat food products thereof unless they are plainly and conspicuously marked or labeled or otherwise identified as required by regulations. | Statute |
| Animal Law Index Volume 11 |
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Policy | ||
| Johnson v. McMahan | 68 Cal.App.4th 173 (1998) | 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 173 (1998) |
After a repairman was injured by a dog that grabbed his leg through his jeans and made him fall from a ladder, the victim sued the owners under the dog bite statute, Civ. Code, § 3342. The court held that the statute applied, even though the plaintiff was not wounded by the bite. The word “bite” did not require a puncture or tearing away of the skin. |
Case |