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Title Citation Alternate Citation Summary Type
Whitman v. State 2008 WL 1962242 (Ark.App.,2008)

Appellant was tried by a jury and found guilty of four counts of cruelty to animals concerning four Arabian horses. On appeal, appellant raised a sufficiency of the evidence challenge and a Rule 404(b) challenge to the admission of testimony and pictures concerning the condition of appellant's dogs and her house. The court found the photographic evidence was admissible for purposes other than to prove appellant's character, e.g., to show her knowledge of neglect of animals within her house, and thereby the absence of mistake or accident concerning the horses that lived outside.

Case
OH - Endangered Species - Chapter 1518. Endangered Species. R.C. § 1518.01 - 1518.99; 1531.25, 1531.99 OH ST § 1518.01 - 1518.99; 1531.25, 1531.99 These Ohio statutes protect both endangered plants and animals as defined by the State of Ohio as well as those species listed on the federal ESA list. Taking of an endangered or threatened animal species constitutes a misdemeanor and the person is required upon pleading guilty to the offense, in addition to any fine, term of imprisonment, seizure, and forfeiture imposed, to make restitution for the minimum value of the wild animal illegally held, taken, or possessed. Notably, if the aggregate value of the animal(s) taken exceeds $1,000, a person is guilty of a felony. Statute
AU - Cruelty - Animal Welfare Act (ACT Primary Act) Animal Welfare Act 1992 The Australian Capital Territory enacted this Act 'for the promotion of animal welfare and for related purposes'. The Act is enforced by the RSPCA ACT and generally covers domestic animals. Statute
HI - Honolulu - Chapter 7: Animals and Fowl (Article 1: Cockfighting and Related Equipment) Revised Ordinances of Honolulu §§ 7-1.1 - 7-1.3

This Honolulu ordinance prohibits any person from engaging or participating in a cockfighting exhibition. This ordinance also prohibits gaffs or slashers or any other sharp instrument from being attached to or in place of the natural spur on a gamecock or other fighting fowl. Any person violating any provision of this article shall be punished by a fine of not less than $250 and not exceeding $1,000 or by imprisonment not exceeding thirty days, or by both.

Local Ordinance
In re MARRIAGE OF Kimberly K. Enders and Michael A. BAKER 48 N.E.3d 1277 (Ill. App. Ct., 2015)

In this case, Michael A. Baker appealed the trial court’s decision regarding property distribution and visitation rights with regard to his two dogs, Grace and Roxy, following his divorce from Kimberly K. Enders. The trial court awarded custody of both dogs to Enders and denied Baker any visitation rights. In making its decision, the trial court relied on a New York case in which the New York Supreme Court did not allow dog visitation. (Travis v. Murray, 42 Misc.3d 447, 977 N.Y.S.2d 621, 631 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.2013). The New York Supreme Court refused to apply the “best interests of the dog” standard and instead applied a “best for all standard,” holding that “household pets enjoy a status greater than mere chattel.” Baker appealed the trial court’s decision arguing that Illinois courts have the authority to order pet visitation. On appeal, the court determined that there was no case law to suggest that an Illinois court had ever addressed the issue of dog visitation. As a result, the court found that the trial court was well within its discretion to apply the standard used in the New York case. Additionally, the court of appeals applied the statutory definition of “dog owner” in Illinois and determined that Enders was the dogs’ rightful owner. The Illinois statute defined owner as “any person having a right of property in an animal, or who keeps or harbors an animal, or who has it in his care, or acts as its custodian.” The court found that because the dogs were left in Ender’s care following the divorce, she is the one who “keeps or harbors” the dogs and is therefore the owner. Ultimately, the court affirmed the trial court’s decision and denied Baker visitation rights.

Case
United States v. Bengis 2006 WL 3735654 (S.D. N.Y. 2006)

Defendants were caught illegally over-fishing off the coast of South Africa and selling the fish in the United States, in violation of the Lacey Act. The United States Government could not seek compensation for South Africa under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act because the fish were not property belonging to South Africa. However, the United States Government may be able to seek restitution for the South African Government under the discretionary Victim and Witness Protection Act.  Opinion Vacated and Remanded by: U.S. v. Bengis, 631 F.3d 33 (2nd Cir., 2011).

Case
Swanson v. Tackling 335 Ga. App. 810 (2016) 2016 WL 718465 (Ga. Ct. App. Feb. 24, 2016) This is an interlocutory appeal by the dog owners (the Swansons) in a personal injury lawsuit for a dog bite. The court in this case overruled the lower court’s ruling that the defendant was not entitled to summary judgement after defendant’s dog bit a child but the dog had never shown a propensity to injure anyone prior to the incident. Plaintiff was suing defendant after defendant’s dog bit plaintiff’s child on the arm and head. Plaintiff argued that defendant is responsible for the injuries caused by the dog because the defendant neglected to properly restrain the dog. The court reversed the lower court’s decision and held in favor of defendant, stating that there was no evidence that was presented to indicate that defendant could have or should have known that the dog would act in this way towards the child. In order to prevail, the plaintiff needed to present evidence that the dog had acted in a similar way in the past. Case
Hair v. Quail Corners Animal Hospital

Standard veterinary malpractice case for a show dog. Includes Interrogatories. Veterinarian negligently treated show dog after she was shot by a hunter. In addition, another vet then left a needle inside the dog. Vets failed to take the needle out, causing the dog's death.

Pleading
Hopson v. DPP [1997] C.O.D. 229

The owner of a bird of prey had kept it in a wire aviary for at least six weeks, during which it had injured itself by repeatedly flying into the wire mesh. Having been convicted on these facts of an offence of cruelly ill-treating the bird contrary to the first limb of s 1(1)(a) of the Protection of Animals Act 1911, he appealed, contending that under that limb, unlike the second limb, he should only have been convicted if he was guilty of a positive act of deliberate cruelty. Dismissing the appeal, the Divisional Court held that a person could be guilty of cruel ill-treatment of an animal he was responsible for by allowing it to remain in a situation where it was continuing to injure itself, even if he did not desire to bring about the harm.

Case
IL - Restaurant - 5/11-20-14. Companion dogs; restaurants 65 ILCS 5/11-20-14 IL ST CH 65 § 5/11-20-14 This law provides that a municipality with a population of 1,000,000 or more may, by ordinance, authorize the presence of companion dogs in outdoor areas of restaurants where food is served, if the ordinance provides for adequate controls to ensure compliance with other Illinois health laws. An ordinance enacted under this Section shall provide that: (i) no companion dog shall be present in the interior of any restaurant or in any area where food is prepared; and (ii) the restaurant shall have the right to refuse to serve the owner of a companion dog if the owner fails to exercise reasonable control over the companion dog or the companion dog is otherwise behaving in a manner that compromises or threatens to compromise the health or safety of any person present in the restaurant. Under this law, "companion dog" means a dog other than one who is assisting a person with disability. Statute

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