Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Connecticut v. Devon D. | 321 Conn. 656, 138 A.3d 849 (2016) | 321 Conn. 656 (2016), 2016 WL 3194779 (Conn.,2016) | Devon D. was convicted of four counts sexual assault and three counts of risk of injury to a child upon allegations made by three of Devon D.’s biological children, C1, C2, and C3. He appealed his conviction on the grounds that the trial court had abused its discretion by having the three cases to be tried jointly and by permitting C1 to testify with a dog at her feet. The appellate court had accepted these arguments and reversed and remanded for a new trial, but the Supreme Court of Connecticut reversed the appellate court. The Connecticut Supreme Court concluded that “the trial court properly exercised its discretion in permitting the cases to be tried together because the evidence in all three cases was cross admissible,” and reversed on that issue. As to the appellate court’s determination that the trial court had abused its discretion in permitting a dog to sit near C1 during her testimony to provide comfort and support,” the Supreme Court also reversed, reinstating the verdict and judgment of the trial court. | Case | |
| NY - Horse Racing - Section 4002.21. License requirements for assistant trainer | 9 NY ADC 4002.21 | 9 NYCRR 4002.21 | An assistant trainer's license may be issued to a person who is 18 years old, has three years of experience, is vouched for by the trainer by whom he or she is to be employed, and passes a written exam (or oral) and a practical exam. | Administrative | |
| AU - Animal Welfare - Animal Welfare Act 2007 (Northern Territory) | Animal Welfare Act 2007 (Northern Territory) |
The Northern Territory was one of the last states to enact Animal Welfare legislation with its passing in 2007 as an act to provide for the welfare of animals, prevent cruelty to animals and for related purposes. The objectives of the Act are to to ensure that animals are treated humanely, to prevent cruelty to animals, and to promote community awareness about the welfare of animals. |
Statute | ||
| IA - Council Bluffs - Breed - Chapter 4.20 - ANIMAL CONTROL (Pit Bull Ordinance) | COUNCIL BLUFFS, IA., MUNICIPAL CODE § 4.20.112 |
In Council Bluffs, Iowa, it is unlawful to own, possess, keep, exercise control over, maintain, harbor, transport, or sell any pit bull. There are exceptions for dogs already licensed if the owner meets certain requirements, such as being at least 18 years old, maintaining liability insurance of at least $100,000, the dog is sterilized and microchipped, the dog is confined and there is a "PIT BULL DOG" sign. Failure by the owner to comply shall subject the pit bull to immediate impoundment and disposal.
|
Local Ordinance | ||
| American Wild Horse Preservation Campaign v. Vilsack | 133 F. Supp. 3d 200 (D.D.C. 2015) | 2015 WL 5726880 (D.D.C., 2015) | The American Wild Horse Preservation Campaign (Plaintiffs) brought this action against the United States Forest Service (Forest Service) to prevent the implementation of the new Devil’s Garden Wild Horse Territory Plan (WHT) that Modoc County helped develop. Plaintiffs brought six claims against defendants, all under the Administrative Procedures Act. In Counts I, II, and III, plaintiffs alleged that the boundary clarification was arbitrary and capricious because it violated the Wild Horses Act, the National Forest Management Act (NFMA), and National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), and in Counts IV, V, and VI, they claimed that the adjustment to the "appropriate management level" (AML) range was arbitrary and capricious because it was contrary to the same three statutes. Because the Forest Service reasonably concluded that the disputed territory was never formally incorporated into the Devil's Garden WHT, and that any references to one contiguous territory were the result of administrative error, the Court found that it was not arbitrary and capricious or in violation of the law for the Forest Service to act to correct the boundary in the 2013 Environmental Assessment and the 2013 Management Plan. Thus, defendants were entitled to summary judgment on Counts I, II, and III. And because the Forest Service articulated a rational basis for its decision to adjust the AML range for the Devil's Garden WHT that was not counter to record evidence or otherwise contrary to the law, the Court found that defendants were also entitled to summary judgment on Counts IV, V, and VI. Thus, plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment was denied, defendants' cross-motion for summary judgment was granted, and because they sought the same relief as defendants, the intervenor-defendants' cross-motion for summary judgment was denied as moot. | Case | |
| WV - Scientific research - § 20-2-50. Permit to hunt, kill, etc., wildlife for scientific or propagation purposes | W. Va. Code, § 20-2-50 | WV ST § 20-2-50 | Under this West Virginia law, the director may issue a permit to a person to hunt, kill, take, capture or maintain in captivity wildlife exclusively for scientific purposes, but not for any commercial purposes. | Statute | |
| Iris Lewis v. Al DiDonna, Pharmacist; James DiDonna, Pharmacist; Eckerd Drug Store of Stone Ridge, New York; Eckerd Corporation |
In this case, the plaintiff brought her dog of nine years to a veterinarian and was given a prescription for an anti-inflammatory drug called Feldene to treat the dog’s condition. After the dog died of renal failure complications, plaintiff discovered that the Feldene prescription was mislabeled by the pharmacist. The Supreme Court, Appellate Division for the Third Judicial Department held that the allegations in plaintiff’s verified complaint sufficiently allege defendant’s wanton and reckless disregard of plaintiff’s rights to survive a motion to dismiss. Further, the court noted that while plaintiff did not appeal the dismissal of her cause of action for loss of companionship, the court made it clear that loss of companionship is not cognizable cause of action in the state of New York. |
Pleading | |||
| Taylor v. RSPCA | [2001] EWHC Admin 103 | [2001] 2 Cr App R 24; (2001) 165 JP 567; [2001] Crim LR 388; (2001) 165 JPN 625 |
Two women, who had been disqualified from keeping horses by a court, transferred ownership of the horses to their niece, but had continued to make arrangements for the accommodation of the horses and to provide food and water for them. The women were convicted in the Magistrates' Court of the offence of "having custody" of the horses in breach of the disqualification order, and appealed. Dismissing the appeal, the Divisional Court held that, what amounted to "custody" was primarily a matter of fact for the lower court to decide, and that the local justices had been entitled to conclude that, notwithstanding the transfer of ownership, the two women had continued to be in control, or have the power to control, the horses. |
Case | |
| Deardorff v. Farnsworth | 343 P.3d 687, review denied, 358 Or. 145 (2015) | 268 Or.App. 844 (2015) |
In this case, the Oregon Court of Appeals was reviewing whether or not the trial court erred in holding that an insurance company was estopped from relying on an exclusion in an insurance policy. The plaintiffs in this case were transporting horses in California that were owned by other when the trailer carrying the horses caught fire. The insurers for the horse owners compensated the horse owners and then filed an action against plaintiffs. As a result, plaintiffs charged the defense of the action to their insurer, OMI. OMI refused to provide a defense for the plaintiffs, arguing that it was not covered in the insurance policy. Plaintiffs filed an action against OMI to recover the costs arguing that they were verbally told that this would be covered in the policy. The trial court ordered summary judgment for the plaintiffs, holding that OMI was estopped from denying liability because it had breached its contract with plaintiff. Ultimately, the court of appeals reviewed the issue and determined that the trial court had erred in its decision. The court of appeals found that based on applicable case law, estoppel cannot be used to negate an express exclusion in an insurance policy. As a result, the court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case. |
Case | |
| VA - Property - § 3.2-6585. Dogs and cats deemed personal property; rights relating thereto | Va. Code Ann. § 3.2-6585 | VA ST § 3.2-6585 | This Virginia statute provides that all dogs and cats shall be deemed personal property and may be the subject of larceny and malicious or unlawful trespass. It further grants authority to animal control officers to seize a stolen dog or cat pending court action. | Statute |