Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RI - Ordinances - § 4-13-3. Prior ordinances preserved | Gen. Laws, 1956, § 4-13-3 | RI ST § 4-13-3 | This Rhode Island statute provides that nothing in the state laws concerning dogs shall be construed as to repeal any ordinance concerning dogs, which has been passed by any town or city council. | Statute | |
| NC - Fur/Dealer Licenses - Chapter 113. Conservation and Development. | N.C.G.S.A. § 113-273 | NC ST § 113-273 | Defines "dealer" and all rules applicable to obtaining a dealer license. Defines "fur-dealer license" and "fur dealers" as those involved in the lawful buying and selling of wild animals or their skins, pelts, or fur. Defines "controlled hunting preserve operator licenses," "game bird propagation licenses," "furbearer propagation licenses" and "taxidermy licenses." | Statute | |
| Unified Sportsmen of Pennsylvania ex rel. their members v. Pennsylvania Game Com'n | 03 A.2d 117 (Pa.Cmwlth., 2006) | 2006 WL 2009061 (Pa.Cmwlth.) |
A Pennsylvania association consisting of hunters and outdoorsmen and members of the association filed a complaint/request for writ of mandamus against the Pennsylvania Game Commission, Department of Conservation and Natural Resources (DCNR), and various state officials, seeking an order directing Commission and DCNR to provide the data and information on which the Commission relied in setting "harvest" figures for Pennsylvania's deer population. Before this Court in our original jurisdiction are the preliminary objections of the Pennsylvania Game Commission , the Pennsylvania Department of Conservation and Natural Resources, and certain Commonwealth officers (collectively, Respondents). The court first found that the Sportsmen indeed have standing, conferred both by statute and under the under the traditional substantial-direct-immediate test. However, Respondent Game Commission's demurrer was sustained, primarily because the court agreed that due to the ambiguous nature of Sportsmen's pleading, it is not possible to discern a legal theory to support the relief requested. Further, the court sustained Respondent's claim that the DCNR, its Secretary, and the state's Governor were not proper parties to association's suit. Despite these procedural defects, the court did not dismiss the Sportsmen's action, and instead allowed them to amend their complaint within 30 days of this order. |
Case | |
| State v. Hammond | 569 S.W.3d 21 (Mo. Ct. App. Nov. 13, 2018) | Defendant Hammond appeals his conviction for misdemeanor animal abuse in violation of § 578.012. The facts underlying the conviction stem from defendant’s conduct with a horse. In 2016, police were dispatched to a horse that was "down" on a road. The officer observed multiple injuries on the horse's hooves, fetlocks, and lower legs. Its hooves were severely abraded, which was confirmed by subsequent veterinary examination. Another officer observed markings on the road indicative of a "blood trail" from defendant's residence to the location of the horse. According to this officer, defendant told him that he had been "doing farrier stuff to his horses and this particular horse had broke away from them five times and broke a couple of lead lines, burned some people’s hands, and that he was going to teach the horse a lesson." Ultimately, the officers were able to get the horse to stand and loaded into a trailer. It later died at the animal clinic to where it was taken. Defendant was charged with felony animal abuse and a jury trial was held. The jury convicted defendant of the lesser-included misdemeanor animal abuse. On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred by refusing to allow his counsel to read Missouri's right-to-farm amendment when it instructed the jury on the amendment. The court noted that, similar to a prior case evoking the right-to-farm amendment, the amendment itself was not intended to nullify or curtail longstanding laws. The prohibition against animal cruelty existed in some form in the Missouri code for 145 years. Further, the court disagreed with defendant's contention that his prosecution criminalized a legitimate farming practice. The jury convicted defendant based on a finding that, when he pulled the horse behind his truck, his conscious object was to cause injury or suffering to the horse. While defendant contends that his was employing a legitimate, established farming technique to "train" the horse, the jury rejected his claim. Defendant's claim on appeal that the animal abuse law could then be used to prosecute farmers for other legitimate farming activities (i.e., branding, castration, use of whips, etc.) was also rejected. The court found that the conscious object of such activities is not to inflect pain or suffering, but to achieve another goal. The pain is "incidental to the farmer's legitimate objectives." The jury found this not to be the case with defendant. Thus, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to allow Hammond to read the right-to-farm amendment to the jury, and when it refused to instruct the jury on the amendment’s terms. Affirmed. | Case | ||
| Anti-cruelty laws that restrain future ownership of animals | This map surveys state laws that allow sentencing courts to restrict future ownership or possession of animals by those convicted of animal cruelty, commonly called "Possession Bans." To date (2024), it appears that 39 states have such laws. Generally, these laws apply only to felony convictions except for a couple states. With some state laws like Indiana, Missouri, and Texas, the possession ban covers only the animals who were subject to the cruelty and any other animals possessed by defendant at the time of the offense. Kansas' law makes those convicted of dogfighting who own dogs within five years of conviction a separate crime. Uniquely, Kentucky's laws restrain ownership if the crime involved sexual assault of an animal or if the animal at issue was an equine. The law does not prevent ownership of future animals. Most laws do address the issue of future animals, though. The most common number of years under which ownership of animals is enjoined by the court is five (5) years. However, California allows ten (10) years for a felony conviction and Delaware expands this to fifteen (15) years. Several states including Maine, Michigan, and Washington enable courts to impose permanent relinquishment of the ability to own or possess animals. The majority of states allow the sentencing court to affix a “reasonable” term of restricted ownership. Some states describe this as a term the judge feels “necessary” or “appropriate.” A few states even limit the ability of the defendant to work with animals in current or future jobs for certain convictions. These laws are distinguished from pre-conviction forfeiture laws that authorize law enforcement or humane officers to impound animals subject to suspected cruel treatment during the pendency of the proceedings. | State map | |||
| NY - Racing - § 220. Licenses for participants and employees at race meetings | McKinney's Racing, Pari Mutuel Wagering and Breeding Law § 220 | NY RAC PARI-M § 220 | The state racing and wagering board issues licenses to owners, trainers, assistant trainers and jockeys, jockey agents, and stable employees for horse races, including steeplechases. | Statute | |
| MI - Cruelty - 712A.18l. Juveniles, guilty of cruelty to animals or arson; court ordered psychiatric or psychological treatment | M. C. L. A. 712A.18l | MI ST 712A.18l | This statute provides that if a juvenile is found to be within the court's jurisdiction for an offense that, if committed by an adult, would be a violation of the Michigan penal code relating to either cruelty to animals or arson, the court shall order that the juvenile be evaluated to determine if he or she needs psychiatric or psychological treatment. If the court determines that psychiatric or psychological treatment is appropriate, the court may order that treatment in addition to any other treatments or penalties allowed by law. | Statute | |
| Carter v. Metro North Associates | 255 A.D.2d 251, 1998 N.Y. Slip Op. 10266 (N.Y.A.D. 1 Dept.,1998) | 255 A.D.2d 251, 1998 N.Y. Slip Op. 10266 (N.Y.A.D. 1 Dept.,1998) |
In this New York case, a tenant sued his landlords for injuries after he was bitten on face by pit bull owned by another tenant. The lower court denied the landlords' motion for summary judgment and granted partial summary judgment for tenant on issue of liability. On appeal, the Supreme Court, Appellate Division held that the trial court erroneously took judicial notice of vicious nature of breed of pit bulls as a whole. In fact, the court found that the IAS court "erred in circumventing the requirement for evidence concerning the particular animal by purporting to take judicial notice of the vicious nature of the breed as a whole." Thus, the landlords were not strictly liable for the tenant's injuries where there was no evidence indicating that the dog had ever attacked any other person or previously displayed any vicious behavior. |
Case | |
| US - Wolf - Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Final Rule Designating | 2007 WL 408325 (F.R.) |
Establishes the Western Great Lakes Distinct Population Segment (DPS) of the gray wolf and removes the DPS from the list of endangered and threatened wildlife. |
Administrative | ||
| Orangutana, Sandra s/ Habeas Corpus | Orangutana, Sandra s/ Habeas Corpus | This decision was decided on an appeal of the writ of habeas corpus brought on behalf of an orangutan named Sandra after it was denied in its first instance. Pablo Buompadre, President of the Association of Officials and Attorneys for the Rights of Animals (AFADA) brought a writ of habeas corpus against the Government of the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires and the City Zoological Garden of Buenos Aires on behalf of the hybrid of two different orangutan species, Sandra. AFADA sought the immediate release and relocation of Sandra to the primate sanctuary of Sorocaba, in the State of Sao Paulo in Brazil. AFADA argued that Sandra had been deprived illegitimately and arbitrarily of her freedom by the authorities of the zoo, and that her mental and physical health was at the time deeply deteriorated, with imminent risk of death. For the first time, basic legal rights were granted to an animal. In this case, Argentina’s Federal Chamber of Criminal Cassation ruled that animals are holders of basic rights. The Court stated that “from a dynamic and non-static legal interpretation, it is necessary to recognize [Sandra] an orangutan as a subject of rights, as non-human subjects (animals) are holders of rights, so it imposes her protection." | Case |