Results
Displaying 6591 - 6600 of 6638
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Center for Biological Diversity v. Haaland | 998 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2021) | This case is a challenge to a decision by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service ("Service") reversing its previous decision that the Pacific walrus qualified for listing as an endangered or threatened species under the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (“ESA”). In 2008, the Center for Biological Diversity (“Center”) petitioned the Service to list the Pacific walrus as threatened or endangered, citing the claimed effects of climate change on its habitat. In 2011, after completing a species status assessment, the Service issued a 45-page decision ("Decision") that found the listing of the Pacific walrus was warranted, but it declined to list the species because it found the need to prioritize more urgent listings. A settlement between the parties in 2017 required the Service to submit a proposed rule or a non-warranted finding. In May of 2017, the Service completed a final species assessment ("Assessment") that concluded some of the stressors to the species had "declined in magnitude" and the walruses had adjusted, which culminated in "a terse 3-page final decision that the Pacific walrus no longer qualified as a threatened species." As a result, in 2018, the Center filed this action alleging that the 2017 Decision violated the APA and ESA. The District Court granted summary judgement to the Service and this appeal followed. The Ninth Circuit first observed that, while the Assessment contains some new information, it does not explain why this new information resulted in an about-face from the Service's 2011 conclusion that the Pacific walrus met the statutory criteria for listing. The Service contends the appellate inquiry must be limited to the 3-page Decision document from 2017. However, the Court noted that a review of the reasons offered by the Service in its appellate briefing illustrates why the Court cannot conduct the required appellate review without reference to the previous Assessment. The agency's new policy contradicts its prior policy (the Decision document which was 40+ more pages longer than the Assessment and includes citations and other data). The Ninth Circuit now holds that the Service did not sufficiently explain why it changed its prior position. As a result, the Court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Service and remanded it to the District Court to direct the Service to provide a sufficient explanation of its new position. | Case | ||
| Gonzalez v. Royalton Equine Veterinary Services, P.C. | 7 N.Y.S.3d 756 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015) | 2015 N.Y. Slip Op. 03632 | Veterinarian contacted State Police after allegedly observing deplorable conditions in Plaintiff's barn. The premises were subsequently searched, and a horse and three dogs were removed and later adopted. Plaintiff commenced an action in City Court for, inter alia, replevin, and several defendants asserted counterclaims based on Lien Law § 183. The Lockport City Court entered partial summary judgment in favor of owner and ordered return of animals. On appeal, the Niagara County Court, reversed and remanded. Owner appealed to the Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department, New York. The Court found the Niagara County Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, Inc. (SPCA) was not required to bring a forfeiture action to divest Plaintiff of ownership of the seized animals because the animals were kept in unhealthful or unsanitary surroundings, the plaintiff was not properly caring for them, and the plaintiff failed to redeem the animals within five days before the SPCA was authorized to make the animals available for adoption. The city court’s order was affirmed as modified. | Case | |
| Tunisia - Cruelty - Animal Transport (in French) | Journal officiel de la République tunisienne nº 6, 19 janvier 2007, p. 189 à 191. | This Order, in French, establishes the technical and sanitary requirements for the transport of animals subject to the procedures of identification. These conditions are designed to ensure the comfort of the animal. | Statute | ||
| US - Marine Mammals - Taking and Importing of Marine Mammals; Deterrence Regulations and Guidelines | 1995 WL 258491 (F.R.) | RIN 0648-AH19 |
The Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) Amendments of 1994 provided new authority to citizens of the United States to deter marine mammals from: Damaging fishing gear and catch; damaging private property; endangering public safety; or damaging public property. The Amendments require NMFS to publish a list of guidelines for use in safely deterring marine mammals and to prohibit deterrence measures that have a significant adverse impact on marine mammals. This proposed rule sets forth preliminary versions of the guidelines and prohibitions, and seeks public comment upon which to refine them. |
Administrative | |
| AZ - Pet Trusts - Honorary trusts; trusts | A. R. S. § 14-2907; A. R. S. § 14-10408 | AZ ST § 14-2907; AZ ST § 14-10408 | This Arizona statute allows for the creation of a trust for a designated domestic or pet animal, and must be performed in 21 years or less. The trust terminates when no living animal is covered by the trust; the remaining property is distributed according to statute and cannot be converted by the trustee. | Statute | |
| Connecticut General Statutes 1918: Chapter 337: Section 6546 | Conn. Gen. Stat. § 6546 (1918) | Section 6546 of Chapter 337 from the 1918 General Laws of Connecticut covers jurisdiction and powers of courts. Specifically, the statute states the power of the court to issue search warrants for animal cruelty. | Statute | ||
| American Bald Eagle v. Bhatti | 9 F.3d 163 (Mass.,1993) | 24 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,173 C.A.1 (Mass.,1993) |
A group of animal preservationists filed suit to enjoin deer hunting on a Massachusetts reservation because it contended that the activity posed such a risk to bald eagles so as to constitute a prohibited “taking” under the ESA. The essence of the plaintiff's argument was that some of the deer shot by hunters would not be recovered and then eagles would consume these deer thereby ingesting the harmful lead slugs from the ammunition. The district court denied the preliminary injunction, ruling that appellants failed to show a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits. On appeal of the denial for injunction, this Court held that plaintiff failed to meet the showing of actual harm under the ESA. There was no showing in the record of harm to any bald eagles during the deer hunt of 1991 and the record fully supported the trial judge's conclusion.
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Case | |
| United States v. McKittrick | 142 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 1998) |
Defendant McKittrick shot and killed a wolf in Montana. Defendant claimed that the federal government's importing of wolves from Canada violated the Endangered Species Act because that Act required that imported "experimental populations" had to be "wholly separate" from any other populations of the same species. McKittrick claimed that because there had been lone wolf sightings in the area before the wolves were brought from Canada to the Yellowstone region, the new population was not "wholly separate" from an existing population. The court held that the regulations importing the wolves from Canada were valid because a few lone wolves do not constitute a "population", and that therefore defendant was guilty of unlawfully taking a wolf. |
Case | ||
| IL - Police animals - 50/3.55. Scope of practice | 210 I.L.C.S. 50/3.55 | IL ST CH 210 § 50/3.55 | This Illinois law provides that an EMR, EMT, EMT-I, A-EMT, PHRN, PHAPRN, PHPA, or Paramedic may transport a police dog injured in the line of duty to a veterinary clinic or similar facility if there are no persons requiring medical attention or transport at that time. For the purposes of this subsection, “police dog” means a dog owned or used by a law enforcement department or agency in the course of the department or agency's work, including a search and rescue dog, service dog, accelerant detection canine, or other dog that is in use by a county, municipal, or State law enforcement agency. | Statute | |
| Animal Transition in Spain |
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