Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Proyecto Amparo en revisión 630, 2017 | Proyecto Amparo en revisión 630, 2017 | This is a draft of a withdrawn "Amparo" decision, but it is relevant as it highlights the connection between the human right to a healthy environment and the duty to protect animals. In particular, it sheds light on how this right influences the legal assessment of bullfighting's legality. In this case, plaintiff, Promociones y Espectáculos Zapaliname, S.A. de C.V., a company specializing in organizing bullfighting events, filed a legal action against various governmental entities and individuals in the state of Coahuila, in Mexico. The plaintiff challenged the 2015 amendment to Coahuila's animal protection law, which prohibited bullfighting and similar practices, on the grounds that it violated their rights to work, property, and cultural expression. The lower court dismissed the case regarding Article 20, Section XV of the animal protection law due to a lack of legal interest and because these provisions were not applicable to the case. The court also rejected the Amparo concerning Article 20, Section XIV of the same law. The case was appealed and eventually transferred to the Supreme Court of Justice. The Second Chamber of the Supreme Court, after hearing the case de novo, upheld the constitutionality of Article 20, Section XIV of Coahuila's animal protection law. The judge emphasized that the right to a healthy environment includes the protection of animals as an element of the environment, moving away from viewing animals purely as property. The court highlighted the presence of various laws recognizing the need for humane treatment of animals and prohibiting cruelty, even though Mexico lacks a national anti-cruelty law. This legal framework justified the ban on bullfighting and supported the broader legislative objective of protecting and treating animals with dignity. The court argued that allowing bullfighting caused suffering and death for the sake of entertainment, which was detrimental to the societal interest of protecting the environment and species conservation, as established in Article 4 of the Constitution. It also stressed the importance of governments adopting gradual measures to protect animals, and regressing on these measures would be undesirable. | Case | |
| Rule v. Fort Dodge Animal Health, Inc. | 604 F.Supp.2d 288 (D.Mass.,2009) | 2009 WL 678744 (D.Mass.) |
The plaintiff brought this action against Defendants Fort Dodge Animal Health, Inc. and Wyeth Corporation, seeking economic damages suffered from the purchase and injection of her dog with ProHeart® 6 to prevent heartworm. The complaint alleged products liability/failure to warn, breach of implied warranty of merchantability, and violation of state deceptive business practices, among others. In 2004, defendants recalled ProHeart® 6 in response to a request by FDA due to reported adverse reactions. This Court found that Massachusetts law follows the traditional “economic loss rule,” where such losses are not recoverable in in tort and strict liability actions where there has been no personal injury or property damage. Here, the plaintiff was barred from recovering because she has not alleged any personal injury or property damage under her products liability claim. Further, plaintiff failed to show that defendants' deceptive act caused some injury and compsensable loss. Defendants' motion to dismiss was granted. |
Case |
| Rotunda v. Haynes | 33 Misc.3d 68 (App. Term 2011) | 933 N.Y.S.2d 803, 75 UCC Rep.Serv.2d 808, 2011 N.Y. Slip Op. 21360 | The plaintiff in this case filed suit against the defendant, a dog breeder, to recover medical fees after receiving a dog that had a “severe genetic heart defect.” The dog was purchased by a third party and given to plaintiff as a gift. The court in this case held that the plaintiff was not entitled to damages under the General Business Law or the Uniform Commercial Code. The court held that the plaintiff was not entitled to damages under the General Business Law because the dog was not actually purchased by plaintiff. In addition, the plaintiff was not entitled to recover under the Uniform Commercial Code because plaintiff was unable to establish “privity with the defendant or personal injuries arising from the alleged defect,” which are required in order to recover damages. The judgment was affirmed. | Case |
| US - AWA - 1966 Public Law 89-544 | 1966 PL 89-544 |
As stated in Senate Report No. 1280 there were three main purposes for the proposed law in 1966: (1) to protect the owners of pet dogs and cats from the theft of their pets; (2) to prevent the use or sale of stolen dogs or cats for purposes of research or experimentation; and (3) to establish humane standards for the treatment of dogs, cats, and certain other animals by animal dealers and research facilities. |
Statute | |
| Bogart v. Chapell | 396 F.3d 548 (4th Cir., 2005) |
A woman was housing hundreds of animals in her residential home, the animals were seized and more than two hundred of them were euthanized. The woman brought a section 1983 claim against the county sheriff's department and human society. The trial court granted defendants summary judgment and the Court of Appeals affirmed holding no viable due process claim existed arising from the euthanization. |
Case | |
| Ecuador - Animal rights - Civil Code | CÓDIGO CIVIL | Even though the constitution has indirectly granted animals rights as they are part of nature, they continue to be categorized as movable objects by the civil code. However, the most recent reform to the civil code is from 2005, meaning the current civil code still needs to be updated to comply with the 2008 constitution and subsequent constitutional court decisions. Article 585 defines movable objects as those that can be transported from one place to another, either by their force, like animals (which is why they are called “semovientes”), or by an external force, like inanimate things. Article 639 states that “domestic animals are subject to domain” (or complete ownership). It is important to note that the bill for animal welfare is currently in the hands of the National Assembly. Changing the categorization of animals in the civil code to “sentient beings” is one of the many topics regulated by this bill. | Statute | |
| Alternatives Research & Development Foundation v. Glickman | 101 F.Supp.2d 7 (D.D.C.,2000) |
In this case, the plaintiffs, a non-profit organization, a private firm and an individual, alleged that the defendants, the USDA and APHIS violated the mandate of the Animal Welfare Act (AWA) by promulgating regulations that exclude birds, mice and rats from the definition of “animal” under the Act. Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that all three plaintiffs lack standing to bring suit. Defendants also moved to dismiss on the grounds that the exclusion of the three species is within the agency's Congressionally delegated discretion, not subject to judicial review. The court denied defendant's motion, holding that based on Lujan , defendants challenge to standing failed. Further, the AWA does not grant the USDA "unreviewable discretion" to determine what animals are covered under the AWA. |
Case | |
| WV - Lien - § 38-11-4. Lien of bailee of animals or vehicles | W. Va. Code, § 38-11-4 | WV ST § 38-11-4 | This West Virginia law (as it relates to animals) states the a person who keeps a livery stable, or boarding stable for animals, or one who boards, pastures, feeds or trains animals for hire, has a lien upon such animals for the sum due him for the care, boarding, pasturage, feeding, or training of such animals, or the care, keeping of such animals. This lien exists even though such animals are permitted to be taken out of the possession of the one claiming such lien even if the contract has not yet terminated for the lien. The purchaser of such an animal, while out of the possession of the person claiming the lien, can take the property free of the lien unless he or she had actual notice of the lien at the time of purchase. | Statute |
| EU - Research - Directive 2010.63.EU | Directive 2010/63/EU | Directive 2010/63/EU revises Directive 86/609/EEC on the protection of animals used for scientific purposes. It aims to replace, reduce and refine the use of animals in research procedures by using alternative approaches. The directive applies to live non-human vertebrate animals, including independently feeding larval forms and foetal forms of mammals in the last trimester, and live cephalopods. The directive also applies to animals used in procedures, which are at an earlier stage of development than that referred to above, if the animal is to be allowed to live beyond that stage of development and, as a result of the procedures performed, is likely to experience pain, suffering, distress or lasting harm after it has reached that stage of development. It also sets out provisions for risk-based inspections and lays down minimum care standards. | Statute | |
| MX - Bird - Parrot Ban in Spanish (DECREE by which article 60 2 to the General Law of Wildlife) | artículo 60 Bis 2 a la Ley General de Vida Silvestre |
(Text of law in Spanish). The ban prohibits the capture, export and import of 22 Mexican parrot species. The ban on imports was needed because most species are shared with Central and South American countries and many were being imported and used as cover up for illegal trade. The ban was approved by Congress last April by consensus and it was originally drafted after a presentation of a 2007 report, "The Illegal Parrot Trade in Mexico: A Comprehensive Assessment." The report revealed for the first time the volume of the illegal trade of parrots within Mexico. An estimated 65,000 -78,500 wild parrots and macaws are captured illegally each year, with more than 75 percent of the birds dying before ever reaching a purchaser. The measure was passed in late October of 2008. |
Statute |