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Title Citation Alternate Citation Summary Type
Northern Ireland - Farm animal - Welfare of Farmed Animals Regulations (Northern Ireland) 2012 2012 No. 156 Regulations placing duties on persons responsible for farmed animals, to include: the conditions under which animals are kept; and specific conditions for laying hens, reared meat chickens, caves, cattle, pigs and rabbits. Statute
NY - Research animals - § 239-b. Research dogs and cats McKinney's Education Law § 239-b NY EDUC § 239-b This New York law, effective in 2016, provides that a publicly-funded higher education research facility must assess the health of the dog or cat and determine whether it is suitable for adoption after the research and testing on the animal is completed. That research facility must then make reasonable efforts to offer for adoption the dog or cat determined to be suitable for adoption, either through private placement or through an animal rescue/organization. Statute
ND - Veterinary - Chapter 43-29. Veterinarians NDCC 43-29-01 to 19; 43-29.1-01 - 08 ND ST 43-29-01 to 19; 43-29.1-01 - 08 These are the state's veterinary practice laws. Among the provisions include licensing requirements, laws concerning the state veterinary board, veterinary records laws, and the laws governing disciplinary actions for impaired or incompetent practitioners. Statute
KY - Assistance Animal - Assistance Animal/Guide Dog Laws KRS §§ 525.010 - 220; 258.500, 258.991; 189.575; 383.085 KY ST § 525.010 - 220; 258.500, 258.991; 189.575; 383.085 The following statutes comprise the state's relevant assistance animal and service animal laws. Statute
Cavallini v. Pet City and Supply 848 A.2d 1002 (Pa. 2004) 2004 PA Super 141

Appellant, Pet City and Supplies, Inc. appealed from the judgment in the amount of $1,638.52 entered in favor of Appellee, Christopher A. Cavallini following a bench trial. The trial court determined that Cavallini was entitled to damages due to Pet City's violations of the Dog Purchaser Protection provisions of the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (UTPCPL). Cavallini purchased a Yorkshire terrier puppy from Pet City that was represented as a pure bred. After several attempts, Pet City failed to supply Cavallini with the requisite registration papers. On appeal, Pet City contended that the trial court erred as a matter of law by determining a private action can be brought under the Dog provisions of the UTPCPL, and erred as a matter of law by imposing a civil penalty against Pet City under the UPTCPL. In finding that the statute does provide a private cause of action, the court looked to the purpose of the statute rather than the plain language. However, the court found the inclusion of a civil penalty in the part that allows a private action was inconsistent with the statute.

Case
Bedford v. Jorden 698 P.2d 854 (Mont. 1985) 215 Mont. 508 (Mont. 1985)

This action was brought by Dale C. Bedford, appellant, on an amended complaint on two counts seeking special damages in the amount of $750, unspecified general damages, and $50,000 in punitive damages against E.E. Jorden, a Billings, Montana veterinarian and his partnership. The first count of complaint alleges that the defendant, Dr. Jorden, willfully or by gross negligence broke, or allowed to be broken a wing of a parrot belonging to the appellant, Bedford. The second count alleges that Dr. Jorden and his business willfully, wantonly or maliciously failed to provide adequate care for the parrot. The court found that the interrogatories and depositions of all witnesses, including the appellant, indicate that there was no evidence produced that would establish a prima facie case of negligence, let alone intentional cruelty or inhumanity to animals.

Case
Coe v. Lewsader 64 N.E.3d 817, appeal denied, 77 N.E.3d 81 (Ill. 2017) 2016 IL App (4th) 150841, 2016 WL 5679604 In this case, Ryan and Hillary Coe filed suit against Eric and Trish Lewsader for damages resulting from an accident involving the Lewsader’s dog. Ryan Coe was driving his motorcycle while intoxicated on a public highway when he hit the Lewsader’s dog that was lying in the middle of the street. Coe suffered severe injuries as a result of the accident and filed suit against the Lewsader’s according to Section 16 of the Illinois Animal Attacks or Injuries statute. According to the Act, “if a dog or other animal, without provocation, attacks, attempts to attack, or injures any person who is peaceably conducting himself or herself in any place where he or she may lawfully be, the owner of such dog or other animal is liable in civil damages.” In order to be awarded damages under the Act, the Coe’s needed to establish “some overt act” of the Lewsader’s dog . As a result, the question before the court was whether or not the Lewsader’s dog was acting overtly when it was lying in the middle of the street at the time of the accident. Ultimately, the court held that the dog was not acting overtly by lying in the middle of the street. Also, the court rejected the Coe’s argument that the dog had acted overtly when it walked into the street before lying down. The court rejected this argument because the overt act needed to take place at the time of the injury, not before. As a result, the court found that the Lewsader’s were not liable for civil damages under the Act because the dog had not acted overtly at the time of accident and therefore the Act did not apply in this situation. Case
MI - Enforcement - Chapters 760 to 777 Code of Criminal Procedure. M. C. L. A. 764.16 MI ST 764.16 This law authorizes private citizens to make arrests. Statute
HI - Disaster; Accomodations for Pets - Chapter 128. Civil Defense and Emergency Act. HRS § 127A-1, § 127A-2, and § 127A-19 (Formerly cited as HRS § 128-1 et seq.) These sections replace former HRS § 128-1. In terms of animal-related provisions, the definition for "evacuation" includes mention of animals. In the section on sheltering, the law states that "[c]ounty emergency management agencies shall be responsible for identifying and operating locations and facilities suitable for sheltering" both the public and pet animals. "Pet animal” has the same meaning as defined in section 711-1100. Statute
Marek v. Burmester 37 A.D.3d 668, 830 N.Y.S.2d 340, 2007 N.Y. Slip Op. 01527 37 A.D.3d 668, 830 N.Y.S.2d 340, 2007 N.Y. Slip Op. 01527

In this New York case, a bicyclist was injured after allegedly being chased and attacked by defendant's two dogs. The plaintiff-bicyclist sued to recover damages for his injuries. The Supreme Court , Putnam County, granted a defense motion for summary judgment, and the bicyclist appealed. The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, held that a genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether defendants had constructive notice of the dogs' proclivity to chase bicyclists on the roadway and as to whether those actions put others at risk of harm.

Case

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