Results
Displaying 5841 - 5850 of 6822
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sentencia Juicio de Amparo 1056/2021 - Elephant Ely - Do NOT publish | Case | |||
| Judgement Rol N°7880-11, Donnkan and Káiser - Chile | Judgement Rol N°7880-11, Donnkan and Kaiser - Chile | Judgement Rol N°7880-11, Donnkan and Kaiser - Chile | Defendant was found guilty of animal cruelty for killing Donnkan y Kaiser, two German Shepherds that were attacking a calf belonging to defendant's neighbor. The lower court sentenced him to 21 days of imprisonment and, suspension from public office during this time, and a fine of two monthly tax units. Defendant appealed, but the appeal was rejected. However, he was granted a suspended sentence. This decision talks about the victims of animal cruelty. The court states that under the criminal code, victims are those offended by the crime. "Although it is true that it can be considered that much progress has been made in the legal protection of animals and, fundamentally, in the protection of those, it has not come to be considered that they have the quality of victims as such of a criminal act because they are not people, and continue to be controlled by human beings who, as their owner, is the one who can be considered the victim." | Case |
| Facility Dogs/Courthouse Support Dogs | As of 2025, twenty (20) states have laws that allow the use of facility/courthouse dogs in some legal proceedings. | State map | ||
| News from around the world, provided by ICFAP January 2025 |
News from around the world, provided by ICFAP
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| GA - Hunting - Chapter 3. Wildlife Generally | Ga. Code Ann., § 27-3-22 | GA ST § 27-3-22 | Georgia is unique as it prohibits the killing, possession, sale, and transporting of eagles and other migratory birds except for the transportation of feathers into the state of non-migratory birds for millinery purposes (the making of hats or headdresses). | Statute |
| Loman v. Freeman | 890 N.E.2d 446 (Ill., 2008) | 229 Ill.2d 104 (Ill., 2008) | This case concerns surgical procedures performed on a racehorse that rendered the horse unfit for future racing. The horse's owners brought this action against the veterinarians who performed the surgical procedure, alleging negligence and conversion. The circuit court dismissed and the court of appeals reversed the decision of the lower court. At the state supreme court, the court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court. The court found that defendant was permanently deprived of the use of the horse due to its lameness from the surgery, which sustained the claim of conversion. | Case |
| Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Reynolds | 8 F.4th 781 (8th Cir. 2021) | This appeal centers around an Iowa statute called the “Agricultural Production Facility Fraud" law that prohibited accessing agricultural production facilities by false pretenses and making false statements as part of an employment application to an agricultural production facility. Animal rights organizations filed a § 1983 action against state and county officials contending the law violated the the First Amendment free speech clause. The district court ruled that both provisions are unconstitutional and entered an injunction against enforcement of the entire statute. Here, the Eighth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court found both the Access Provision and the Employment Provision constitute direct regulations of speech. However, the court held the conclude that the Access Provision's prohibition on assuming false pretenses to obtain access to an agricultural production facility is consistent with the First Amendment. In contrast, the Employment Provision did not survive strict scrutiny because is proscribes speech that is protected by the First Amendment and was not narrowly tailored. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the plaintiffs on Iowa Code § 717A.3A(1)(b), reversed the judgment declaring unconstitutional § 717A.3A(1)(a), vacated the injunction against enforcement of § 717A.3A(1)(a), (2), and (3), and remanded for further proceedings. | Case | |
| Concerned Dog Owners of California v. City of Los Angeles | 123 Cal.Rptr.3d 774 (Cal.App.2 Dist., 2011) | 194 Cal.App.4th 1219 (2011); 2011 WL 1601919 (Cal.App.2 Dist., 2011) |
Dog owners mounted a constitutional challenge to a Los Angeles municipal ordinance that required all dogs and cats within the city to be sterilized. The Court of Appeal held that the ordinance did not violate the owners’ freedom of association rights, free speech rights. or equal protection rights. The court held that it was not unconstitutionally vague, was not outside of the city's police powers, did not vest unfettered discretion in city officials, did not constitute an unconstitutional prior restraint or an unconstitutional taking. Finally, the law did not violate individual liberties under the California Constitution. |
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| State v. Crow | 429 P.3d 1053 (2018) | 294 Or. App. 88, 2018 WL 4353388 | This Oregon case discusses whether 11 miniature horses, multiple cats, and a dog are separate victims for purposes of merger into one conviction. Defendant appeals a judgment of conviction for 13 counts of unlawful possession of an animal by a person previously convicted of second-degree animal neglect. The facts are not at issue: Defendant was previously convicted of multiple counts of second-degree animal neglect involving dogs and miniature horses and was subsequently found to be in possession of those animals. On appeal, defendant's primary argument is that "the public is the single collective victim" for purposes of the violation, so the trial court erred in entering 13 separate convictions for unlawful possession of an animal. In support, defendant analogizes it to unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon, where the public is deemed the collective victim for purposes of merger. The State counters with the fact animals are living beings, unlike firearms, and that living beings can be victims of crimes. Further, the State contends that the language of ORS 161.067(2) and legislative history demonstrate an intent to protect individual animal victims. The court found that the text of statute shows an intent to protect individual animals of the same genus as previous crimes rather than protection of the public, generally. The court was not persuaded by defendant's contention that established links between animal cruelty and domestic violence show that the legislature intended to protect the public rather than individual animals when it enacted ORS 167.332(1). Legislative testimony for amendments to ORS 167.332 from animal experts detailed how difficult it was for judges to impose bans on possession before the passage of the amendment due to the way the law was previously written. Thus, the court concluded that the principal purpose of ORS 167.332(1) was to protect individual animals from further abuse and neglect, and to deter animal abuse and neglect where those individuals convicted show "an identifiable threat to a particular genus of animal." Here, in defendant's case, the trial court did not err when it entered 13 separate convictions for unlawful possession of an animal. Affirmed. | Case |
| Farm Sanctuary, Inc. v. Department of Food & Agriculture | 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 75 (Cal.App. 2 Dist.,1998.) |
Environmental group brought suit challenging regulation allowing ritual slaughter exception to statute requiring that animals be treated humanely. The Superior Courtupheld regulation and appeal was taken. The Court of Appeal, Masterson, J., held that: (1) group had standing to sue, and (2) regulation was valid. |
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