Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Moore v. Garner | 2005 WL 1022088 (E.D.Tex.) |
Complaints were made against a plaintiff-couple about the poor conditions for over 100 dogs and other animals that were living in on the couple’s farm. The couple who owned the farm failed to do anything about it and the animals were seized. Plaintiffs brought claims against sixty defendants (mainly Van Zandt County, Texas officials) for conspiracy and violations of the Hobbs Act, Animal Welfare Act, Animal Enterprise Protection Act, RICO, the Texas Constitution and other federal statutes. The trial court granted defendants' motion to dismiss and the District Court affirmed. |
Case | |
| England/Wales - Animal Welfare - Animal Welfare (Service Animals) Act 2019 | 2019 c.15 | This Act amends the Animal Welfare Act of 2006 (England and Wales). It makes it an offence to be cause unnecessary suffering to a service animal whilst in service, removing the defence to human safety from the Animal Welfare Act 2006. Also known as 'Finn's Law.' | Statute | |
| England, Wales & Scotland - Sales, live animal - The Welfare of Animals at Markets Order 1990 | 1990 No. 2628 | Rules covering the treatment of animals in markets, which make it an offence to cause or permit any injury or unnecessary suffering to an animal at a market. The Order also sets out specific arrangements in respect of penning, food and water and the care of young animals. | Statute | |
| Hendricks v. Barlow | 656 N.E.2d 481 (Ind. 1995) | 656 N.E.2d 481 (Ind. 1995) |
Landowners were held in violation of a zoning regulation, established under a Hendricks County ordinance, which forbade having wild animals residing on residential property. The trial court held that the county could not pass such a law, since it would be preempted by state and federal law. However, on appeal, this Court found that federal (the AWA) and state law did not preempt the County from passing such ordinances. The trial court erroneously attempted to interpret the law when it was not ambiguous, and, thus, preemption by state and federal law should not have been found. Thus, the zoning regulation was permitted. |
Case |
| US - Importation - CHAPTER 3. ANIMALS, BIRDS, FISH, AND PLANTS | 18 USCS § 42 | Under this federal law, no importation of certain listed animals is permitted. Whoever violates this section, or any regulation issued pursuant thereto, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than six months, or both. | Statute | |
| AL - Wildlife - § 9-2-13. Commissioner of Conservation and Natural Resources -- Authority to prohibit importation of birds, anim | Ala. Code 1975 § 9-2-13 | AL ST § 9-2-13 | This Alabama law provides that the Commissioner of Conservation and Natural Resources may, by regulation, prohibit the importation of any animal when such importation is not in the best interest of the state. However, this does not apply to those animals used for display purposes at circuses, carnivals, zoos, and other shows or exhibits. Importing a prohibited animal into the state is a Class C misdemeanor with a fine of $1,000 - 5,000, or jail for 30 days, or both. | Statute |
| Coyote v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service | (no F.Supp. citation) 1994 E.D. California |
Defendant brought a motion after the USFWS denied his application to obtain eagle feathers for religious use where defendant failed to obtain certification from the Bureau of Indian Affairs that he was a member of a federally-recognized tribe. The court held that this requirement is both contrary to the plain reading of that regulation and arbitrary and capricious. For discussion on formerly recognized tribes and the BGEPA, see Detailed Discussion. |
Case | |
| IN - Law enforcement - Chapter 42.5. Burial with Law Enforcement Animals or Service Animals | IC 23-14-42.5-1 - 7 | This chapter allows the cremated remains of a deceased law enforcement or military animal of a deceased owner to be scattered, placed, or interred in a manner described in this subsection before, after, or in conjunction with the interment of the remains of the deceased owner. The deceased animal's cremated remains may be scattered or placed on top of the deceased owner's burial plot or interred on top of the deceased owner's burial plot as long as the interment of the deceased animal's cremated remains does not encroach on a neighboring burial plot, involve disinterment of the owner, or involve digging greater than one foot of depth. The person owning the deceased animal must consent in writing and give this consent to the cemetery owner. If the deceased owner does not own the animal at the time of the deceased animal's death, the deceased owner may provide written notice in his or her last will, in a written designation to the cemetery, or in a funeral planning declaration. | Statute | |
| Haggblom v. City of Dillingham | 191 P.3d 991 (Alaska 2008) | This is an owner's appeal of the city order which ordered her dog be euthanized or banished from city limits because the dog bit a person without provocation. The order had been affirmed by the superior court and is now in front of the state Supreme Court. Haggblom argues that the ordinance is unconstitutional because it does not provide meaningful process, and is too vague because it does not explicitly offer the alternative of banishment from city limits. This court found that due process was satisfied and that the ordinance is constitutionally clear, and thus affirms the order. | Case | |
| Hoesch v. Broward County | 53 So.3d 1177 (Fla.App. 4 Dist., 2011) | 2011 WL 408882 (Fla.App. 4 Dist.) |
A Broward County, Florida ordinance defines a dangerous dog as “any dog that . . . [h]as killed or caused the death of a domestic animal in one incident.” Plaintiff Brian Hoesch’s dog escaped from Hoesch’s backyard and attacked and killed a neighbor’s cat. Prior to this incident, the dog had never been declared “dangerous” by any governmental authority. Hoesch requested a hearing after Broward’s animal control division notified Hoesch of its intent to destroy his dog. After a judgment in favor of Broward County, Hoesch contends that both county ordinances conflict with state law, section 767.11(1)(b), which defines a “dangerous dog” as any dog that “[h]as more than once severely injured or killed a domestic animal . . . .” The District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District, concluded “that Broward County ordinance sections 4-2(k)(2) and 4-12(j)(2) are null and void insofar as they conflict with state law.” |
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