Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| United States v. Charette | 893 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir., 2018) | 2018 WL 3117903, 18 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6479 (9th Cir. June 26, 2018) | Defendant Charette was convicted by bench trial of taking a grizzly bear behind his home in Montana in violation of the federal Endangered Species Act. On appeal, defendant challenges his conviction on three grounds: (1) there was insufficient evidence to infer that he did not have a permit to take the grizzly bear; (2) his request for a jury trial was improperly denied; and (3) the lower court incorrectly analyzed his self-defense claim under an objective standard as opposed to the correct subjective standard. On appeal here, the court observed that the plain language of the ESA and legislative history makes it clear that permits and exceptions under the ESA are affirmative defenses, and not elements of the crime. In this case, Charette had the burden of proving the existence of a valid permit, which he did not do at trial. The court also quickly dispensed with the Sixth Amendment jury trial issue, finding that the taking of a grizzly bear is a petty offense. As to defendant's last argument on his self-defense claim, this court did find that the trial court erred in applying an objectively reasonable standard. This error was not harmless because it affected defendant's decision to testify as to his subjective belief in the need for self-defense. As a result, this court reversed the district court's decision, vacated defendant's conviction, and remanded the case for further proceedings. | Case | |
| Hatfield v. Bd. of Supervisors of Madison Cty. | 235 So.3d 18 (Miss. Aug. 10, 2017) | 2017 WL 3452426 (Miss. Aug. 10, 2017) | This Mississippi Supreme Court decision considers the construction of a zoning ordinance that prohibits the "keeping or raising poultry" in the "R-1 Residential District" of Madison County. The property owner, Hatfield, was found to be violating R-1 by the Madison County Board of Supervisors after county officials found around 60 "ducks, geese and other fowl" on this property. Hatfield appealed this decision to the Circuit Court as arbitrary and capricious based on an unconstitutionally vague ordinance section. The Circuit Court, as the reviewing appellate body for the ordinance violation, found the Board's decision was supported by evidence and not arbitrary or capricious. On appeal by Hatfield, the Supreme Court first observed that there are two districts in appellant's subdivision: Agricultural and Residential. In the Agricultural Districts, breeding, raising, and feeding fowl is an expressly permitted use. Appellant lives the zoned Residential Estate District. While the R-1 zoning allows "livestock" and "grazing livestock" on tracts of land one acre or greater, it does not allow the breeding, raising, and feeding chickens, ducks, or other fowl as a permitted use. Hatfield suggested that grazing/livestock section (Section 601) could be interpreted to include poultry, fowl, and/or birds. However, the Supreme Court found that position unreasonable since the examples listed in the code section are "obviously limited to large, four-legged, hoofed animals." This is further supported by the fact raising fowl is expressly permitted in one district, but not the other. Thus, the Ordinance was sufficiently clear and not manifestly unreasonable. The circuit court's decision was affirmed. | Case | |
| UT - Endangered Species - Chapter 20. Enforcement--Violations and Penalties | U.C.A. 1953 § 23A-5-309 - 314 | UT ST § 23A-5-309 - 314 | This Utah statute criminalizes the intentional or reckless abandonment of a carcass or killing of wildlife for pecuniary gain. The statute lists the restitution value of species protected under the code (bald eagles $1,000 and golden eagles $500). Further, the statute proscribes mandatory incarceration for felony convictions (aggregate value of species taken over $500) where the motive of the individual was pecuniary gain. | Statute | |
| CT- Pet Shops - Sec. 22-344-21a. Prohibited sales | CT ADC § 22-344-32 - 94 | Regs. Conn. State Agencies § 22-344-32 - § 22-344-94 | This Connecticut regulation lists the animals of which the exhibition, sale or offer for sale by a pet shop is prohibited. The condition in which commercial kennel facilities, pet shops, grooming facilities, training facilities, and animal shelters must be kept are described including sanitation, health requirements, ventilation, and other structural requirements. | Administrative | |
| NY - Eagles - Chapter 43-B. Of the Consolidated Laws. | N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law § 11-0537 | NY ENVIR CONSER § 11-0537 | New York makes it illegal to "knowingly or with wanton disregard for the consequences" take, transport, possess, or engage in commerce of bald eagles or their parts without a valid permit. This incorporates the exact language of the federal act. | Statute | |
| State v. Overholt | 193 P.3d 1100 (Wash. App. Div. 3,2008) |
Defendant was convicted of several counts of second degree unlawful hunting of big game after a game agent (“agent”) followed vehicle tracks to Defendant’s home upon finding fresh cow elk gut piles, and Defendant showed the agent two cow elk carcasses hanging in Defendant’s shed. On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 3 found that because the agent was in fresh pursuit of criminal activity and did not enter Defendant’s property with the intent to obtain consent to search in order to evade a search warrant, the agent was not obligated to issue Ferrier warnings, and that suppressing the seized carcasses from evidence would not have altered the outcome of the case in light of the substantial evidence obtained prior to seizing the carcasses. |
Case | ||
| Schindler v. Mejias | 100 A.D.3d 1315 (N.Y.A.D. 3 Dept., 2012) | 2012 WL 5950370 (N.Y.A.D. 3 Dept.); 955 N.Y.S.2d 252 |
This appeal is an appeal of the denial of defendant's motion for summary judgment in a defamation action. Plaintiff, an attorney, brought an action against Hector L. Mejias Jr., an employee of defendant Ulster County Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, claiming that Mejias falsely accused him of misrepresenting himself as the Ulster County District Attorney during a sworn deposition. The statement occurred during an incident at the SPCA where Plaintiff-Schindler was trying to pick up a dog owned by his client. The particular issue on appeal is whether the supreme court erred in determining that Mejias's supporting deposition constitutes libel per se. The court found that the alleged act was sufficiently egregious because such a claim would suggest professional misconduct on an attorney's part and invites both disciplinary action and damage to an attorney's professional reputation. Further, defendants failed to meet their burden of showing an absence of malice. The order was affirmed. |
Case | |
| RSPCA v. McCormick | [2016] EWHC 928 (Admin) | It was held that for an animal fight to have taken place, contrary to Section 8 of the Animal Welfare Act, the following must have occurred: a "protected animal" must have been placed with another animal in an environment where the ability of both to escape is restricted and controlled by some person or persons connected with that activity or by some artificial restraint. ‘Placed with’ is to be construed as a ‘matter of normal language.’ | Case | ||
| RI - Spay/Neuter - Chapter 19. Animal Care. § 4-19-18. Penalties for violations | Gen.Laws 1956, § 4-19-18 | RI ST § 4-19-18 | This Rhode Island statute provides that violations of Sec. 4-19-16, relating to the mandatory spay/neuter agreement from a licensed releasing agency. Violations of the written agreement executed pursuant to § 4-19-16 by an adopting party are punishable by a fine of fifty dollars ($50.00) for the first offense, one hundred fifty dollars ($150) for the second offense and four hundred dollars ($400) for the third and subsequent offenses. Second and subsequent offenses may constitute grounds for seizure and forfeiture of the dog or cat. | Statute | |
| NC - Exotic pets - Chapter 153A. Counties. | N.C.G.S.A. § 153A-131; N.C.G.S.A. § 160A-187 | NC ST § 153A-131; NC ST § 160A-187 | These two North Carolina statutes provide that a city or county may by ordinance regulate, restrict, or prohibit the possession or harboring of animals which are dangerous to persons or property. | Statute |