Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Wildearth Guardians v. U.S. Department of the Interior | 205 F. Supp. 3d 1176 (D. Mont. 2016) | 2016 WL 4688080 (D. Mont. Sept. 7, 2016) | In this case, Wildearth Guardians filed suit to challenge the United States Fish and Wildlife Service’s designation of critical habitat for the Canada lynx. Wildearth argued that United States Fish and Wildlife Service wrongly excluded geographical areas in its final critical habitat designation. The areas that Wildearth argued should have been included in the designation were the Southern Rockies in Colorado, the Kettle Range of northeastern Washington, the state of Oregon, and certain National Forest lands in Montana and Idaho. Ultimately, the court reviewed Wildearth’s arguments and held that the Fish and Wildlife Service did wrongly exclude the Southern Rockies in Colorado and the National Forest lands in Montana and Idaho. With regard to the areas in Washington and Oregon, the court found that the Fish and Wildlife Service did not err in excluding in those areas from the critical habitat designation. The Fish and Wildlife Service used “primary constituent elements” (PCE) to determine which areas should be designated as a critical habitat for the Canada lynx. The court found that with respect to Colorado, there was a close call as to one of the of PCE’s and that the Service should have favored the lynx according to the standard set in the Endangered Species Act. Lastly, the court found that the Service also erred with respect to Montana and Idaho because it failed to comply with previous court orders to inspect the lands to determine whether or not the lands contained “physical and biological features essential to lynx recovery.” The court found that had the Service complied with these orders, it would have found that Montana and Idaho should have been included in the designation. The plaintiffs motions were granted in part and the matter was remanded to the Service for further action consistent with this order. The final rule remains in effect until the Service issues a new final rule on lynx critical habitat, at which time the September 2014 final rule will be superseded. | Case |
| Eshleman v. Key | 774 S.E.2d 96; 297 Ga. 364 (Ga., 2015) | 2015 WL 3936075 (Ga., 2015) | A county police officer failed to securely fasten her police dog’s portable kennel; the dog escaped as a result and attacked an 11 year old boy. The father of the boy sued the county police officer, alleging that she failed to restrain the dog. The officer moved for summary judgment on the ground of official immunity. The trial court denied her motion and the appeals court affirmed that decision. On issuing a writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case. As a county police officer and dog handler, the Court stated the officer was responsible for the care and maintenance of the dog at all times, even when she was not working. For that reason, the allegation that she failed to secure the dog outside her home concerned her performance of an official function and was presumptively entitled to official immunity—with two exceptions to that presumption. Since the father had not contended that the officer acted with malice or with intent to injure anyone, the issue was whether the officer acted with negligence in the performance of a ministerial function. Since the county had not given the officer specific directions about the extent to which the dog should be restrained and since a generalized duty of care stated in a state statute and county ordinance was not enough to amount to a ministerial duty, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision. | Case |
| FL - Equine Activity Liability Statute- Chapter 773. Equine Activities. | West's F. S. A. § 773.01 - 773.06 | FL ST § 773.01 - 773.06 | This Florida statute provides that an equine activity sponsor, an equine professional, or any other person shall not be liable for an injury to or the death of a participant resulting from the inherent risks of equine activities. Liability will not be limited by statute, however, where the equine professional or sponsor knew the tack or equipment was faulty, failed to make reasonable and prudent efforts to determine the ability of the participant to engage safely in the equine activity, owns or is otherwise in lawful possession of the land or facilities where the injury is attributable to a known dangerous latent condition, commits an act or omission that constitutes willful or wanton disregard for the safety of the participant, or intentionally injures the participant. Posting of warning signs alerting participants to the limitation of liability by law is also required. | Statute |
| Rossi v. Mohawk and Hudson River Humane Soc. | Slip Copy, 2009 WL 960204 (N.D.N.Y.) |
Petitioner-Debtor challenged the Bankruptcy Court’s denial of Petitioner’s application for a Temporary Restraining Order and for a stay pending appeal after the Mohawk and Hudson River Humane Society seized 23 cats from Petitioner’s prior home for failure to provide proper sustenance/cruelty to animals and subsequently obtained a bond against Petitioner for the cost of providing animal care. The United States District Court, N.D. New York denied Petitioner’s motion for leave to appeal requesting relief identical to that which was denied by the Bankruptcy Court, finding that the exhibits submitted show that Petitioner was currently charged with four misdemeanors, and that the commencement of the criminal charges against Petitioner and the posting of security pending the disposition of such criminal charges fall within the exception to the automatic stay under federal law. |
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| Bard v. Jahnke | 791 N.Y.S.2d 694 (N.Y. 2005) | 2005 N.Y. Slip Op. 01979 |
A subcontractor was injured at a dairy farm he was working at when he was pinned up against a stall by a bull . The subcontractor brought claims against the dairy farm and carpenter for negligence and strict liability. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and the Court of Appeals affirmed. |
Case |
| Hebert v. Broussard | 886 So.2d 666 (La.App. 3 Cir., 2004) | 2004 WL 2536810 (La.App. 3 Cir.) |
A dog that chased and pinned a man was shot by a police officer who had been called for assistance. The dog owner instituted an action against the police officer, the police chief and the city. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the police officer, police chief and city, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision holding the police officer was entitled to statutory immunity. |
Case |
| Acción de incumplimiento No. 25000-23-41-000-2023-00292-01- Colombia- Do not publish yet |
Sentencia promulgada por la sala Contencioso-Administrativa del Consejo de Estado en la que se ordena la reglamentación de la ley de fomento apícola de 2022. |
Case | ||
| Corte Suprema Rol N°50.969-22 | Corte Suprema Rol N°50.969-22 | In July 2022, the Interspecies Justice Foundation filed the first writ of habeas corpus for a non-human animal in Chile. The petition urged the court to recognize Sandai, a 28-year-old orangutan to be recognized as a non-human person and subject of rights, and therefore, to end his captivity in Buin Zoo in Chile. The plaintiff argued that Sandai lived in conditions unfit for his species. One of the expert testimonies submitted to the court stated that “Sandai’s body language reflects a depressed, defeated, and vulnerable emotional and psychological state, which is normal if we consider the conditions in which Sandai is being kept.” The Chilean Supreme Court upheld the decision of the lower court denying the admissibility of the habeas corpus filed on behalf of Sandai. In dismissing the appeal, the court stated that the constitution in its article 19 refers to persons and that in accordance with the Royal Spanish Academy, persons are individuals of the human species. Therefore, Sandai does not meet the legal requirements to be protected under this legal mechanism. Thus, upholding the decision of the Court of Appeals of San Miguel on July 27. Furthermore, with the purpose of protecting the well-being of Sandai, the Supreme Court ordered the Livestock Service (SAG) to adopt all appropriate measures to guarantee that the Buin Zoo complies with the law, specifically attending to Sandai’s case, stating: “that the deprivation of his liberty does not cause him suffering and any other alteration of its normal development, verifying that they have the appropriate facilities for his species, avoiding all mistreatment and deterioration of his health”. | Case | |
| NV - Damages, pet - 41.740. Damages for which person who kills or injures pet | N.R.S. 41.740 | NV ST 41.740 | This Nevada law provides that if a "natural person" intentionally, willfully, recklessly or negligently injures or kills the pet of another natural person, the person is liable for (a) the cost of veterinary care incurred because of the injury or death of the pet; (b) any reduction in market value of the pet caused by the injury; (c) the market value and reasonable burial expenses if the pet is killed; and (d) reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred in bringing an action under this section. All the damages must not exceed $5,000 per pet. There are several exceptions under the law. A pet is defined as any domesticated dog or cat normally maintained in or near the household of its owner. | Statute |
| Kohl v. New Sewickley Tp. Zoning Hearing Bd. | 108 A.3d 961 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2015) | 2015 WL 249186 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2015) |
Applicants sought a zoning variance to operate a nonprofit dog-rescue shelter. The zoning board denied the application, concluding that the dog-rescue operation run by applicants was a non-permissible “kennel” under the township's zoning ordinance. Applicants appealed to a trial court. The trial court determined that because applicants did not receive “economic gain” or a profit for their efforts, their dog-rescue operation was not a “kennel” and, therefore, was not a prohibited land use under the zoning ordinance. The trial court therefore reversed the zoning board's order. Intervenors, the applicants’ neighbors, appealed from the trial court's decision. Upon review, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania concluded that the term “kennel,” as used in the zoning ordinance, was ambiguous, and had to be construed in favor of applicants to find that applicants' operation of a large dog rescue facility on their property did not constitute the operation of a kennel. The appeals court therefore affirmed the trial court's decision. |
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