Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Big Cats of Serenity Springs, Inc. v. Vilsack | --- F.Supp.3d ----, 2015 WL 1432069 (D. Colo. 2015) | 2015 WL 1432069 (D. Colo. 2015) | In an amended complaint, Plaintiffs asserted four claims against Defendants relating to a May 7, 2013 United States Department of Agriculture inspection of Big Cats of Serenity Springs, Inc. The claims included a Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures; a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against the Inspector Defendants “because they acted under color of state law when they induced the deputies to cut the chains and enter the premises;” a declaratory judgment “declaring that [Defendant] Thompson inappropriately overrode the medical advice of [Plaintiff] Big Cats' veterinarians and declaring that, in the future, the USDA cannot force [Plaintiff] Sculac to choose between following the medical advice of his veterinarians and the mandates of a USDA inspector;” and a declaratory judgment that the USDA must follow its own regulations and that it cannot conduct a warrantless search of the Big Cats facility outside of ‘normal business hours' solely because an inspector ‘want [s] to’ or because an inspector subjectively ‘believe[s][it] necessary to determine the welfare status of the animals....' ” In addition to declaratory relief, Plaintiffs also sought compensatory and punitive damages, costs, expenses, and prejudgment interest. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss. US Magistrate Judge issued a recommendation that, to the extent the Motion argued that the declaratory judgment claims should be dismissed because Plaintiffs lack standing, the Motion be granted in part and denied in part and that the declaratory judgment claims asserted by Plaintiffs Nick Sculac, Julie Walker, and Jules Investment, Inc. be dismissed without prejudice. In all other aspects, the Magistrate recommended that the Motion be denied. A District Court judge approved and adopted these recommendations and denied defendant’s objections to the recommendations. | Case |
| McQuaker v. Goddard | [1940] 1 KB 687 |
A camel is not to be regarded as a wild animal by the common law as a camel 'is, in all countries, a domestic animal, an animal that has become trained to the uses of man, and a fortiori accustomed to association with man.' Whether an animal is to be regarded as wild or domestic is a question of law, and is to be judged according to the genus or class of which it belongs, not the characteristics of the individual animal. |
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| Austria - Animal Welfare - Federal Animal Protection Act | Bundesgesetzblatt für die Republik Österreich, Part I, No. 118, 28 September 2004, 21 pp. | The subject Federal Act, in English, aims at the protection of life and well-being of all animals based on man’s special responsibility for the animal as a fellow-creature. The Federal, Laender and Municipal authorities are obligated to create and deepen understanding for animal protection on the part of the public and in particular on the part of youth. In this Act, it is unlawful to inflict unjustified pain, suffering or injury on an animal or expose it to heavy fear, as well as to kill animals without reason. Interventions carried out for other than therapeutic or diagnostic purposes or for the expert marking of animals in accordance with legal regulations applicable, are prohibited and particulars are listed. | Statute | |
| US - Housing - Fair Housing. Subchapter I. Generally. Section 3602. Definitions. | 42 U.S.C.A. 3601 - 3604 | The following sections of the Fair Housing Act relate to "reasonable accommodations" for persons with a handicap or disability. In Section 3602, the definition of "handicap" includes a person with: (1) a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person's major life activities; (2) a record of having such an impairment, or (3) being regarded as having such an impairment. Section 3604 is the operative part of the law that makes it unlawful to discriminate because of a handicap in the sale or rental of a dwelling. Under subsection (3)(B), the law states that discrimination includes the refusal to make "reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling." | Statute | |
| AR - Pet Sales - Chapter 97. Retail Pet Stores. | A.C.A. §§ 4-97-101 to 109 | AR ST §§ 4-97-101 to 109 | This statutory section comprises the Arkansas Retail Pet Store Consumer Protection Act of 1991. The purpose of the act is to ensure that purchasers receive consumer animals that are physically and temperamentally sound, healthy, and fit as companions. The Act also provides a means by which the acquisition and care of those animals can be monitored. | Statute |
| State v. Spade | 695 S.E.2d 879 (W.Va., 2010) | 2010 WL 2243519 (W.Va.), 225 W.Va. 649 (2010) |
In 2006, appellant was charged with one count of animal cruelty after 149 dogs were seized from her rescue shelter. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia held that, since the appellant (1) entered into a valid plea agreement which "specifically and unequivocally reserved a restitution hearing" and (2) "attempted on numerous occasions to challenge the amounts she was required by the magistrate court to post in separate bonds," that the final order of the Circuit Court of Berkeley County should be reversed. Accordingly, the court found that the plaintiff was entitled to a restitution hearing to determine the actual reasonable costs incurred in providing care, medical treatment, and provisions to the animals seized. |
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| CA - Trusts - § 15212. Trusts for care of animals; duration; requirements; accountings; beneficiaries | West's Ann. Cal. Prob. Code § 15212 | CA PROBATE § 15212 | This California statute provides that a person can create a trust for the care of a designated domestic or pet animal for the life of the animal. The duration will only be for the life of the pet, even if the trust instrument contemplates a longer duration. Note that the statute uses the singular form of "animal" and the term "domestic" or "pet" is used. | Statute |
| IN - Cruelty - THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO ANIMALS ACT, 1960 | 59 OF 1960 |
The Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960 prohibits any person from inflicting, causing, or if it is the owner, permitting, unnecessary pain or suffering to be inflicted on any animal. The Act makes it a crime to beat, kick, torture, mutilate, administer an injurious substance, or cruelly kill an animal. It is also illegal to over-ride, over-drive, over-load, or work an unfit animal. It is an offense to cruelly transport, confine, chain or tether an animal. It is a violation to engage in animal fighting or shooting competitions in which animals are released from captivity to be shot. An owner commits an offense if he or she fails to provide sufficient food, drink or shelter, unreasonably abandons any animal, or permits any diseased or disabled animal to roam or die in any street.
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| Sentencia C-115/06 | Sentencia C-115/06 | In this opportunity, the Court held that bullfighting represents a cultural manifestation and artistic expression of human beings that the legal system must protect. Therefore, bullfighting could not be considered a violent act in terms of article 12 of the Constitution because the prohibition of torture and cruel treatment or punishment presumes an act to be violent when it is against a human being. In turn, bullfighting cannot be considered a violent act because here, there is no treatment that is incompatible with human dignity. | Case | |
| I.B. Sirmans v. State | 534 S.E.2d 862(Ga.App.,2000) | 2000 Fulton County D. Rep. 2440 |
Defendant was convicted of four counts of animal cruelty and one count of simple assault. The portion of the sentence depriving defendant of animals which the State failed to demonstrate were abused vacated and case remanded; judgment affirmed in all other respects because the motion to suppress was properly denied, and defendant was not prejudiced by the trial court's refusal to sever the trial. |
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