Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| NJ - Wildlife - 23:4-62.2. Bounties or premium for killing prohibition | N. J. S. A. 23:4-62.2 | NJ ST 23:4-62.2 | This New Jersey statute states that no county or municipality shall hereafter pay any premium or bounty for the killing of any fox or woodchuck. | Statute |
| SOS Animal |
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Policy | ||
| Center for Biological Diversity v. Kempthorne | Slip Copy, 2008 WL 4543043 (N.D.Cal.) | (only the Westlaw cite is available) |
In an action alleging multiple violations of the Endangered Species Act (ESA), the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) pursuant to Defendants’ final rule designating the polar bear as threatened and promulgation of a special rule under section 4(d) of the ESA, Defendants Kempthorne and the United States Fish and Wildlife Service brought a motion to transfer the case to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Intervenor-Defendant Arctic Slope Regional Corporation brought a separate motion to transfer the case to the District of Alaska, and Intervenor-Defendant Alaska Oil and Gas Association filed a motion with the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (MDL Panel) seeking to transfer the case to the D.C. District Court . The United States District Court, N.D. California denied the motion to transfer the case to the District of Alaska, and decided to take the motion to transfer to the District of Columbia into submission and rule on it once the MDL Panel has issued its decision on whether to transfer the case to the District of Columbia. |
Case |
| State v. Nix | 334 P.3d 437 (2014), vacated, 356 Or. 768, 345 P.3d 416 (2015) | 355 Or. 777, 2014 WL 3867789 (Or. Aug. 7, 2014) | In this criminal case, defendant was found guilty of 20 counts of second-degree animal neglect. Oregon's “anti-merger” statute provides that, when the same conduct or criminal episode violates only one statute, but involves more than one “victim,” there are “as many separately punishable offenses as there are victims.” The issue in this case is whether defendant is guilty of 20 separately punishable offenses, which turns on the question whether animals are “victims” for the purposes of the anti-merger statute. The trial court concluded that, because only people can be victims within the meaning of that statute, defendant had committed only one punishable offense. The court merged the 20 counts into a single conviction for second-degree animal neglect. On appeal, the Court of Appeals concluded that animals can be victims within the meaning of the anti-merger statute and, accordingly, reversed and remanded for entry of a judgment of conviction on each of the 20 counts and for resentencing. The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals and affirmed. Thus, in Oregon, for the purposes of the anti-merger statute, an animal, rather than the public or an animal owner, is a “victim” of crime of second-degree animal neglect. | Case |
| European Convention for the Protection of Animals for Slaughter |
An international treaty regulating slaughter for the protection of animals. This treaty was made to ensure that animals are spared suffering, pain fear and distress for both the benefit of the animal and to enhance the quality of the meat produced. |
Treaty | ||
| AL - Assistance Animals - Assistance Animal/Guide Dog Laws | Ala.Code 1975 § § 21-7-1 - 10; 3-1-7; § 32-5A-220; § 24-8A-1 - 5; § 13A-11-230 - 235 | AL ST § 21-7-1 - 10; § 3-1-7; § 32-5A-220; § 24-8A-1 - 5; § 13A-11-230 - 235 | The following statutes comprise the state's relevant service animal, assistance animal, and guide dog laws. | Statute |
| Animal Law Review Vol 12, No. 2 Table of Contents |
|
Policy | ||
| IN - Cattle Slaughter - THE GOA ANIMAL PRESERVATION ACT, 1995 | 7 of 1996 | The law, specific to the state of Goa, allows the slaughter of bovines only when they are unlikely to be economical for the purpose of draught, agricultural operations, breeding, giving milk, or bearing offspring. Offences under the Act are cognizable—persons alleged to have committed an offence under the Act can be arrested without warrant. No legal proceedings can be instituted against the government or any officer of the government or local authority for actions done in good faith in pursuance of the Act. | Statute | |
| Maldonado v. Franklin | Not Reported in S.W. Rptr., 2019 WL 4739438 (Tex. App. Sept. 30, 2019) | Trenton and Karina Franklin moved into a subdivision in San Antonio, Texas in September of 2017. Margarita Maldonado lived in the home immediately behind the Franklins’ house and could see into the Franklins’ backyard. Maldonado began complaining about the Franklins’ treatment of their dog. The Franklins left the dog outside 24 hours a day, seven days a week no matter what the weather was like. Maldonado also complained that the dog repeatedly whined and howled which kept her up at night causing her emotional distress. Maldonado went online expressing concern about the health and welfare of her neighbor’s dog, without naming any names. Mr. Franklin at some point saw the post and entered the conversation which lead to Mr. Franklin and Maldonado exchanging direct messages about the dog. Maldonado even placed a dog bed in the backyard for the dog as a gift. In December of 2017, the Franklins filed suit against Maldonado for invasion of privacy by intrusion and seclusion alleging that Maldonado was engaged in a campaign of systemic harassment over the alleged mistreatment of their dog. While the suit was pending, Maldonado contacted Animal Control Services several times to report that the dog was outside with the heat index over 100 degrees. Each time an animal control officer responded to the call they found no actionable neglect or abuse. In June of 2018, Maldonado picketed for five days by walking along the neighborhood sidewalks, including in front of the Franklins’ house, carrying signs such as “Bring the dog in,” and “If you’re hot, they’re hot.” The Franklins then amended their petition adding claims for slander, defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and trespass. The trial court granted a temporary injunction against Maldonado, which was ultimately vacated on appeal. Maldonado filed a Anti-SLAPP motion and amended motion to dismiss the Franklins’ claims as targeting her First Amendment rights. The trial court did not rule on the motions within thirty days, so the motions were denied by operation of law. Maldonado appealed. The Court began its analysis by determining whether Maldonado’s motions were timely. Under the Texas Citizen’s Participation Act (TCPA) a motion to dismiss must be filed within sixty days of the legal action. The sixty-day deadline reset each time new factual allegations were alleged. Due to the fact that the Franklins had amended their petition three times and some of the amended petitions did not allege any new factual allegations, the only timely motions that Maldonado filed were for the Franklins’ claims for slander and libel. The Court then concluded that Maldonado’s verbal complaints to the Animal Control Service and online posts on community forums about the Franklins’ alleged mistreatment of their dog were communications made in connection with an issue related to a matter of public concern and were made in the exercise of free speech. Therefore, the TCPA applied to the Franklins’ slander and libel claims. The Court ultimately concluded that although Maldonado established that the TCPA applied to the slander and libel claims, the Franklins met their burden to establish a prima facie case on the slander and libel claims. Therefore, the Court ultimately concluded that Maldonado’s motion to dismiss the slander and libel claims were properly denied. The Court affirmed the trial court’s order and remanded the case to the trial court. | Case | |
| State v. Morison | 365 P.2d 266 (Colo.1961) | 148 Colo. 79 (1961) |
Cattle owners sued the state and its agricultural commission for negligently performing the duty to use proper steps to prevent the spread of a contagious disease after they bought dairy cows at a sale that subsequently infected their herd. The owners were forced to sell their herd of dairy cows. The Supreme Court held that the owners could recover the difference between fair market value of their herd before and after it contracted the disease, loss of profits due to diminished milk production from cows before sale, value of silage or feed that had been contaminated, and reasonable costs of disinfecting the farm, but not for loss of profits for the dairy operation after they sold the cows, or loss of progeny. |
Case |
