Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Smith v. City of Detroit | Slip Copy, 2017 WL 3279170 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 2, 2017); [Reversed and Remanded by 751 F. App'x 691 (6th Cir. 2018)] | [Reversed and Remanded by Smith v. City of Detroit, Michigan, 751 F. App'x 691 (6th Cir. 2018)] This case stems from the killing of three dogs by Detroit Police Officers in 2016. Plaintiff-dog owners brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action based on unlawful seizure their dogs in violation of the Fourth Amendment. In addition, plaintiffs raised Monell municipal liability claims and state laws claims for conversion and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). Before this court is defendants' motion for summary judgment. The shooting of the dogs occurred during a drug raid pursuant to a search warrant (the marijuana charges were eventually dismissed due to the failure of police officers to appear at trial). One of the dogs escaped his barricade in the basement and was shot after allegedly charging the officers. The other dog "opened and closed the bathroom door by himself" according to testimony of the officers in their depositions, information that was absent from initial police reports according to the court. The last dog was shot as she began "charging" up the basement stairs while officers were at the top of the stairs. Depositions statements also reveal that none of the officers received any specific training on handling animal encounters during raids and one of the officers indicated he had shot at least 69 animals and another had shot 39. In analyzing the plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment interests in their dogs, the court held that because plaintiffs failed to properly license their dogs under Michigan law, they did not have a "legitimate possessory interest protected by the Fourth Amendment." Thus, plaintiffs' claims based on the Fourth Amendment were dismissed. Specifically, the court stated, "in the eyes of the law it is no different than owning any other type of illegal property or contraband." As to the violation of a clearly established constitutional right for the seizure of the dogs under the Fourth Amendment against the police department, the court found the Detroit Police Department's plan did not violate the Fourth Amendment, especially where the informant said there was only a "small dog" present at the residence. The individual officers' actions were also found to be reasonable based on the "imminent threat" of the dogs. As to the Monell claim, plaintiffs failed to establish a pattern of violations showing deliberate indifference that is sufficient to establish municipal liability. Finally, on the IIED claim, the court relied on the fact that there is no precedent in Michigan to permit recovery for damage to property (to wit, a dog). Similarly, plaintiffs' conversion claim also failed where the court found the unlicensed status removed any "legitimate interest" in the dogs. The court subsequently granted defendants' motion for summary judgment. | Case | |
| UT - Hunting - § 23-20-4.5. Illegal taking, possession, or wanton destruction of protected wildlife | U.C.A. 1953 § 23A-5-312 (formerly cited as U.C.A. 1953 § 23-20-4.5) | UT ST § 23A-5-312 (formerly cited as UT ST § 23-20-4.5) | This statute lists the restitution amounts for the illegal killing of certain species (including bald and golden eagles) of wildlife, with enhanced monetary penalties for "trophy" animals. These funds are used in educational and wildlife enforcement activities by the state. | Statute |
| NY - Endangered Species - Chapter 43-B. Of the Consolidated Laws. | N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law § 11-0535 | NY ENVIR CONSER § 11-0535 | The New York code for endangered species defines endangered species as any species which meets one of the following criteria: native species in imminent danger of extirpation or extinction in New York; or species listed as endangered by the United States Department of the Interior in the Code of Federal Regulations (50 CFR part 17). | Statute |
| In re Knippling | 183 P.3d 365 (Wash.App. Div. 3,2008) |
The Defendant was convicted in the Superior Court in Spokane County, Washington of second degree assault and first degree animal cruelty. The Defendant requested that he receive credit against his term of community custody for the extra 24 months' confinement time he served before he was re-sentenced. The Court of Appeals held that the Defendant was entitled to 24 months credit against his term of community custody. |
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| Gray v. RSPCA | [2013] EWHC 500 (Admin) | Mr Gray appealed against the police seizure of 115 horses from his horse trading premises, pursuant to section 18 of the Animal Welfare Act 2006. Gray had been convicted of numerous counts of cruelty, specifically under sections 4 and 9 of the Animal Welfare Act 2006. Mr Gray argued that an offence under sections 4 and 9 required either actual knowledge or a form of constructive knowledge that the animal was showing signs of unnecessary suffering, and that negligence was not sufficient. It was held that the plain effect of section 4(1) of the Act is to impose criminal liability for unnecessary suffering caused to an animal either by an act or omission which the person responsible knew would, or was likely to, cause unnecessary suffering, or by a negligent act or omission. Further, it was held that section 9(1) of the Act sets a purely objective standard of care which a person responsible for an animal is required to provide. | Case | |
| Animal Law Index Volume 20, Part 1 |
Animal Law Review, Volume 20, Issue 1 (Fall 2013)
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Policy | ||
| RI - Exotic Pets - Chapter 18. Importation of Wild Animals | Gen. Laws, 1956, § 4-18-1 to 15 | RI ST § 4-18-1 to 15 | This chapter of Rhode Island laws proclaims that its intent is to provide safeguards for the protection of persons in the state from disease hazards associated with imported wild animals. Under the chapter, no person shall import into, receive, or possess in this state without first obtaining a permit from the department, animals of the following orders, families, and genera: primates, carnivores, amphibia, reptilia, canidae, and insecta. Personal pets under a special permit are exempted from the importation permit requirement. A permit may be granted by the department to import a wild animal as a personal pet, if a written affidavit or declaration under penalty of perjury is completed at the time of entry at the site of first arrival. This chapter also requires that certain species undergo quarantine for specified periods of time. Any person who violates any provisions of this chapter shall be fined not less than one hundred dollars ($100), and the loss of any specimen referred to in this chapter. | Statute |
| NC - Rabies - § 130A-195. Destroying stray or feral animals in quarantine districts | N.C.G.S.A. § 130A-195 | NC ST § 130A-195 | This North Carolina statute provides that when quarantine has been declared and dogs and cats continue to run uncontrolled in the area, any peace officer or Animal Control Officer shall have the right, after reasonable effort has been made to apprehend the animals, to destroy the uncontrolled dogs and cats and properly dispose of their bodies. | Statute |
| Hoffa v. Bimes | 954 A.2d 1241 (Pa.Super.,2008) | 2008 PA Super 181; 2008 WL 3126320 |
This case arises from the treatment of plaintiff's horse by the defendant-veterinarian. This appeal arises from plaintiff's claim that the trial court erred in granting a compulsory non-suit in favor of defendant finding that the Veterinary Immunity Act bars claims against veterinarians except those based upon gross negligence. This court agreed with the lower court that defendant was confronted with an emergency medical condition such as to fall under the protections of the Act. Further, this court held that the trial court committed no error in concluding that plaintiff's consent was not required before the veterinarian performed the abdominal tap because that procedure was rendered under an 'emergency situation.' |
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| Animal Protection Institute of America v. Hodel | 860 F.2d 920 (C.A.9 (Nev.),1988) | 19 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,251 (C.A.9 (Nev.),1988) |
The Ninth Circuit held that the Secretary could not transfer title to a private individual whom the secretary knows will commercially exploit the adopted horse. The Secretary argued that the WFRHBA placed only one requirement on the transfer of title: the private individual must humanely care for and maintain the horse for one year prior to title transfer. The court, however, concluded that the statute commands the secretary to not only determine that the animal has been well cared for, but also that the adopter remains a qualified individual. Given the statute’s prohibition of commercial exploitation of wild horses as well as its concern with their humane treatment, the court concluded that a private individual cannot remain a “qualified individual” if he or she intends to commercially exploit the horse after they obtain title. |
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