Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Kangas v. Perry | 620 N.W.2d 429 (Wis. 2000) |
Plaintiff, a passenger of a horse-drawn sled sued the owner of the property on which the accident occurred, as well as the owner of the horses and the sled for the injuries she suffered when thrown from the sled. The Court of Appeals found that the equine immunity statute provided protection for the owner of the horse against tort liability. The plain language of the statute provides that immunity from civil liability is available to all persons , “ including an equine activity sponsor or equine professional…”; thus, protection is not limited only to those who are sponsors or professionals, rather they are examples of types of people to whom the statute applies. |
Case | |
| Pine v. State | 889 S.W.2d 625 (Tex. App. 1994). |
Mens rea in cruelty conviction may be inferred from circumstances. With regard to warrantless seizure, the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit seizure when there is a need to act immediately to protect and preserve life (i.e. "emergency doctrine"). |
Case | |
| FL - Education - 1003.47. Biological experiments on living subjects | West's F. S. A. § 1003.47 | FL ST § 1003.47 | This Florida law provides guidelines for use of animals in K-12 instruction. It prohibits surgery or dissection on any living mammalian vertebrate or bird (vivisection). While dissection may be performed on nonliving subjects, students may be excused from this upon written request from a parent. In addition, any live animals on the premises of public and private elementary, middle, and high schools shall be housed and cared for in a humane and safe manner. If any instructional employee of a public high school or career center knowingly or intentionally fails or refuses to comply with any of the provisions of this section, the district school board may suspend, dismiss, return to annual contract, or otherwise discipline such employee as provided in the law. | Statute |
| IN - Spay, neuter - Chapter 4. Spay-Neuter Requirement for Animal Care Facilities | IC 15-20-4-1 - 5 | IN ST 15-20-4-1 - 5 | This Indiana chapter added in 2016 concerns the spay-neuter requirements for animal care facilities. Beginning July 1, 2021, except as provided in this chapter, a companion animal shall be spayed or neutered before adoption from an animal care facility. | Statute |
| WI - Fur - 100.35. Furs to be labeled | W. S. A. 100.35 | WI ST 100.35 | This law represents Wisconsin's fur labeling law. The law states that no person shall sell or offer or display for sale any coat, jacket or other garment made wholly or partially of fur without a label that states in English the species of fur or pelt used. This section does not apply to such garments displayed, offered, or sold at a price of less than $50. | Statute |
| PA - Cruelty - Chapter 37. Humane Society Police Officers. | 22 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701 - 3718 | PA ST 22 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701 - 3718 | These statutes enable and regulate Pennsylvania's grant of police powers to humane society agents. Topics within these statutes include the appointment, termination, powers granted to, and training of humane society police officers. | Statute |
| Rural Export & Trading (WA) Pty Ltd v Hahnheuser | (2008) 249 ALR 445 | (2008) 169 FCR 583; [2008] FCAFC 156 |
The trial judge held that the respondent's placing of a ham mixture in the feed of sheep prior to live export was covered by the defence of dominant purpose for environmental protection under the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth). On appeal, the court held that the respondent's actions were not an attempt at environmental protection but rather sought to prevent what he believed would be cruelty to those animals on board the ship during live export and upon arrival. The case was referred back to the Federal Court for assessment of damages. |
Case |
| Parker v. Parker | 195 P.3d 428 (Or.App.,2008) | 223 Or.App. 137 (2008); 2008 WL 4570581 |
Plaintiff and his 12 year-old quarter horse were visiting defendant at defendant's property when defendant's dog rushed at the horse causing it to run into a steel fence. The horse suffered severe head trauma, which necessitated its later euthanization. Plaintiff filed suit for damages asserting liability under common law negligence and O.R.S. 609.140(1) - the statute that allows an owner to recover double damages where livestock is injured due to being injured, chased, or killed by another person's dog. The appellate court agreed with plaintiff that O.R.S. 609.140(1) creates an statutory cause of action independent from negligence. Further, the court found that plaintiff fell within the class of persons the statute aims to protect because the legislature did not intend to limit the statute's application to property owned by the livestock's owner. |
Case |
| Peru - Wildlife - LEY 9147, 1949 | LEY 9147, 1949 | This law declares government protection over all the wild species of animals that are within the national territory. It also prohibits the hunting of vicuña, chinchilla and guanacu species. | Statute | |
| Hill v. Coggins | 867 F.3d 499 (4th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1003 (2018) | 2017 WL 3471259 (4th Cir. Aug. 14, 2017) | In 2013, Plaintiffs visited Defendants' zoo, the Cherokee Bear Zoo, in North Carolina where they observed four bears advertised as grizzly bears in what appeared to Plaintiffs as substandard conditions. As a result, Plaintiffs filed a citizen suit in federal district court alleging the Zoo's practice of keeping the bears was a taking of a threatened species under the federal Endangered Species Act (ESA). In essence, Plaintiffs contend the Zoo's conduct was a form of harassment under the ESA, and so they sought injunctive relief. After denying the Zoo's motions for summary judgment, the district court held a bench trial where the court ruled against Plaintiffs on the issue of the Zoo's liability under the ESA. The manner in which the bears were kept did not constitute a taking for purposes of the ESA. On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, this Court first found Plaintiffs established Article III standing for an aesthetic injury. Second, the Court agreed with the district court that evidence showed these bears were grizzly bears. While the Defendant-Zoo's veterinarian testified at trial that they are European brown bears, the collective evidence including expert testimony, veterinary records, USDA reports, and the Zoo's own advertising justified the lower court's conclusion that the bears are threatened grizzly bears. As to the unlawful taking under the ESA, the Fourth Circuit vacated the lower court's holding and remanded the case to district court. The legal analysis used by the court was incorrect because the court did not first determine whether the Zoo's practices were "generally accepted" before it applied the exclusion from the definition of harassment. The lower court based its conclusion on the fact that the Zoo met applicable minimum standards under the Animal Welfare Act (AWA) and did not explore whether these standards were "generally accepted." Affirmed in part, vacated and remanded. | Case |