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Title Citation Alternate Citation Agency Citation Summary Type
Goodby v. Vetpharm, Inc. 974 A.2d 1269 (Vt.,2009) 2009 WL 1262406 (Vt.), 2009 VT 52

This Vermont case answered whether noneconomic damages are available when a companion animal dies due to negligent acts of veterinarians and a pharmaceutical company, and also whether a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) is allowed for the death of a pet. The Vermont Supreme Court answered both questions in the negative. Plaintiffs' cats died after taking hypertension pills produced by defendant pharmaceutical company Vetpharm, which contained a toxic level of the medication (20 times the labeled dose). After the cats were brought into defendant-veterinarians' office, plaintiff contends that defendant veterinarians negligently or wantonly failed to diagnose the toxicity in the cats, and improperly treated the cats as a result. While the plaintiffs and amici urged the court to adopt a special exception to recover noneconomic damages for the loss of their personal property (to wit, the cats), the court found that to be a role more suited to the state legislature. With regard to the NIED claim, the court held that plaintiffs were never in the "zone of danger" necessary to establish a claim.

Case
CA - Parks - § 5008.1. Animals brought into parks; conditions; maintenance of Internet Web site West's Ann. Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 5008.1 This law allows the state parks director to determine when it is in the public interest to allow visitors to bring animals to units of the state park system. Animals brought in by visitors must be under immediate control of the visitor and must not pose a safety threat, create a public nuisance, or pose of threat to natural or cultural resources. The department may require a person bringing an animal into a state park system to provide proof of appropriate immunizations and valid licenses. In 2018, the legislature added a part to the law that states no later than July 1, 2020, the department shall establish and maintain on its Internet Web site a comprehensive, up-to-date list of each state park system unit with information on whether the unit or a portion of the unit allows dogs and additional information that may include, but is not limited to, the specific areas of the unit in which dogs are allowed and the total miles of trail in the unit that are open to dogs. Statute
James v. RSPCA EWHC 1642 Defendant was charged with unnecessary suffering towards three horses found in terrible conditions. It was held that where a protected animal is found in distress, a veterinarian's certificate need not be in writing for a constable or inspector to exercise powers under Section 18 of the Animal Welfare Act 2006 (namely seizure and detention). Oral certification of suffering will suffice in certain circumstances, for example where the protected animal requires urgent treatment and there is not sufficient time to produce a written certificate. Case
RI - Dogs - Consolidated Dog Laws Gen. Laws, 1956, § 4-13-1 - 44; § 4-13.1 - 15; § 4-19-1 - 24 RI ST § 4-13-1 - 44; § 4-13.1 - 15; § 4-19-1 - 24 These statutes comprise Rhode Island's dog laws. Among the provisions include licensing requirements, which are specified by county or town, vicious dog laws, and euthanasia provisions. Statute
NC - Commerce - Chapter 113. Conservation and Development. N.C.G.S.A. § 113-294 NC ST § 113-294 North Carolina law makes it a Class 2 misdemeanor to sell, possess for sale, or buy any wildlife. Further, the law specifically makes it a greater transgression (a Class 1 misdemeanor) to unlawfully take, possess, transport, sell, or buy any dead or alive bald or golden eagle, nest or egg. The taking of other animals listed like bears and cougars also incurs greater penalty. Statute
R. v. McConkey 2008 CarswellAlta 156 2008 ABPC 37, [2008] A.W.L.D. 3238, 438 A.R. 87

In this case, the defendants pleaded guilty to violations of the Animal Protection Act after a peace officer for the humane society found four dogs in distress due mainly to a lack of grooming. On appeal, the defendants did not contest the amount of the fines, but suggested that the court should consider the economic status of the defendants (both were on government assistance). The court found that the conduct of the defendant and the level of the distress experienced by the dogs over a long period of time was an aggravating factor in determining the fine. With regard to a Section 12(2) prohibition to restrain future animal ownership, the court was reluctant to inflict stress on the animals still residing at the home by removing them from their long-time home.

Case
Hood River County v. Mazzara 89 P.3d1195 (Or. 2004) 193 Or.App. 272 (2004)

In this Oregon case, the defendant appealed a conviction for violating Hood River County Ordinances (HRCO) under which the owner of a dog may not allow it "to become a public nuisance * * * " by "[d]isturb[ing] any person by frequent or prolonged noises[.]" (Her dog was reported to have barked for six straight hours.)  The defendant argued that the ordinances are invalid as applied to her because ORS 30.935 immunizes farm practices from the application of local government ordinances.  The defendant operated a farm with a herd of 60 cashmere and angora goats on land that bordered a national forest and used her dogs to keep predators at bay.  The Court of Appeals noted that once defendant raised the defense of the right to farm practice, the county had the burden of disproving it, which it failed to do.  Further, the trial court erred by disregarding uncontested facts that established defendant's immunity.

Case
WA - Importation - Chapter 16-54. Animal Importation WASH. ADMIN. CODE §16-54-030 WAC 16-54-030 Washington requires health certificates for the importation of most animals into the state. Administrative
Wallen v. City of Mobile --- So.3d ----, 2018 WL 3803749 (Ala. Crim. App. Aug. 10, 2018) Wallen appeals her convictions for six counts of violating Mobile, Alabama's public nuisance ordinances. The nuisance convictions stem from an anonymous complaint about multiple barking dogs at Wallen's property. After receiving the tip in March of 2016, an animal control officer drove to the residence, parked across the street, and, as he sat in his car, heard dogs bark continuously for approximately ten minutes. That same day, a local realtor went to house that was for sale behind Wallen's property and heard an "overwhelming" noise of dogs barking continuously for 30-45 minutes. For almost a year, officers received complaints about noise coming from Wallen's house. In May of 2017, Wallen entered a plea of not guilty for multiple charges of violating the public nuisance ordinance in Mobile Circuit Court. She also filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the Mobile City Code was unconstitutionally vague. Her motion was later denied, and a jury trial was held where Wallen was found guilty of six counts of violating Mobile's public-nuisance ordinance. On appeal, Wallen first argues that the public nuisance ordinance is unconstitutionally overbroad because it regulates without reference to time, place, and manner. However, the court found that Wallen did not establish how the overbreadth doctrine applied to her case and how the ordinance was unconstitutional. As to her next vagueness challenge, Wallen contended that the ordinance had no objective standards to determine whether a dog's barking is disturbing or unreasonable. This court disagreed, finding the statute defines what are "disturbing noises" (which specifically states barking), and other courts previously established that the term "habit" in a dog-barking statute is not vague. Finally, the found that Wallen's last general argument, that the code is unconstitutional as applied to her, did not satisfy court rules with respect to issues presented and support with authority on appeal. The judgment of the lower court was affirmed. Case
In re Marriage of Piskalns Unpublished Disposition, 344 Mont. 555, 186 P.3d 877 (Table) (2008) 2008 WL 2441361 The parties both appealed from the district court’s orders distributing the marital estate upon the parties’ divorce. Kara Pilskalns claimed that the court erred when it granted ownership of Maggie, the couple’s dog, to Andrew Pilskalns. This court affirms the decision, declining to use the best interest of the child standard for the distribution of pets as they are marital property. Case

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