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Displaying 6581 - 6590 of 6822
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| People v Beam | 624 N.W.2d 764 (Mich. 2000) | 244 Mich. App. 103 (2000) |
Defendant argues on appeal that his conviction under MCL 750.49, which punishes the owner of a dog trained or used for fighting that causes the death of a person, must be reversed because the statute is unconstitutionally vague; specifically, that the terms "trained or used for fighting," "without provocation," and "owner" are vague. The court disagreed and held that the statute is sufficiently clear and gives the defendant fair notice of the offense. |
Case |
| Houk v. State | 316 So. 3d 788 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2021) | 2021 WL 1685627 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2021) | Appellant Crystal Houk challenges her convictions and sentences for animal cruelty and aggravated animal cruelty on several grounds. Appellant contends her dual convictions for those crimes violate double jeopardy because animal cruelty and aggravated animal cruelty are degree variants under section 775.021(4)(b)2. The conviction stems from Houk leaving her dog Gracie May in a car in a Walmart parking lot with the windows closed on a hot, humid day in Florida for over an hour. Apparently, Appellant had pressed a PVC pipe against the accelerator to keep the car accelerating since there was something wrong with the air conditioner. When employees gained entry to her vehicle, they discovered the A/C was actually blowing hot air and the dog was in great distress. Gracie died soon thereafter from heat stroke. A postmortem examination revealed her internal temperature was above 109.9 degrees. Houk was charged with aggravated animal cruelty and animal cruelty, tried by jury, and convicted. She was sentenced to concurrent terms of thirty-six months of probation on Count 1 and twelve months of probation on Count 2, each with a condition that she serve thirty days in jail. On appeal here, this court first found that the offenses of animal cruelty and aggravated animal cruelty satisfy the Blockburger same elements test and do not fall under the identical elements of proof or subsumed-within exceptions. However, as to the degree variant exception, the court agreed with Appellant that the offense of animal cruelty and aggravated animal cruelty are not based on entirely different conduct and a violation of one subsection would also constitute a violation of the other. Additionally, while another statutory section allows the charging of separate offenses for multiple acts or acts against more than one animal, the section does not authorize "the charging of separate offenses or the imposition of multiple punishments when a single act against one animal satisfies both subsections." Accordingly, the court agreed with Appellant and reversed her conviction for animal cruelty (while keeping the higher degree conviction of aggravated cruelty). | Case |
| Honeycutt v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. | 890 So.2d 756 (2nd Cir. 2004) |
A driver hit a cow standing in the road and the driver brought suit against the cow's owner and the owner's insurance agency. The trial court held in favor of the driver and the Court of Appeals affirmed based upon the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor. |
Case | |
| Johnson v. District of Columbia | 2014 WL 5316644 (D.D.C. Oct. 17, 2014) (Only the Westlaw citation is currently available) | Although he has never been prosecuted or threatened with prosecution under the District of Columbia's Animal Control Act, plaintiff, an animal rights activist, challenges a provision that reads: “No person shall knowingly and falsely deny ownership of any animal.” D.C.Code § 8–1808(b). Plaintiff asserts that he desires to give speeches in the District of Columbia about why he opposes treating animals as property, and in such speeches he would like to deny ownership of his dog. However, he alleges that he does not do so because he is deterred by D.C.Code § 8–1808(b). Plaintiff therefore sued the District of Columbia to obtain declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing the statute violated his First Amendment right to free speech. The District Court, however, found that plaintiff lacked standing because he presented no concrete evidence to substantiate his fears of prosecution, but rather rests his claims on mere conjecture about possible governmental actions. Such hypothetical fears cannot form the basis for standing under Article III of the US Constitution. The defendant's motion to dismiss was therefore granted and the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment was therefore dismissed. | Case | |
| TX - Impound - § 826.033. Restraint, Impoundment, and Disposition of Dogs and Cats. | V. T. C. A., Health & Safety Code § 826.033 | TX HEALTH & S § 826.033 | This Texas statute provides that a municipality or county may adopt ordinances or rules to require that each dog or cat be restrained by its owner and that any stray dog or cat be declared a public nuisance. Further, it can declare that each unrestrained dog or cat be detained or impounded by the local rabies control authority. Each stray dog or cat be impounded for a period set by ordinance or rule and a humane disposition be made of each unclaimed stray dog or cat upon its expiration. | Statute |
| Horse Issues | Policy | |||
| NV - Wildlife - Chapter 501. Administration and Enforcement. | NRS § 501.097 | NV ST § 501.097 | "Wildlife" means any wild mammal, wild bird, fish, reptile, amphibian, mollusk or crustacean found naturally in a wild state, whether indigenous to Nevada or not and whether raised in captivity or not. | Statute |
| ANIMAL LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, CENTER FOR FOOD SAFETY, SHY 38, INC. & HOPE SANCTUARY, Plaintiffs, v. LAURA KELLY & DEREK SCHMIDT, Defendants | Slip Copy, No. CV 18-2657-KHV, 2020 WL 362626 (D. Kan. Jan. 22, 2020) | The Animal Legal Defense Fund (“ALDF”), Center for Food Safety (“CFS”), Shy 38, Inc. and Hope Sanctuary are interest groups that aim to protect and advocate for animals and the environment. These interest groups filed suit on December 4, 2018 against the Governor and Attorney General of Kansas seeking a declaratory judgment that the Kansas Animal and Field Crop and Research Facilities Protect Act was unconstitutional. The Act made it a crime to damage or destroy an animal facility or an animal, exercise control over an animal facility or animal from a facility, take photos or videos at an animal facility that that is not open to the public, and remain at an animal facility against the owner’s wishes. Both parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. ALDF desired to conduct an undercover investigation in Kansas but refrained from doing so out of fear of criminal prosecution under the Act. The Plaintiffs alleged that the Act violated their First Amendment right to freedom of speech. To be subject to criminal prosecution under subsection (a) of K.S.A. 47-1827, the ALDF investigator had to cause physical damage to an animal or the animal facility or its property. The Plaintiffs did not allege that the ALDF investigator intended to cause such physical damage so the ALDF investigator was not at risk of criminal prosecution under the provision and, therefore, ALDF did not demonstrate standing to challenge subsection (a). ALDF alleged sufficient injury to support standing to challenge subsections (b), (c), and (d) of the Act. CFS, Shy 38, and Hope Sanctuary also had standing to challenge those subsections. The Court found that subsections (b), (c), and (d) regulated speech rather than conduct and was content-based rather than neutral-based. The Court ultimately concluded that the Plaintiffs were entitled to summary judgment on their claim that subsections (b), (c), and (d) violated the First Amendment. The Defendants were entitled to summary judgment on their lack of standing claim for subsection (a) and K.S.A. 47-1828. | Case | |
| PA - Education - § 15-1523. Pupil's right of refusal; animal dissection | 24 P.S. § 15-1523 | PA ST 24 P.S. § 15-1523 | This Pennsylvania law states that public or nonpublic school pupils from kindergarten through grade twelve may refuse to dissect, vivisect, incubate, capture or otherwise harm or destroy animals or any parts thereof as part of their course of instruction. Schools must notify pupils and their parents/guardians of the right to decline participation. A pupil who chooses to refrain from participation or observation shall be offered an alternative education project. No pupil shall be discriminated against based on his or her decision to exercise rights under this law. | Statute |
| State v. Nix | 334 P.3d 437 (2014), vacated, 356 Or. 768, 345 P.3d 416 (2015) | 355 Or. 777, 2014 WL 3867789 (Or. Aug. 7, 2014) | In this criminal case, defendant was found guilty of 20 counts of second-degree animal neglect. Oregon's “anti-merger” statute provides that, when the same conduct or criminal episode violates only one statute, but involves more than one “victim,” there are “as many separately punishable offenses as there are victims.” The issue in this case is whether defendant is guilty of 20 separately punishable offenses, which turns on the question whether animals are “victims” for the purposes of the anti-merger statute. The trial court concluded that, because only people can be victims within the meaning of that statute, defendant had committed only one punishable offense. The court merged the 20 counts into a single conviction for second-degree animal neglect. On appeal, the Court of Appeals concluded that animals can be victims within the meaning of the anti-merger statute and, accordingly, reversed and remanded for entry of a judgment of conviction on each of the 20 counts and for resentencing. The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals and affirmed. Thus, in Oregon, for the purposes of the anti-merger statute, an animal, rather than the public or an animal owner, is a “victim” of crime of second-degree animal neglect. | Case |