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Displaying 51 - 60 of 6637
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FL - Disaster - 252.3568. Emergency sheltering of persons with pets | West's F. S. A. § 252.3568 - 3569 | FL ST § 252.3568 - 3569 | In Florida, there must be strategies for the evacuation of persons with pets in the state and local comprehensive emergency management plans. | Statute | |
| PRIETO, GERMÁN LUIS C/ COLONNA LUCIANA ANDREA, EXPTE. N° 450237 | Sentencia definitiva numero: 86 "PRIETO, GERMÁN LUIS C/ COLONNA LUCIANA ANDREA – ORDINARIO – EXPSentencia número 86 de la Cámara de Apelaciones de lo Civil y Comercial y en lo Contencioso Administrativo, de la ciudad de Río Cuarto de 26 de octubre de 2012 | This case revolves around a dispute between German Luis Prieto (the plaintiff) and Luciana Andrea Colonna (the defendant) regarding the ownership of personal property acquired during their cohabitation. The plaintiff claimed sole ownership of the property assets and sought their return, while the defendant argued that these assets constituted community property acquired for their shared residence during their relationship. Additionally, the defendant claimed that the plaintiff granted her exclusive possession and gifted the property to her upon their separation, relieving her of any obligation to return it. The court held that the plaintiff had the right to take back the property, with the exception of Bauty, considering that the latter had developed a significant emotional bond with the defendant and that his surrender could cause unnecessary suffering. In the judge's view, dogs were not mere "things." Consequently, the judge upheld the lower court's decision in part, ordering all the assets to be returned to the plaintiff. At the same time, the defendant was allowed to retain custody of the canine companion. | Case | ||
| MS - Trust - § 91-8-408. Trust for care of animal | Miss. Code Ann. § 91-8-408 | MS ST § 91-8-408 | This Mississippi statute allows a trust to be created to provide for the care of an animal alive during the settlor's lifetime. The trust terminates upon the death of the animal or, if the trust was created to provide for the care of more than one (1) animal alive during the settlor's lifetime, upon the death of the last surviving animal. | Statute | |
| IN - Trust - 30-4-2-18. Trust to provide for care of an animal alive during settlor's lifetime | I.C. 30-4-2-18 | IN ST 30-4-2-18 | Indiana's pet trust law was enacted in 2005. The trust terminates upon the death of the animal or upon death of last surviving animal alive during settlor's lifetime. Property of a trust authorized by this section may be applied only to the trust's intended use, except to the extent the court determines that the value of the trust property exceeds the amount required for the trust's intended use. | Statute | |
| CO - Ordinances - Pet animal control and licensing | C. R. S. A. § 30-15-101 | CO ST § 30-15-101 | This Colorado statute states that the board of county commissioners of any county may adopt a resolution for the control and licensing of dogs. These regulations may require licensing of dogs by owners, require that dogs and other pet animals be under control at all times and define "control," define "vicious dog" and "vicious animal," establish a dog pound, or other animal holding facility, provide for the impoundment of animals which are vicious, not under control, or otherwise not in conformity with the resolutions, and establish such other reasonable regulations and restrictions for the control of dogs and other pet animals. | Statute | |
| US - AWA - Subpart E. Marine Mammal Regulations | 9 C.F.R. § 3.100 to .118 | This subpart concerns the Specifications for the Humane Handling, Care, Treatment, and Transportation of Marine Mammals. | Administrative | ||
| Palila v. Hawaii Dept. of Land and Natural Resources | Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2013 WL 1442485 (D.Hawai'i) |
Fearing potential prosecution under a county ordinance and a state statute for carrying out a Stipulated Order that protects an endangered species (the Palila), defendants, joined substantially by the plaintiffs, sought a motion for declaratory and injunctive relief. The district court granted the defendants’ motion because federal law, the Stipulated Order, preempted both state and county law. The court therefore stated that so long as defendants, or their duly-appointed agents, were acting to enforce the specific terms of the Stipulated Order, they may conduct an aerial sighting over the Palila's critical habitat and shoot any ungulates sighted in that area without fear of violating (1) Hawaii County Code §§ 14–111, –112, & 1–10(a); or (2) HRS § 263–10. |
Case | ||
| Cardenas v. Swanson | 531 P.3d 917 (Wyo., 2023) | 2023 WY 67, 2023 WL 4344196 (Wyo. July 5, 2023) | The Cardenas family (Appellants) owned three St. Bernard dogs. Appellants lived on a home adjacent to large tracts of state land, and would allow the dogs to roam the land unleashed, but the dogs would return each night. One afternoon, the dogs were let outside to run, but one dog did not return. Appellants found the dog caught in a snare, where it died from a broken neck. Appellants attempted to free the dog from the snare, and one of the Cardenas children was injured in the process. While appellants were attempting to free their dog from the snare, the other two dogs were also caught in snares, and died from their injuries. Appellants filed suit against the trapper who set the snares (Appellee), asserting claims of negligence, willful and wanton misconduct, violation of statutes, infliction of emotional distress, and civil rights violations. Appellee filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted and denied in part, finding that appellee’s conduct was not willful and wanton and that appellants could not recover emotional damages for the loss of the dogs. On appeal, the court considered: (1) whether the members of the Cardenas family can recover damages for emotional injuries for the loss of their dogs, and (2) whether this court should allow the recovery of emotional distress damages for the loss of a pet. The court held that (1) emotional injuries for the loss of property are not recoverable, under this court’s precedent emotional damages are only recoverable for certain limited situations. Dogs are considered personal property under state law, and damage to personal property is not one of the situations in which emotional damages are recoverable. Next, the court held that (2) it would not create a precedent to allow people to recover emotional distress damages when animate personal property is harmed, as that change would be best suited for the legislature to make. The court affirmed the judgment of the trial court and dismissed the case. | Case | |
| R v. Shand | R. v. Shand, 2007 ONCJ 317 | In R v Shand 2007 ONCJ 317 (CanLII), the court examined the necessary elements required to established the “willful” mens rea component present in Canadian Federal Criminal Statute s. 429. The accused was charged with three counts of animal cruelty contrary to s.446 of the Criminal Code in relation to a dog in her care. The court found that on two of the counts that the accused was had acted "wilfully" because she was either "reckless or indifferent as to her dog's condition." | Case | ||
| Inst. of Cetacean Research v. Sea Shepherd Conservation Soc. | 860 F. Supp. 2d 1216 (W.D. Wash. 2012) rev'd, 708 F.3d 1099 (9th Cir. 2013) and rev'd, 725 F.3d 940 (9th Cir. 2013) | The Institute of Cetacean Research, a Japanese whaling group, sued the direct action environmental protection organization Sea Shepherd, claiming that Sea Shepherd’s actions taken against the whaling group’s vessels in the Antarctic are violent and dangerous. The Institute claimed that Sea Shepherd had rammed whaling ships, thrown dangerous objects on to the ships, attempted to prevent them from moving forward, and navigated its vessels in such a way as to endanger the Japanese ships and their crews. The Institute’s request for an injunction was denied when the Court held that the Institute did not establish the necessary factors. The Court did state, however, that though Sea Shepherd’s acts did not constitute piracy, it did not approve of the organization’s methods or mission. | Case |