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Displaying 5971 - 5980 of 6822
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Nonhuman Rts. Project, Inc. v. Cheyenne Mountain Zoological Soc'y | 562 P.3d 63, reh'g denied (Colo., 2025) | 2025 CO 3 | This Colorado case involves the appeal of the dismissal of a habeas corpus proceeding. The appeal asked the Colorado Supreme Court to decide whether the liberty interests protected by the "great writ of habeas corpus" extend to nonhuman animals. Petitioner Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. (“NRP”) contends that the district court erred in dismissing its habeas petition because the five elephants that are the subject of the petition, Missy, Kimba, Lucky, LouLou, and Jambo (“the elephants”), lacked standing to seek relief via the great writ. These elderly elephants live at the Cheyenne Mountain Zoo (“CMZ”) and where NRP asserts they were unlawfully confined. In support of this contention, NRP submitted affidavits from several animal biologists who stated that these intelligent and complex creatures are suffering from psychological disorders and stress from being in captivity. The Zoo countered with a motion to dismiss, arguing the elephants received extraordinary care and that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the claim because the elephants do not have standing to seek habeas relief. After the district court granted the motion to dismiss, this court sought to determine whether habeas corpus relief extends to nonhuman animals. The court first looked at Colorado's statutory grant of authority for habeas relief. In doing so, the court found that the statute grants "any person" the ability to seek habeas relief from illegal confinement or restraint of liberty. While "person" is not defined in the law, the court found other statutory definitions that limit "person" to mean "human being." This definition is bolstered by the plain and ordinary meaning of the word "person." Since Colorado's law explicitly limits habeas corpus relief to "persons," the court was unpersuaded by NRP to expand the writ to animals based on common law interpretations. Further, the court noted that even if the statute did not say "person," it would still not be persuaded to expand the writ because no other jurisdiction has recognized "personhood" for nonhuman species, expansion would have "unintended consequences" for interactions between humans and animals, and there is no evidence the Colorado legislature ever intended to recognize animals as legal persons in the statute. This court affirmed the district court's finding that Colorado's writ of habeas corpus does not apply to nonhuman animals. | Case | |
| Código Penal para el Estado Libre y Soberano de Tlaxcala | Código Penal de Tlaxcala | In 2022, Decreto No. 160 modified the Criminal Code by adding Title XX, “Of the Crimes Committed Against Animals.” It has only one title: “Crimes Against the Life, Integrity, and Dignity of Animals,” which comprises articles 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, and 442. Article 435 deals with acts of mistreatment and animal cruelty. | Statute | ||
| AK - Dogs - Title 3. Agriculture and Animals. Chapter 55. Dogs. | AS § 03.55.010 - 070, § 11.56.705 - 715; § 44.09.140 | AK ST § 03.55.010 - 070, § 11.56.705 - 715; § 44.09.140 | This collection reflects Alaska's dog laws. The primary dog laws give permission to kill dangerous dogs that are running at large or those that are chasing livestock. It also defines a dangerous dog - "Any dog which when unprovoked has ever bitten or attacked a human being is considered vicious . . ." Notably, "[a]ny person may lawfully kill any vicious or mad dog running at large." This section also allows a village council of an unincorporated village to destroy loose dogs in the village or otherwise control dogs to the extent authorized first class cities. Other laws concern the state dog and harming police dogs. | Statute | |
| Lucille Everette, Plaintiff v. HBPC Corporation, PS d/b/a Highland Bird & Pet Clinic, a Washington Corporation (UBI 602-374-921) |
This King County, Washington order states that the appropriate measure of damages for "Tashi" is intrinsic value and not fair market or replacement value. The matter came before the court on plaintiff's motion concerning damage theories. |
Pleading | |||
| U.S. v. CITGO Petroleum Corp. | 801 F.3d 477 (5th Cir. 2015) | 2015 WL 5201185 (5th Cir., 2015) | CITGO was convicted of multiple violations of the Clean Air Act and its regulations, and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918 (“MBTA”). CITGO urged the 5th Circuit to reverse the Clean Air Act convictions because the district court erroneously instructed the jury about the scope of a regulation concerning “oil-water separators.” CITGO also contended that the MBTA convictions were infirm because the district court misinterpreted the statute as covering unintentional bird kills. The 5th Circuit agreed with both contentions, holding that CITGO's equalization tanks and air floatation device were not oil-water separators under the Clean Air Act's regulations and that “taking” migratory birds involved only “conduct intentionally directed at birds, such as hunting and trapping, not commercial activity that unintentionally and indirectly caused migratory bird deaths. The district court’s decision was reversed and remanded with instructions. | Case | |
| Pedersen v. Benson | 255 F.2d 524 (C.A.D.C. 1958) | 103 U.S.App.D.C. 115 |
In the matter of Pedersen v. Benson , an importer had a permit to import five giraffes from Kenya, three of which were sold and released to public zoos after the requisite quarantine period. The other two were bought by ‘Africa USA,’ but not released. One of them had a heart attack and died. Plaintiff’s filed suit to have the other one they purchased released. The permits, issued by APHIS, were issued under the further understanding that all the giraffes would be consigned to an approved zoological park (Africa USA is a privately-owned zoo). The Court found no basis to uphold the government’s claim that a government officer may impose an ad hoc system of licensure upon any citizen, or upon any one group, i.e. private zoos, as opposed to another. Here, the importation was specifically permitted for all five animals, and any one animal was just as much a potential carrier of hoof and mouth disease as this particular giraffe. Therefore, this matter was dismissed for failure to state a cognizable claim. |
Case | |
| Sentencia Caso Humberto José Saldaña Taboada contra la Municipalidad Provincial de Trujillo - Peru | Saldana contra Trujillo | En este caso, el demandante demandó al alcalde de Trujillo, Perú, exigiendo el cumplimiento de una ordenanza que exigía al municipio a proporcionar refugio temporal para los perros. Trujillo carecía de un refugio municipal para perros y utilizaba el Centro Antirrábico, que no cumplía con los requisitos legales. La ciudad argumentó que la ordenanza tenía como objetivo gestionar a los perros potencialmente peligrosos, no proteger a los abandonados, y albergaba a los perros en el Centro Antirrábico debido a su comportamiento agresivo. Los tribunales de primeras instancias fallaron en contra del demandante, interpretando que la ordenanza solo se aplicaba a los perros potencialmente peligrosos. Sin embargo, el Tribunal Constitucional encontró leyes contradictorias respecto a las responsabilidades de la ciudad y revocó la decisión, ordenando a Trujillo proporcionar un refugio adecuado o colaborar con organizaciones sin ánimo de lucro para albergar a los perros callejeros. | Case | ||
| IA - Restaurant - Inspection standards for food establishments. | IA ADC 481-31.1(137F) | Iowa Admin. Code 481-31.1(137F) | This Iowa regulation was amended in 2020 by adding subsection 31.1(14) to allow "pet dogs" on exterior premises of a food establishment, including outdoor patio and outdoor dining areas, provided the food establishment meets all of the listed requirements. These requirements include: having a separate outdoor entrance; not allowing food preparation in the outdoor area or storage of reusable customer utensils; mandating that food or water dishes provided to dogs are single-use and disposable or come from the pet owners themselves; prohibiting contact between employees and the dogs; making sure the outdoor area is kept clean; ensuring that the area is immediately cleaned and sanitized if body fluids are excreted; making sure the outdoor area is not fully enclosed; requiring the removal of disruptive pet dogs; and posting of rules at the entrance. These rules include the leashing of dogs at all times, the prohibiting of dogs in the interior of the food establishment and on furniture, and the requirement to notify employees if the dog deposits any body fluid. | Administrative | |
| Canada - P.E.I. Statutes - Companion Animal Protection Act | CHAPTER A-11.2 | This set of laws comprises the Prince Edward Island (PEI) Companion Animal Protection Act. The act outlines the duties of animal owners including a duty to provide animals with adequate food, water, and shelter and access to veterinary care when injured or ill. Further, under the act, no person shall torture an animal or inflict on or cause unnecessary pain or suffering to an animal. Additionally, no person shall perform, or permit to be performed, cosmetic surgery on an animal unless medically necessary (as defined). No person shall operate a companion animal retail store unless the person holds a license issued by the Director for that purpose. The disposition of seized animals is described in the law as well as appointment of humane agents. A person found to be violating the act is subject to a fine of not less than $500 and not more than $10,000, and/or imprisonment for a term of not more than six months, with increasing fines and incarceration terms for subsequent offences. | Statute | ||
| NY - Larchmont - Breed - Article IV. Pit Bull. Terriers. | LARCHMONT, NY., CODE OF THE VILLAGE OF LARCHMONT §§ 97-19 - 97-26 (1998) |
In Larchmont, New York, no person may sell, purchase, possess, rent, lease or harbor a pit bull terrier with exceptions for registered dogs. Registration requirements include proof of $500,000 liability insurance, properly confining or securing the dog, and posting notice signs. Failure to comply could result in imprisonment of up to six month and/or a fine of up to $1,000. |
Local Ordinance |