Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| KY - Exotic Animals - Chapter 65. General Provisions Applicable to Counties, Cities | KRS § 65.877 | KY ST § 65.877 | This Kentucky statue authorizes counties and cities to regulate or prohibit the holding of inherently dangerous wildlife. For example, the Department of Fish and Wildlife Resources has identified some of the following animals as being dangerous: African buffalo, Hippopotamus, Hyenas, Old world badger, Lions, jaguars, leopards, or tigers, Clouded leopard, Cheetah, Elephants, Rhinoceroses, Gorillas, Baboons, drills, or mandrills, Crocodiles, Alligators or caimans, certain snakes, Gila monsters or beaded lizards, Komodo dragon, Wolverine, Bears, Wolf, mountain lion. | Statute |
| Womack v. Von Rardon | 135 P.3d 542 (Wash. 2006) |
In this Washington case, a cat owner sued a minor and his parents after the minor set her cat on fire. While this Court found that the trial court correctly granted summary judgment with respect to Ms. Womack's private nuisance, tort outrage, and statutory waste claims, it held that the lower court incorrectly calculated the measure of damages. Noting that the Division 2 Appellate Court left open the question of emotional distress damages where a pet has been maliciously injured in Pickford v. Masion , 124 Wash.App. 257, 262-63, 98 P.3d 1232 (2004), this Court held that the general allegations include sufficient facts to find both malicious conduct toward Ms. Womack's pet and her resulting emotional distress. Thus, "[f]or the first time in Washington, we hold malicious injury to a pet can support a claim for, and be considered a factor in measuring a person's emotional distress damages." |
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| Hastings v. Sauve | 94 A.D.3d 1171 (N.Y.A.D. 3 Dept., 2012) | 2012 WL 1129275 (N.Y.A.D. 3 Dept., 2012); 941 N.Y.S.2d 774 (2012) | Plaintiff motorist was injured after hitting a cow that had wandered onto the highway, and sued owner for negligently failing to confine cow. The Supreme Court held that injury claims could only proceed under strict liability theory based on owner's knowledge of animal's vicious propensities. There was no evidence that cow had a vicious propensity, or that owner knew of propensity, thus, owner was not liable. This order was Reversed by Hastings v. Sauve , 2013 WL 1829834 (N.Y., 2013). | Case |
| MN - Hospitals, nursing homes - § 144.573. Pets in certain institutions | M.S.A. § 144.573 | Minn. Stat. Ann. § 144.573 (West) | This Minnesota statute describes the level of care required for pets who live in institutional facilities with their owners. | Statute |
| Schor v. N. Braddock Borough | 801 F. Supp. 2d 369 (W.D. Pa. 2011) | Sadie, a six (6) year old pit bull and family pet was shot and killed by the Defendant Officer Wittlinger. The Plaintiff, Sadie’s owner, filed a twelve count complaint alleging four § 1983 claims under federal law against all Defendants including the borough, police department, board of supervisors, police chief, and Officer Wittlinger. The remaining eight counts alleged claims solely against the officer. The Defendants' filed a partial motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The Court granted the dismissal of claims against the board, police chief, and officer in their official capacities. The court also dismissed the Plaintiff’s state negligence claims. However, the court did not dismiss claims brought against Police Chief Bazzone and Officer Wittlinger in their individual capacities. The court reasoned that the facts pled by the Plaintiff were sufficient to show that Chief Bazzone may have acted with deliberate indifference by not disciplining Officer Wittlinger after a prior dog shooting incident, and maintained a custom within the Police Department that it was proper to shoot a pet dog wandering the streets. The court also denied the motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s fourth amendment rights claim. The court reasoned that the facts pled by the Plaintiff were sufficient to state a claim for violation of her Fourth Amendment rights because the plaintiff had a possessory interest in her dog Sadie as “property” and the officer used excessive force while seizing the Plaintiff’s property. | Case | |
| MN - Impound - Chapter 346. Animals | M. S. A. § 346.47 | MN ST § 346.47 (formerly MN ST § 35.71) | This is Minnesota's holding period law. This law mandates that all animals seized by public authority must be held for redemption for at least 5 business days by the impounding agency or a longer time if specified by municipal ordinance. The law requires the establishments to preserve records of the animals in custody for at least six months. A person must not release an animal seized and held under this section for research or product testing, either directly or through an animal dealer. | Statute |
| IA - Hunting, canned - 484B.4. Hunting preserve operator's license--application and license requirements | I. C. A. § 484B.4 | IA ST S 484B.4 | Under this Iowa statute, a person who owns or controls by lease or otherwise for five or more years, a contiguous tract of land having an area of not less than three hundred twenty acres, and who desires to establish a hunting preserve to propagate and sell game birds and their young or unhatched eggs, and shoot game birds and ungulates on the land, can apply to the state for an operator's license. The commission reviews the application to determine, among other things, that allowance of the license is not detrimental to wildlife and does not interfere with migratory bird activity. | Statute |
| Snead v. Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals of Pennsylvania | 929 A.2d 1169 (Pa.Super., 2007) | 2007 PA Super 204, 2007 WL 1990510 (Pa.Super.) |
This Pennsylvania case involves cross-appeals following a jury trial in which defendant SPCA, was found liable for euthanizing the dogs belonging to plaintiff Snead, who was awarded damages in the amount of $154,926.37, including $100,000 in punitive damages. The facts stemmed from a seizure several dogs at a seemingly abandoned property owned by Snead where Snead was arrested on dog fighting charges, which were then dropped the next day. However, Snead was not aware that the charges were dropped and that the dogs were therefore available to be reclaimed. The dogs were ultimately euthanized after Snead went to reclaim them. On appeal, this court first held that the SPCA does not operate as a branch of the Commonwealth and therefore, does not enjoy the protection of sovereign immunity or protection under the Pennsylvania Tort Claims Act. The court held that there was sufficient evidence presented for Snead's Sec. 1983 to go to the jury that found the SPCA has inadequate procedures/policies in place to safeguard Snead's property interest in the dogs. As to damages, the court found the there was no evidence to impute to the SPCA evil motive or reckless indifference to the rights of Snead sufficient for an award of punitive damages. |
Case |
| Andrus v. Allard | 444 U.S. 51 (1979) |
The Court holds that the narrow exception in the BGEPA for "possession and transportation" of pre-existing eagles and eagle artifacts does not extend to sale of the those lawfully obtained artifacts. The legislative history and plain language of the statute is clear on Congress' intent to prohibit any commerce in eagles. This prohibition on commerce in eagle artifacts does not constitute an unconstitutional taking because the ability to sell the property is but one strand in the owner's bundle of property rights. The denial of one property right does not automatically equate a taking. For further discussion on the prohibition in commerce of pre-existing eagle artifacts, see Detailed Discussion of Eagle Act. |
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| WI - Vehicle - 895.484. Civil liability exemption; entering a vehicle to render assistance | W. S. A. 895.484 | WI ST 895.484 | This Wisconsin law enacted in 2015 makes a person immune from civil liability for property damage or injury resulting from his or her forcible entry into a vehicle to rescue an animal or person. Immunity is provided only if certain conditions were met. The person must have a "good faith belief" that the person or domestic animal was in imminent danger of suffering bodily harm and used no more force than necessary to remove the person or animal. That person must have first determined the vehicle was locked and forcible entry was necessary, and that person must have dialed 911 or other emergency services prior to this action. In addition, the person must have waited with the person or animal until emergency services arrived or left information on the vehicle's windshield as described in the law. | Statute |