Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Journal of Animal Law Table of Contents Volume 5 |
Published by the students of Michigan State University College of LawJournal of Animal Law Vol. V (2009)The table of contents is provided below. |
Policy | ||
| Kovar v. City of Cleveland | 102 N.E.2d 472 (Ohio App. 1951) | 60 Ohio Law Abs. 579 (1951) |
This case involved a petition by LaVeda Kovar, et al against the City of Cleveland to obtain an order to restrain the City from disposing of dogs impounded by the City Dog Warden by giving or selling them to hospitals or laboratories for experimental and research purposes. The Court of Appeals held that the City of Cleveland, both by its constitutional right of home rule and by powers conferred on municipal corporations by statute, had the police power right to provide that no dog should be permitted to run at large unless muzzled, and any dog found at large and unmuzzled would be impounded. Further, by carrying out the mandate of the city ordinance by disposing of these impounded dogs was simply the performance of a ministerial or administrative duty properly delegated to Director of Public Safety. |
Case |
| Lunon v. Botsford | 946 F.3d 425 (8th Cir. 2019) | Lunon had a German Shephard as a breed dog, named Bibi, which had gotten loose and was turned into the local animal shelter. The animal control officer failed to scan the dog for a microchip. After five days at the animal shelter, Bibi was sterilized and adopted out. Lunon was able to recover his dog through a replevin action, however, Lunon claimed that his fourteenth amendment right to procedural due process was violated when Bibi was spayed and adopted out without providing pre-deprivation notice and an opportunity for Lunon to be heard. Lunon filed suit against the animal control officer, two directors of the animal shelter in Pulaski County, the city of North Little Rock, Pulaski County, the Pulaski County Animal Shelter, and the North Little Rock Animal Shelter. The defendants removed the case to federal court and sought summary judgment. The district court did not grant summary judgment and the defendants appealed. The Court found that the animal control officer picking up Bibi and delivering her to the animal shelter did not deprive Lunon of a protected property interest. There is no constitutional duty for an animal control officer to scan a stray dog for a microchip. Therefore, the animal control officer was not liable. The public officials that participated in this action were all protected under governmental immunity because Lunon failed to demonstrate that each individual defendant violated his constitutional right to due process. The Court ultimately reversed the order of the district court and remanded with directions to enter judgment dismissing those claims with prejudice. | Case | |
| Smith v. Meyring Cattle Co., L.L.C. | 921 N.W.2d 820 (Neb., 2019) | 302 Neb. 116 (2019) | Harley Smith worked for Meyring Cattle Company. Smith was injured when a herd dog allegedly nipped at the hoof of one of the cows and the cow charged forward trampling Smith. Smith sustained substantive injuries. Smith sued Meyring under negligence theories and under strict liability as set forth under Nebraska law. The district court found for Meyring. Smith appealed asserting that the district court erred by finding as a matter of law that strict liability did not apply to the facts of the case and for granting Meyring’s motion for partial directed verdict. as matter of first impression, the Supreme Court of Nebraska stated that the element that a dog be vicious or have dangerous propensities is implicitly part of the strict liability statute. The Court concluded that there was no evidence that the herd dog bit, worried, or chased Smith. There was also no evidence that the herd dog’s actions were directed toward Smith. The language of the strict liability statute was never understood as encompassing bodily hurt to a person by way of a dog worrying or chasing “any sheep or other domestic animals” that collided with that person. The Court affirmed the judgment of the district court. | Case |
| WA - Veterinary - Chapter 18.92. Veterinary Medicine, Surgery, and Dentistry. | West's RCWA 18.92.010 - 900 | WA ST 18.92.010 - 900 | These are the state's veterinary practice laws. Among the provisions include licensing requirements, laws concerning the state veterinary board, veterinary records laws, and the laws governing disciplinary actions for impaired or incompetent practitioners. | Statute |
| WI - Somerset - Breed - Sec. 7-1-9. Wild, exotic and dangerous animals; pit bull dogs. | SOMERSET, WI., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 7-1-9 (2000) |
It is unlawful to keep, harbor, own or possess any pit bull dog in Somerset Wisconsin, with exceptions for dogs registered prior to the effective date of the pit bull ban. Such dogs are subject to certain requirements, such as proper confinement or the use of a leash and muzzle, posting “Beware of Dog” signs, and keeping $50,000 liability insurance. Puppies born to such dogs must be removed from the city after 6 weeks. |
Local Ordinance | |
| Song v Coddington | (2003) 59 NSWLR 180 | [2003] NSWSC 1196 |
The appellant was charged and convicted of being a person in charge and authorising the carriage of a number of goats in cages which did not allow those goats to stand upright. The appellant was a veterinary doctor employed by the Australian Quarantine Inspection Service and authorised under the Export Control (Animals) Orders 1987 to certify animals for export. On appeal, it was determined that for the purposes of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (General) Regulation 1996, the appellant was not a person in charge of the goats. |
Case |
| Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Olympic Game Farm, Inc. | --- F.Supp.3d ----, 2019 WL 2191876 (W.D. Wash. May 21, 2019) | This case has to do with the mistreatment and unsafe captivity of numerous animals kept at a roadside zoo in Sequim, Washington called Olympic Game Farm (OGF). The Animal Legal Defense Fund (ALDF) alleged that OGF’s failure to abide by the Federal Endangered Species Act, as well as alleged violations of Washington State animal cruelty laws created a public nuisance. OGF admitted one of the allegations, specifically, that they are not accredited but possess or display Roosevelt Elk. That was an admitted violation of Washington law which makes it unlawful for a non-accredited facility to possess such a species. That single admission supported ALDF’s public nuisance claim in addition to all of the other alleged state violations. The court stated that ALDF met the "low bar" of standing in a public nuisance context. Accordingly, OGF’s Motion to Dismiss was denied. | Case | |
| T. , J. A. s/ infracción Ley 14.346 | Id SAIJ: FA12340061 | The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the lower court that sentenced the Defendant to eleven months of imprisonment after finding him criminally responsible for acts of cruelty in violation of Article 1 of Ley 14.346 against a stray dog. The Defendant was found guilty of sexually abusing a dog, who he forced into his premises. The dog’s genital area was sheared and she had serious injuries, which the veterinarian concluded were clear signs of penetration. The Supreme Court referred to the Chamber of Appeals on Criminal Matters of Parana "B.J.L. s/ infracción a la Ley 14.346", of October 1, 2003, where the referred court stated that “the norms of Ley 14.346 protect animals against acts of cruelty and mistreatment, is not based on mercy, but on the legal recognition of a framework of rights for other species that must be preserved, not only from predation, but also from treatment that is incompatible with the minimum rationality." Further, "the definition of ‘person’ also includes in our pluralistic and anonymous societies a rational way of contact with animals that excludes cruel or degrading treatment." | Case | |
| TX - Assistance animals - Assistance Animal/Guide Dog Laws | V. T. C. A., Government Code § 661.910; V. T. C. A., Human Resources Code § 121.002 - 009; V. T. C. A., Penal Code § 42.091; V.T.C.A., Penal Code § 38.151; V. T. C. A., Transportation Code § 552.008 - 010; V. T. C. A., Health & Safety Code§ 437.023; | TX GOVT § 661.910; TX HUM RES § 121.002 - 008; TX PENAL § 38.151; TX TRANSP § 552.008 - .10; TX HEALTH & S § 437.023; TX OCC § 2402.112 | The following statutes comprise the state's relevant assistance animal and guide dog laws. | Statute |