Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Defenders of Wildlife v. Hogarth | 177 F. Supp. 2d 1336 (2001) |
Environmental groups challenge implementations of the International Dolphin Conservation Program Act ("IDCPA") which amended the MMPA and revised the criteria for banning tuna imports. |
Case | |
| People v. Romano | 908 N.Y.S.2d 520 (N.Y.Sup.App.Term,2010) | 2010 WL 3339158 (N.Y.Sup.App.Term) |
Defendant appealed a conviction of animal cruelty under Agriculture and Markets Law § 353 for failing to groom the dog for a prolonged period of time and failing to seek medical care for it. Defendant argued that the term “unjustifiably injures” in the statute was unconstitutionally vague, but the Court held the term was not because a person could readily comprehend that he or she must refrain from causing unjustifiable injury to a domestic pet by failing to groom it for several months and seeking medical care when clear, objective signs are present that the animal needs such care. |
Case |
| Commonwealth v. Szewczyk | 53 N.E.3d 1286 (Mass.App.Ct.,2016) | 89 Mass.App.Ct. 711 (2016) | In this Massachusetts case, defendant was charged with animal cruelty after he shot a dog that had wandered onto his property with a pellet gun. The pellet was lodged in the dog’s leg and caused significant pain and discomfort to the dog. Following conviction, defendant appealed the District Court’s ruling arguing that the judge erred in denying three of his eleven requests for rulings of law.Specifically, defendant's principal argument was that he had a lawful purpose in shooting (to scare the dog off his property), his intent was justified (to insure his wife's safety on the property), and the pain inflicted by defendant shooting the dog does not fit the statutory meaning of "cruel." At the close of evidence, defendant submitted a written request for ruling under Mass. R.Crim. P.26 setting out these issues. The court held that the District Court judge correctly denied the three requests because they were clearly outside the scope of rule 26 because they called upon the judge as a fact finder to weigh the evidence presented at trial. Next, the court reviewed the facts of the case to determine whether or not a rational trier of fact could have found the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Ultimately, the court held that a rational trier of fact would have been able to find that defendant did commit animal cruelty by shooting the dog. The court focused on the fact that the defendant could have used other means to ensure that the dog did not enter the property again without causing pain and suffering to the dog by shooting the dog in the leg. The judgment was affirmed. | Case |
| Nelson v. Lewis | 344 N.E.2d 268 (Ill.App. 1976) | 36 Ill.App.3d 130 (1976) |
Toddler accidentally stepped on the tail of the owner's dog, and the dog responded by scratching her eye, causing permanent damage to the tear duct. The toddler sought damages under Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 8, para. 366 (1973), arguing that her unintentional act did not constitute provocation. The court held that provocation under the statute referred to both intentional or unintentional acts. Because the dog was provoked by the unintentional act, he did not react viciously. |
Case |
| ME - Cat - Consolidated Cat Laws | 7 M. R. S. A. § 3916 - 3919C; 1 M. R. S. A. § 217 | ME ST T. 7 § 3916 - 3919C, 4041; ME ST T. 1 § 217 | These statutes comprise Maine's cat laws. Among the provisions include rabies vaccination requirements, stray cat procedures, and the designation of the "state cat." | Statute |
| US - Horses - Sale of Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros | PL 108-447 |
These amendments to the Wild Horses Act, 16 U.S.C.A. § 1333, amended by Public Law 108-447, allow for the sale of animals for commercial purposes in some circumstances, specifically when the excess animal is more than 10 years old, or has been unsuccessfully offered for adoption on at least 3 occasions. Once the excess animal is sold, it will no longer be considered a wild free-roaming horse or burro according to this Act. |
Statute | |
| Anderson v. State Department of Natural Resources | 693 N.W.2d 181 (Minn. 2005) |
A paper manufacturing company sprayed pesticides on their tree grove, but accidentally over sprayed killing some of plaintiff's commercial bees. The commercial beekeeper sued the paper manufacturing company and the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the paper company. The Supreme Court of Minnesota ultimately reversed the grants of summary judgment on the commercial beekeeper's negligence claims and affirmed dismissal of the nuisance claims. |
Case | |
| Powell v. Adlerhorst Int'l, Inc. | 2015 WL 6756126 (D. Or. Nov. 4, 2015) (unpublished) | The plaintiff in this case brought suit after suffering a dog bite from a service dog that was purchased from defendant. The defendant was a corporation that purchased dogs from Europe and then sold them to police agencies to be used as service dogs. Plaintiff (a police officer with the Sherwood Police Department) filed suit asserting both a strict product liability and negligence claim for injuries sustained from dog bites. At issue here is whether the dog was defective and unreasonably dangerous at the time the defendant sold it to the City of Sherwood. Defendant moved for summary judgment and the court denied the motion. The court ultimately held that a reasonable jury could find that defendant should have known about the dog’s aggressive behavior before selling it to plaintiff, thus making it liable for damages. | Case | |
| Sinclair v. Okata | 874 F. Supp. 1051 (D.Alaska,1994) |
Defendants are able to present a genuine question of fact regarding whether they were on notice of their dog's vicious propensity given their characterization of the four prior biting incidents as "behavioral responses common to all dogs." Defendants' expert concluded that each time, Anchor's responses were "natural" or instinctive. Plaintiffs offer no evidence, through expert testimony or otherwise, to refute the opinion of defendants' expert. |
Case | |
| IN - Exotic pet - Chapter 26. Wild Animal Permit. | I.C. 14-22-26-1 to 6 | IN ST 14-22-26-1 to 14-22-26-6 | This set of Indiana laws concerns the keeping of protected and dangerous wild animals. Under the law, a person must obtain a permit to possess these classes of animals. A permit may be suspended if an emergency exists (e.g., the animal is in peril or the animal is in a position to harm another animal). | Statute |