Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Triumph Foods, LLC v. Campbell | --- F.Supp.3d ----, 2024 WL 421994 (D. Mass. Feb. 5, 2024) | This case was brought by a group of pork producers and farmers to challenge the Massachusetts' Prevention of Farm Animal Cruelty Act on the grounds that it violates the dormant Commerce Clause by improperly regulating interstate commerce. The Act would require pork producers to phase out certain means of pig confinement in order to sell pork products in Massachusetts. In response, the state filed a motion to dismiss arguing that there is no causally connected harm to the pork producers, which the court denied. The court first evaluated the slaughterhouse exemption, which exempts sales from the requirement that they must take place within Massachusetts if the buyer takes physical possession of the pork while on the premises of an establishment inspected under the Federal Meat Inspection Act. Plaintiff argued that as an out-of-state pork processor, it could not take advantage of this exemption, even though it operates entirely federally inspected facilities, because it ships its product into Massachusetts from out-of-state and, its buyers do not take physical possession of its product while at its facilities. The court found that this exemption has a discriminatory effect, and vacated the order in part to allow the court to consider whether the Act with the slaughterhouse exemption severed is preempted by the Federal Meat Inspection Act. | Case | ||
| Friends of Animals v. Clay | 811 F.3d 94 (2d Cir. 2016) | 2016 WL 305359 (2d Cir. Jan. 26, 2016) | Friends of Animals (“FOA”) appeals an order of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York granting summary judgment in favor of defendants-appellees William Clay in his official capacity as a Deputy Administrator in the Department of Agriculture-APHIS and the FWS. FOA challenged FWS's issuance of a “depredation permit” to the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey authorizing the emergency “take” of migratory birds that threaten to interfere with aircraft at JFK Airport. FOA argues that FWS's own regulations unambiguously prohibit it from issuing such a permit and that the permit should therefore be set aside as the product of agency action that was “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” The District Court granted summary judgment for defendant FWS. On appeal, this court affirmed that ruling. FOA pointed out that the "emergency take" regulation at 50 C.F.R. § 21.41 does not authorize FWS to issue a permit that allows the emergency take of a migratory bird irrespective of its species, but instead requires a "species-specific" inquiry. However, this court disagreed, finding that "§ 21.41 does not place Port Authority officials in the untenable position of having to choose between violating federal law and deliberately ignoring serious threats to human safety." Further, the court found the specific requirements in § 21.41 concern only applicants seeking a permit and not the FWS itself. In this situation, the court found the 2014 permit's emergency-take provision satisfied § 21.41. The District Court's order was affirmed. | Case | |
| US - Migratory Bird - Migratory Bird Permits; Regulations for Double-Crested Cormorant Management | 2003 WL 22295159 | FR Doc. 03-25500 |
Increasing populations of the double-crested cormorant have caused biological and socioeconomic resource conflicts. In November 2001, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (Service or we) completed a Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) on double-crested cormorant management. In March 2003, a proposed rule was published to establish regulations to implement the DEIS proposed action, Alternative D. In August 2003, the notice of availability for a Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) was published, followed by a 30- day comment period. This final rule sets forth regulations for implementing the FEIS preferred alternative, Alternative D (establishment of a public resource depredation order and revision of the aquaculture depredation order). It also provides responses to comments we received during the 60-day public comment period on the proposed rule. The Record of Decision (ROD) is also published here. |
Administrative | |
| IN - Exotic pet - Chapter 26. Wild Animal Permit. | I.C. 14-22-26-1 to 6 | IN ST 14-22-26-1 to 14-22-26-6 | This set of Indiana laws concerns the keeping of protected and dangerous wild animals. Under the law, a person must obtain a permit to possess these classes of animals. A permit may be suspended if an emergency exists (e.g., the animal is in peril or the animal is in a position to harm another animal). | Statute | |
| CO - Assistance Animals - Colorado Assistance Animal/Guide Dog Laws | C. R. S. A. § 12-240-144; § 12-245-229; § 12-255-133; § 18-13-107, § 18-13-107.3, § 18-13-107.7; § 18-9-202; § 18-1.3-602; § 24-34-301; § 24-34-309; § 24-34-801 - 804; § 40-9-109; § 42-4-808 | CO ST § 12-240-144; § 12-245-229; § 12-255-133; § 18-13-107, § 18-13-107.3, § 18-13-107.7; § 18-9-202; § 18-1.3-602; § 24-34-301; § 24-34-309; § 24-34-801 - 804; § 40-9-109; § 42-4-808 | The following statutes comprise the state's relevant assistance animal and service animal laws. | Statute | |
| Sawh v. City of Lino Lakes | 800 N.W.2d 663 (Minn.App.,2011) | 2011 WL 2982992 (Minn.App.,2011) |
The city council ordered the destruction of a dog after finding it to be a dangerous animal and the owner appealed. The Court of Appeals held that procedural due process required that the owner should have been given a meaningful opportunity to contest the declaration of the dog as a “potentially dangerous animal” before it was declared a “dangerous animal” under the city ordinance. |
Case | |
| U.S. v. Thomas | 887 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1989) |
The issue in this case is whether Edward A. Thomas, a Montana hunting guide and outfitter, may be found guilty of conspiracy to violate the Lacey Act where the alleged object of the conspiracy was "to transport, receive and acquire elk in interstate commerce ... in violation of Montana state hunter's law." The Court held that while a prosecution under the Lacey Act may not be sustained for the substantive acts of selling guiding services and hunting permits, an action can be maintained for conspiracies to violate the Act through these types of acts. In this case, the underlying violations were acts of hunting with a transferred license or permit where the acts were allegedly committed by others. |
Case | ||
| Puppies 'N Love, v. City of Phoenix | 116 F. Supp. 3d 971 (D. Ariz. 2015) | 2015 WL 4532586 (D. Ariz., 2015) | Defendant City of Phoenix passed an ordinance that prohibited pet stores from selling dogs or cats obtained from persons or companies that bred animals; pet stores could only sell animals obtained from animal shelters or rescue organizations. Puppies 'N Love operated a pet store in Phoenix that sold purebred dogs obtained from out-of-state breeders. Puppies 'N Love and its owners sued the City, claiming primarily that the Ordinance violated the dormant Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution by closing the Phoenix market to out-of-state breeders and giving an economic advantage to local breeders. All parties, including Intervenor Humane Society of the United States (“HSUS”), filed motions for summary judgment. The District Court granted the Intervenor’s and the city’s motions, but denied Puppies ‘N Love’s motion, thereby upholding the ordinance. | Case | |
| Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Otter | 44 F. Supp. 3d 1009 (D. Idaho 2014) | 2014 WL 4388158 (D. Idaho, 2014) | In a ‘hold your tongue and challenge now’ First Amendment challenge to an Idaho statute that criminalizes undercover investigations and videography at “agricultural production facilities,” the Animal Legal Defense Fund, as well as various other organizations and individuals, (collectively, “ALDF”), brought suit. The State defendants, Governor Butch Otter and Attorney General Lawrence Wasden, moved to dismiss the ALDF's claims. The claims against the Governor were dismissed under 11th Amendment immunity because the ALDF failed to explain the requisite connection between the Governor and enforcement of section 18–7024. The court also found that since the ALDF failed to allege a concrete plan to violate subsection (e), it lacked standing to challenge section 18–7042(1)(e) and the claim in regards to that provision was therefore dismissed. However, the ALDF’s First Amendment, bare animus Equal Protection, and preemption claims survived the motion to dismiss. | Case | |
| GA - Endangered - Article 5. Protection of Endangered Wildlife | Ga. Code Ann., § 27-3-130 to 133 | GA ST §§ 27-3-130 to 133 | These statutes provide for the definition of "protected" species and outline the duties of the board responsible for enforcing Georgia's endangered species law. Included in the Board's duties are inventorying and designating listed species and promulgating regulations. Violation of these regulations results in a misdemeanor. | Statute |