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Displaying 5881 - 5890 of 6637
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CA - Horse docking - § 597p. Docked horses; registration; time; fee; certificate | West's Ann. Cal. Penal Code § 597p | CA PENAL § 597p | This statute requires every owner, or user of any docked horse, within the State of California, to register his or her docked horse. | Statute | |
| AK - Importation - Chapter 36. Animal Health | 18 AK ADC 36.001 - 990 | 18 AAC 36.001 - 990 | These Alaska regulations concern the importation requirements for animals. Health certificates and permits from the state veterinarian are required. | Administrative | |
| RI - Breeders - Part 4. Rules and Regulations Governing Animal Care Facilities | 250 RI ADC 40-05-4.1 - .14 | 250 R.I. Admin. Code 40-05-4.1 - .14 | These rules and regulations are established to provide minimum standards to govern all licensed or registered animal care facilities in Rhode Island. They serve as standards for the construction and maintenance of such facilities, the care of animals in those facilities, as well as the criteria for inspectors to use when conducting inspections for licensure or in response to a complaint concerning their operation. They are considered minimum standards that must be maintained. | Administrative | |
| Animal Legal Defense Fund Boston, Inc. v. Provimi Veal Corp. | 626 F.Supp. 278 (D.Mass.,1986) |
District Court found that federal law preempts Massachusetts's consumer protection statute that requires retailers to inform consumers of relevant information, the disclosure of which may have influenced the buyer or prospective buyer not to enter into the transaction. The District Court also held that the Animal Legal Defense Fund could not enforce a cruelty to animals claim because it involves criminal statutes that only public prosecutors and legislatively-sanctioned groups may enforce. |
Case | ||
| Map of State Internet-Hunting Laws | As of 2024, about 42 states have laws or regulations banning remote control and/or computer-assisted hunting of animals. Some states like Arkansas, Florida, Oregon, and Missouri implement this ban through administrative regulation. Some laws are more specific than others and ban not only the owning and operating of a shooting range for the purpose of online shooting, but also ban creating such websites. In some states, people may also be fined or given jail time for utilizing a website via the Internet which allows the online shooting of animals. | State map | |||
| US - AWA - 2008 Public Law 110-234 | 2008 PL 110-234 | 122 Stat 923 | 2008 Amendments to the Animal Welfare Act concerning the importation of live dogs. | Statute | |
| US - Crimes - Chapter 3. Animals, Birds, Fish, and Plants. | 18 USCA § 43 | This federal law provides for crime and penalties for animal enterprise terrorism. | Statute | ||
| AL - Fish and Wildlife - Article 3. Division of Wildlife and Freshwater Fisheries | Ala. Code 1975 § 9-2-60 - 67 | AL ST § 9-2-60 to 67 | This set of laws establishes the Division of Wildlife and Freshwater Fisheries within the Alabama Department of Conservation and Natural Resources and outlines the powers and duties of various officials within that division. | Statute | |
| Acción de Inconstitucionalidad 7/2021 - Ciudad de México | ACCIÓN DE INCONSTITUCIONALIDAD 7/2021 | Brought by the National Human Rights Commission, this action of unconstitutionality seeks the annulment of Article 10Bis, Section II, Subsection i) of the Animal Protection Law of Mexico City. This provision was added through Decree Number 495, published in the city's Official Gazette on December 16, 2020. The provision at issue allowed the Animal Squad (Brigada Animal) to enter enclosed areas where there was a presumption of animal cruelty without a warrant. The Supreme Court of Justice (Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación (SCJN)) invalidated section i), section II, of article 10 Bis of the Animal Protection Law of Mexico City. | Case | ||
| Andrade v. Westlo Mgmt. LLC | 276 A.3d 393 (R.I. 2022) | 2022 WL 2183604 (R.I. June 17, 2022) | The defendants, Westlo Management LLC (Westlo) seek review of a Superior Court order granting partial summary judgment on several counts in favor of the plaintiffs, Curtis W. Andrade and The Rhode Island Commission for Human Rights (the commission). The defendants assert that the existence of genuine issues of material fact precluded partial summary judgment and that the commission did not have standing to intervene in this matter. The matter stems from a denial of plaintiff's request for a reasonable accommodation at Westlo's property. Prior to moving in to Westlo's low-income property, plaintiff was told by a leasing agent that he was not permitted to have his dog, Enzo, because the dog (a pit bull) was on the complex' restricted breed list. Andrade then informed the leasing manager that the dog was his support animal (although he could not recall at deposition whether he filled out paperwork for an assistance animal). After moving in, he left the dog mostly at his mother's residence, but did bring the dog to his residence in December of 2011. While the dog was there, an incident occurred with another resident in a hallway near the elevators. Andrade testified that his dog never made physical contact with the resident, while the other resident claims the dog charged at him and pinned him to a wall. This resulted in a report being made to the building manager who then informed Andrade the dog was not allowed on the premises. Andrade then discussed the need for a support animal with his doctor who agreed and wrote a note stating that Andrade “would benefit in having a dog due to his medical condition[.]” The building manager rejected this request in a letter citing the breed ban and the recent incident with the dog. After a subsequent refusal by the building manager, Andrade filed a charge of discrimination with the Rhode Island Commission for Human Rights. After unsuccessful settlement discussions with the parties, Westlo initiated eviction proceedings against Andrade for non-payment of rent and the commission issued a right-to-sue letter. Andrade then filed the instant lawsuit and a hearing justice granted the commission's right to intervene. The complaint against Westlo raised the unlawful denial of full and equal access to housing and public accommodations based on Andrade's disability and unlawful retaliation by eviction, among other things. After cross-motions for summary judgment by both parties, the hearing justice granted plaintiffs motion for summary judgment finding that Westlo had discriminated against Andrade. However, she found there to be a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the dog had requisite training. Further, she refused to interfere with the order granting the commission's motion to intervene. The justice also acknowledged that she had misstated that the request for the reasonable accommodation had occurred before the elevator incident with the other resident. As a result, she declined to make a finding of fact on that issue. On defendants' appeal of summary judgment, defendants argue that the issue of whether an accommodation is reasonable under the FHA is a factual one and thus it was error for the hearing justice to make those determinations. The Supreme Court looked at the similar language of both the federal FHA and the state FHPA. While the court found that plaintiff met the definition for disability under the laws and that defendant was made aware of plaintiff's need for reasonable accommodation, it was troubled by the "direct threat" posed by the dog. Specifically, the court found issue with the date mix-up in the initial hearing for the incident with the dog an other resident. Therefore, due to the highly fact-specific nature of the assessment of an assistance animal as well as the conflicting evidence presented, this court disagreed with the hearing justice and concluded summary judgment was not appropriate. Further, the court found a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the dog was "necessary" to fully enjoy his dwelling since benefit of dog as it relates to plaintiff's disability was not fully described and the dog lived away from plaintiff for a year. As to the challenge to the motion to intervene, the court found Westlo failed to obtain the transcripts necessary to review the issue. Thus, this court quashed that portion of the Superior Court order that grants the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment “as to the [l]iability of Westlo Management, on [c]ounts 1, 2, 3, and 7[.]” The record was remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. | Case |