Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AZ - Phoenix - Chapter 8 - ANIMALS. | Chapter 8 |
The following comprises Phoenix, Arizona's animal-related ordinances. Topics include the keeping of reptiles or wild animals, vicious animal provisions, and sections addressing animal cruelty. An entire article (Article IV) deals with the confinement of animals in motor vehicles. |
Local Ordinance | ||
| Crisman v. Hallows | 999 P.2d 1249 (Utah App.,2000) | 393 Utah Adv. Rep. 9, 2000 UT App 104 (2000) |
Plaintiff dog owners appeal the trial court's entry of summary judgment in favor of defendant Ted Hallows. Hallows. a Division of Wildlife Resources employee, shot the dogs after they got loose from plaintiffs' backyard. While the factual accounts of the shooting differed, Hallows asserted that he shot the dogs within the scope of his employment and was therefore protected under the Governmental Immunity Act. On appeal, the court first found that plaintiffs may maintain an action against Hallows for conduct outside the scope of his employment and this claim was not barred by their admitted failure to comply with the Immunity Act's notice of claim and statute of limitations requirements. Further, as to plaintiffs' claims that Hallows was not acting within his scope of employment when the shooting occurred, there was sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact. |
Case | |
| UFO Chuting of Hawaii, Inc. v. Young | 380 F.Supp.2d 1166 (2005, D.Hawai'i) | 2005 WL 1907675 (D.Hawai'i) |
Some parasail operators brought an action against state officials challenging validity of a state law that banned parasailing in navigable waters. Defendants argued that the court's order should be reconsidered in light of an intervening change in federal law that they say allows for the seasonal parasailing ban. After vacation of summary judgment in favor of operators, 2005 WL 1910497, the state moved for relieve from final judgment. The District Court held that the federal law permitting Hawaii to enforce state laws regulating recreational vessels for purpose of conserving and managing humpback whales did not violate separation of powers doctrine, and federal law did not violate Equal Protection Clause. |
Case | |
| RI - Assistance Animals - Consolidated Assistance Animal Laws | Gen. Laws, 1956, § 4-13-4, § 4-13-16.1, § 39-2-13, § 31-18-14 - 16.1, § 34-37-4, § 40-9.1-1 - 1.7; 42-87-3; § 34-37.1-6 | RI ST § 4-13-4, § 4-13-16.1, § 39-2-13, § 31-18-14 - 16.1, § 34-37-4, § 40-9.1-1 - 1.7; 42-87-3; § 34-37.1-6 | The following statutes comprise the state's relevant assistance/service animal laws. | Statute | |
| MT - Ecoterrorism - Chapter 30. Protection of Farm Animals and Research Facilities | MCA 81-30-101 to 81-30- 105 | MT ST 81-30-101 to 81-30- 105 | This chapter comprises Montana's Farm Animal and Research Facilities Protection Act." Unlawful acts include exercising control over a facility without consent, damaging or destroying the property of an animal facility, entering an animal facility with the intent to commit a prohibited act, entering an animal facility to take pictures by photograph, video camera, or other means with the intent to commit criminal defamation, and entering an animal facility if the person knows entry is forbidden. A person who has been damaged by reason of a violation of 81-30-103 may bring against the person who caused the damage an action in the district court to recover an amount equal to three times all actual and consequential damages; and court costs and reasonable attorney fees. | Statute | |
| Carroll v. County of Monroe | 712 F.3d 649 (2nd Cir. 2013) | Upon executing a no-knock warrant by using a battering ram to break through the front door of the plaintiff’s home, police encountered the plaintiff’s dog. An officer claimed the dog was growling, barking, and quickly and aggressively approaching him. He then fired one shot from his shotgun, striking the dog and killing him. Prior to the execution of the warrant, the officers were aware that a dog would be present and did not discuss a plan for controlling the dog or neutralizing the dog by any non-lethal means. The plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the police officers and municipality, alleging violations of her Fourth Amendment rights. The court denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgement and held that the issue of whether the officer acted reasonably was a question for the jury. | Case | ||
| US - Wolf - Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Reinstatement of Protections for the Gray Wolf in the Western Great L | 2009 WL 2947315 (F.R.) | Docket No. FWSR3ES20090063; 9222011130000; C6 |
We, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (Service), are issuing this final rule to comply with a court order that has the effect of reinstating the regulatory protections under the Endangered Species Act of 1973, as amended (ESA), for the gray wolf (Canis lupus) in the western Great Lakes. This rule corrects the gray wolf listing in our regulations which will reinstate the listing of gray wolves in all of Wisconsin and Michigan, the eastern half of North Dakota and South Dakota, the northern half of Iowa, the northern portions of Illinois and Indiana, and the northwestern portion of Ohio as endangered, and reinstate the listing of wolves in Minnesota as threatened. This rule also reinstates the former designated critical habitat for gray wolves in Minnesota and Michigan and special regulations for gray wolves in Minnesota. |
Administrative | |
| Janota-Bzowska v. Lewis | 1997CarswellBC1957 | 96 B.C.A.C. 70, 155 W.A.C. 70, 43 B.C.L.R. (3d) 352, [1997] B.C.J. No. 2053 |
The respondent Janota-Bzowska was an invited guest at the home of the appellant Lewises, where another guest (appellant Holtzman) had tied his Labrador dog outside; the dog lunged at the respondent, causing her to fall and break her finger. A trial court earlier found both dog-owner and home-owners liable to Janota-Bzowska under the doctrines of scienter (strict liabilty) and negligence. On appeal, the court held that there was insufficient evidence to establish that the dog had a propensity to lunge at people, or that the owner knew of such propensity, although the dog was known to chase deer. However, this was not sufficient to allow recovery under scienter. On the issue of negligence, the court also held that the dog's behaviour being 'unexpected and out of character' showed no suggestion of a risk for which the owner had failed to take reasonable precautions, so there was no negligence shown. |
Case | |
| State v. Kelso | 689 P.2d 1307 (1984) | 70 Or.App. 393 (1984) |
Appeal from a district court decision relating to mental state requirements of an animal owner. The Court of Appeals reversed a district court finding which required a higher mental state than negligence in violation of a statute which provides that the owner or custodian of an animal or livestock shall not "permit" animal to run at large. The Court of Appeals found that the offense does not require a culpable mental state. |
Case | |
| Gibson v. Babbitt | 223 F.3d 1256 (11th Cir. 2000) |
Defendant, a Native American, challenged the constitutionality of the limitation of eagle parts through the permit system to members of federally recognized tribes. The limitation under the federal eagle permit system to federally recognized Indian tribes does not violate RFRA because the government has a compelling interest in protecting a species in demise and fulfilling pre-existing trust obligations to federally-recognized tribes in light of the limited supply of eagle parts. For further discussion on free exercise challenges under the BGEPA, see Detailed Discussion of Eagle Act. |
Case |