Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| MD - Habitat - Subtitle 7. State Chesapeake Bay and Endangered Species Fund | MD Code, Natural Resources, § 1-705 | MD NAT RES § 1-705 | Maryland law specifically allocates funds for the habitat protection, conservation, and propagation of endangered and threatened species. This fund has a provision that designates this fund for the monitoring, surveying, and protection of bald eagle nest sites in addition to other wildlife. | Statute | |
| Lopez v. State | 720 S.W.2d 201 (Tex. App. 1986). |
The court convicted the defendant of cruelty to animals where the defendant left his dog in the car on a hot, sunny, dry day with the windows only cracked an inch and a half. Such action was deemed "transporting or confining animal in a cruel manner." |
Case | ||
| Gilman v. Nevada State Board of Veterinary Medical Examiners | 89 P.3d 1000 (Nev. 2004) | 2004 WL 1109610 (Nev.), 120 Nev. 263 (2004) |
The Slensky's took their ill beagle to Defendant's Animal Hospital for routine vaccinations and examinations due to the dog's loose stools for four days. X-rays of the dog were taken, and when the dog was returned to the Slensky's, where it then collapsed. Defendant instructed them to take the dog to the emergency clinic, where it later died. The family filed a complaint with the Nevada State Board of Veterinary Medical Examiners, and Defendant was later convicted of gross negligence and incompetence, an ethics violation, and for using an unlicensed veterinary technician. His license was suspended and he was placed on probation. The Court held that Defendant: (1) could be assessed costs of the proceeding; (2) he could not be assessed attorney's fees; (3) the Board could award expert witness fees above the statutory cap; (4) the Board failed to justify the imposition of costs for an investigator; and (5) statutes did not permit the employment of an unlicensed veterinary technician. |
Case | |
| Burkholder v. Department of Agriculture | 265 A.3d 863 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2021) | In this Pennsylvania case, James Burkholder, d/b/a Whispering Spring Kennel (Burkholder), petitioned for review of an adjudication of the Secretary of Agriculture (Secretary) that imposed a $19,500 civil penalty on Burkholder for transferring two dogs in excess of the annual limit under his Class IV kennel license in December of 2017. Burkholder raises two arguments: first, the Dog Law does not specify that transfers of more than 60 dogs by a private kennel constitute violations; and two, the penalty imposed is excessive and unreasonable. This court first noted that a Kennel Class IV license clearly does not allow him to transfer more than 60 dogs and thus any transfers in excess violate the Dog Law. As to the excessive penalty argument, the court first examined the distinction between separate and ongoing violations of the Dog Law because it raised a question of first impression under the Dog Law. Relying on the distinction in other contexts, particularly regarding penalties imposed by the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission (PUC), the court found that a kennel owner holding too many dogs could remedy the violation simply by transferring the excess dogs. The problem here is that, where an owner has transferred more dogs than his license allows, there is no way to correct the violation. Thus, said the court, a per-day fine is improper. "Each unauthorized transfer of a single dog is a single violation of the Dog Law, not a continuing violation, because it is not ongoing in nature and such transfers can be feasibly segregated into discrete violations so as to impose separate penalties." The court concluded that the Department erred as a matter of law by imposing ongoing penalties for two discrete unauthorized transfers. The order of the Department as to the excess transfers of dogs was affirmed, but the portion as to the amount of the penalty was vacated. The matter was remanded for further proceedings. | Case | ||
| MS - Dog - Consolidated Dog Laws | Miss. Code Ann. § 19-5-50; § 19-25-83; § 19-5-3; § 21-19-9; § 21-21-5; § 37-7-342; § 41-53-1 - 13; § 45-3-52; § 49-7-42; § 69-29-2; § 73-39-89; § 95-5-19 - 21 | MS ST § 19-5-50; § 19-25-83; § 19-5-3; § 21-19-9; § 21-21-5; § 37-7-342; § 41-53-1 - 13; § 45-3-52; § 49-7-42; § 69-29-2; § 73-39-89; § 95-5-19 - 21 | These Mississippi statutes comprise the state's dog laws. Included are provisions relating to hunting with dogs, local dog ordinances, and liability of owners for damage done by dogs. | Statute | |
| ID - Equine Activity Liability - CHAPTER 18. EQUINE ACTIVITIES IMMUNITY ACT. | I.C. § 6-1801 - 1802 | ID ST § 6-1801 - 1802 | This Idaho statute provides that an equine activity sponsor or an equine professional shall not be liable for any injury to or the death of a participant or equine engaged in an equine activity and no participant may maintain an action against an equine activity sponsor or professional. Statutory definitions are provided, including "participant," "equine," and who is considered an "equine sponsor" or "equine professional. Liability is not limited by this statute where the equine professional knowingly provided faulty tack or equipment, failed to make reasonable and prudent efforts to determine the ability of the participant to engage safely in the equine activity, owns or otherwise is in lawful possession of the land or facilities upon which the participant sustained injuries because of a known, dangerous latent condition, or if he or she commits an act or omission that constitutes willful or wanton disregard for the safety of the participant or intentionally injures the participant. | Statute | |
| Simpson v. Department of Fish and Wildlife | 255 P.3d 565 (Or. App., 2011) | 2011 WL 1486081 (Or. App.) ; 242 Or.App. 287 (2011) |
Game ranch owners sought a declaratory ruling from the Department of Fish and Wildlife (DFW) as to whether their animals were property of the state. DFW ruled that the state had only a regulatory interest in the game animals. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the State's property interest in the animals was not proprietary or possessory. The State's interest was regulatory, based on a state statute and a regulation adopted by the State Fish and Wildlife Commission. It also held that the State's interest in wild game is that of a sovereign. |
Case | |
| Oestrike v. Neifert | 255 N.W. 226 (Mich. 1934) | 267 Mich. 462 (Mich. 1934) |
In this case, defendant Neifert rented land to graze cattle. Plaintiff owned billboards in the pasture that were often painted with lead-based paint. Defendant's cattle ate the lead-contaminated paint left in the pails and the ground and subsequently died from poisoning. The Court upheld the award of damages to defendant-Neifert on a negligence theory because plaintiffs should have reasonably known that the cattle would ingest the paint left in the pails and on the field. |
Case | |
| NY - Horse Racing - Section 4117.1. Drive to finish | 9 NY ADC 4117.1 | 9 NYCRR 4117.1 | Every race must be contested by every horse in the race and every horse must be driven to the finish. | Administrative | |
| Farm Sanctuary v. USDA | Seven organizations dedicated to protecting the animals, people, and environments that suffer due to industrial animal agriculture filed a lawsuit against the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) challenging its decision to reduce oversight at pig slaughterhouses and eliminate limits on the slaughter speeds. | Pleading |