Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CO - Environment - Ley 1333, 2009 | Ley 1333, 2009 | Ley 1333, 2009, establishes the fines, sanctions, injunctions, and corresponding procedures for violations of environmental regulations. It establishes provisional dispositions, preventive seizure procedures of flora and fauna, and guidelines on how to proceed when the environmental authority does not have the infrastructure or equipment to keep wildlife individual specimens. It creates information portals for the control of environmental regulations called the Unique Registry of Environmental Wrongdoers (RUIA), and the Wildlife Information Portal (PIFS). | Statute | ||
| US - Endangered - Emergency Petition to List the Pygmy Three-Toed Sloth | Submitted by the Animal Welfare Institute (AWI) | The Animal Welfare Institute (AWI) formally requests that the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) list the pygmy three-toed sloth (Bradypus pygmaeus) as endangered under the federal Endangered Species Act (ESA) on an emergency basis. Alternatively, if the USFWS determines that an emergency listing is not warranted in this case, AWI requests that it process this listing petition pursuant to the standard timetable as required under the ESA. | Administrative | ||
| US - Chimpanzees - Research | NIH Working Group Report (2013) | This report summarizes the findings and recommendations of the Working Group on the Use of Chimpanzees in National Institutes of Health (NIH)-Supported Research. The NIH formed this committee within the Council of Councils, a federal advisory committee, to advise the NIH on the implementation of the recommendations of the Institute of Medicine’s (IOM’s) Committee on the Use of Chimpanzees in Biomedical and Behavioral Research regarding the use of chimpanzees in NIH-sponsored research. | Administrative | ||
| AK - Ordinances - § 03.55.070. Power of village council to control dogs | AS § 03.55.070 | AK ST § 03.55.070 | This Alaska statute enables a village council the power to destroy loose dogs in the village and otherwise control dogs to the extent authorized first class cities. The council may impose and enforce the provisions of a dog control ordinance in the total area within 20 miles of the village. | Statute | |
| Anays Rodriguez-Porras, Plaintiff v. Miami-Dade Animal Services, Miami-Dade Police Department, Miami-Dade County, Defendants |
This Miami-Dade County, Florida case concerns the unauthorized euthanization of the plaintiff's dog, "Cowboy." Cowboy was a beloved family pet who was fitted with an identification microchip in case he was ever lost. In August of 2005, Cowboy got loose after being frightened by a storm and picked up by an animal shelter officer. The plaintiff was inaccurately informed that no dog matching Cowboy's description was at the shelter (records from the shelter showed he was actually picked up the same day he escaped from his home). Five days later, she was informed that Cowboy was at the shelter. After telling the shelter she would be there the next day to pick up Cowboy (since the shelter was closing and would not wait for her to arrive), the shelter euthanized the dog despite assurances to plaintiff that he would be kept safe. Plaintiff sued animal control, the county, and police department for intentional infliction of emotional distress, conversion, wrongful disposition of a body, and negligence. |
Pleading | |||
| Defenders of Wildlife v. Norton | 239 F.Supp.2d 9 (D.D.C. 2002) |
Plaintiffs, twelve conservation organizations and one individual involved in Lynx conservation efforts, challenge a final decision by the USFWS declaring the Lynx in the contiguous United States to be a "threatened," rather than "endangered," species under the Endangered Species Act. Plaintiffs allege that the designation of the Lynx as threatened is "arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law," in violation of § 706(2)(A) of the Administrative Procedure Act and that the Service has violated the ESA by failing to designate "critical habitat" for the Lynx as required by that statute. The Court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs, finding that the FWS's conclusion that, "[c]ollectively, the Northeast, Great Lakes, and Southern Rockies do not constitute a significant portion of the range of the DPS," (three of the Lynx's four regions) were collectively not a significant portion of its range was counterintuitive and contrary to the plain meaning of the ESA phrase "significant portion of its range." With regard to the FWS's failure to designate critical habitat, the excessive delays experienced by the FWS ran completely counter to the mandate of the ESA and were without proper justification. |
Case | ||
| People v. Spence | 212 Cal.App.4th 478 (Cal.App. 4 Dist., 2012) | 151 Cal.Rptr.3d 374, 12 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 14,151, 13 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 27, 2012 Daily Journal D.A.R. 17,325 |
In this California case, a jury convicted James Spence of two counts of sexual offenses against a child 10 years old or younger (his housemate's daughter). He was sentenced to a total term of 55 years to life. Among other issues on appeal, Spence argues the court erred by allowing a therapy dog or support canine to be present at the child's feet while she testified, and contends this was “overkill” with the additional support person present on the witness stand. Section 868.5 of the Evidence Code allows up to two support persons during testimony. The court found that the dog was not a "person" for purposes of the code. The trial judge's decision to allow the dog was discretionary. The jury was given instructions to base its decision solely on the evidence presented at trial and not on any sympathies. Further, the court found even if more specific express findings of necessity would have been proper prior to allowing both the dog and support person on the the witness stand, any error was harmless. |
Case | |
| Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Olympic Game Farm, Inc. | 591 F. Supp. 3d 956 (W.D. Wash. 2022), on reconsideration in part, No. C18-6025RSL, 2022 WL 4080657 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 6, 2022), and on reconsideration in part, No. C18-6025RSL, 2022 WL 4080658 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 6, 2022) | This matter concerns defendant Olympic Game Farm, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment after plaintiff sued those owners and operators of an animal-based attraction on the Olympic Peninsula for violating the federal Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) by taking and possessing protected species and creating a public nuisance in violation of Washington state law. Specifically, defendants seek a summary determination that its brown bears, wolves, and Canada lynx are not listed species for purposes of the ESA, that it has not harmed, harassed, or possessed any species in violation of the ESA, and that it is not a public nuisance. In granting the motion in part, the court held that grizzly bears found in Washington state are protected under the Endangered Species Act and wolves with some domestic dog ancestry are also protected by the Endangered Species Act. However, the animal welfare group did not give the operators enough notice of their claims regarding the housing and care of the grizzly bears. The court also found it unclear whether allowing tourists to feed grizzly bears large amounts of bread is a violation of accepted animal care practices. With regard to the wild cats, the animal welfare group did not prove that the operators' lion enclosures failing to meet the aspirational Association of Zoos and Aquariums (“AZA”) standards, a standard met by only a minimum of USDA exhibitors, showed a failure to meet a "generally accepted standard" of care. In contrast, the court found that it was unclear whether the operators provided adequate veterinary care for their tigers and thus, this aspect of the ESA claim may proceed. On the state nuisance claim, the court held that the operators' alleged violations of the Endangered Species Act did not constitute a public nuisance. Finally, it was unclear whether the operators' treatment of a Canada lynx's fractured femoral bone violated Washington's animal cruelty laws. Said, the court, "[a]lthough it is not clear that mere negligence in providing veterinary care violates Washington's animal cruelty laws, in the absence of any countervailing argument or facts, plaintiff has raised a triable issue of fact regarding this claim." The motion was granted in part and denied in part. | Case | ||
| Goodwin v. Crawford Cty., Georgia | Slip Copy, 2019 WL 2569626 (M.D. Ga. June 21, 2019) | This instant action is a motion to dismiss by Defendant Sims in a § 1983 action and state law claims by plaintiff Goodwin against several Crawford County, Georgia officials. The case started with the shooting of plaintiff's dog, allegedly by Defendant Crawford County Officer Neesmith. After the dog was shot in his driveway, plaintiff alleges that Neesmith consulted another officer named Hollis who arrived on scene. Neesmith then called Defendant Sims, who was an employee of the Crawford County Health Department. Sims explained to Neesmith by phone that Plaintiff Goodwin could be liable for the cost of a rabies shot if the dog's head was not removed and that the cost of the shot was approximately $20,000. After this call, Hollis order plaintiff to cut off his own dog's head to be tested for rabies or face criminal charges and the cost of the rabies shot. In the presence of plaintiff's wife and children, the plaintiff relented and cut off the dog's head with a knife, but was too emotionally distraught to take the dog's head to the Crawford County Health Department (Plaintiff Dakon did so). As to only Defendant Sims' motion to dismiss, this court found that her economic coercion was not arbitrary and thus did not violate plaintiff's substantive due process rights. Further, the court found that Sims did not actually coerce or force plaintiff to do the decapitation. Regarding plaintiff's intentional infliction of emotional distress against Sims, the court found that Sims' alleged use of "financial pressure" did not amount to extreme and outrageous conduct. Instead, the court said "she did her job," which was to communicate the rabies control procedures and did not actually require plaintiff to personally decapitate his dog. Accordingly, the Court granted Sims' Motion to Dismiss. | Case | ||
| The United Kingdom | Policy |