Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Harby v. Harby | 331 So. 3d 814 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2021) | This Florida case involves an appeal of a final judgment of dissolution of marriage. With respect to animal law, the wife appealed the trial court's distribution of family dogs, Liberty and Nico, to the former husband. According to testimony, the dogs were bonded to each other. The former wife testified that the family adopted Liberty "to be an emotional support dog" and was her constant companion. The former wife testified that she cared for the dogs when they were adopted in 2013 and 2014 until the parties separated in 2017. Since that separation, the dogs have been in the husband's possession and care. The trial court determined that the dogs were marital property and that the wife appeared to be in good health with no physical or mental disabilities. Further, both parties agreed the dogs should not be separated from each other and the court found the dogs had been in the husband's possession since the parties separated. On appeal, the wife argues that the trial court's distribution of the family dogs to Former Husband was arbitrary, capricious, and unsupported by the record. In particular, the wife contends that one of the dogs is her emotional support animal and former husband expressed no desire or claim for the dogs in testimony. The court first observed that Florida is not one of the handful of states with statutes that give pets a special property status in distribution of marital assets. Instead, animals are considered personal property. Here, the court found both parties have cared for the dogs at times and the husband cared for them after the parties separated in 2017. And, while the court found that Liberty was "emotionally comforting," there was no evidence that the former wife had a disability and that Liberty provided emotional support to alleviate an effect of such disability. Thus, the role Liberty played was to provide comfort and companionship like most household pets. Since the trial court also considered each party's sentimental interest in the pets, including the children's attachment since they resided primarily with the former husband, there was no showing that the court abused its discretion in awarding the dogs to former husband. Thus, the appellate court concluded that the trial court acted within its discretion by awarding the family dogs to the former husband. | Case | |
| Dart v Singer | [2010] QCA 75 |
The applicants pleaded guilty to a number of charges under the Animal Care and Protection Act 2001 (Qld) following the seizure of 113 live dogs, one cat, 488 rats, 73 mice, 12 guinea pigs and 11 birds from their premises due to unsanitary and inappropriate living conditions. The applicants claimed that RSPCA officers were acting ultra vires and that a stay preventing the RSCPA from parting with the animals should be effected. The applicants' argument failed. |
Case | |
| Center for Biological Diversity v. Badgley | 335 F.3d 1097 (C.A.9 (Or.),2003) | 33 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,244, 3 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6393, 2003 Daily Journal D.A.R. 8066 |
The Center for Biological Diversity and eighteen other nonprofit organizations appealed the district court's summary judgment in favor of the United States Fish and Wildlife Service. The Center claimed the Secretary of the Interior violated the Endangered Species Act by making an erroneous, arbitrary, and capricious determination that listing the Northern Goshawk (a short-winged, long-tailed hawk that lives in forested regions of higher latitude in the northern hemisphere and is often considered an indicator species) in the contiguous United States west of the 100th meridian as a threatened or endangered species was not warranted. In the absence of evidence that the goshawk is endangered or likely to become endangered in the foreseeable future, the court found the FWS's decision was not arbitrary or capricious and affirmed the summary disposition. |
Case |
| Spencer Creek Pollution Control Ass'n v. Organic Fertilizer Co. | 505 P.2d 919 (1973) | 264 Or. 557 (1973) |
This is a nuisance case involving the operation of a cattle feed lot. Plaintiff sued to enjoin feed lot operators from interfering with use and enjoyment of plaintiffs' property asked for damages. The circuit court rendered judgment and defendant appealed. The Supreme Court held that decree limiting defendants to having no more than 600 head of cattle on its feed lot at one time was reasonable. |
Case |
| Campbell v. Supervalu | 2007 WL 891682 (N.D.Ind.) | North District Court of Indiana dismissed a claim that Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA) preempted the plaintiff's state law claims. While a past court decision held that FMIA preempted state attempts to regulate meat inspection, this case was distinguishable because the suit focused on an alleged act of negligence that fell outside inspection of meat and because the state is not placing additional or different requirements then those set by FMIA. | Case | |
| In the Matter of: Akiko Kawahara, Respondent | 1980 WL 26513 (N.O.A.A.) | 2 O.R.W. 340 (1980) |
The principle issue in this case is whether the planned stopover of a few hours in Kennedy Airport in New York constitutes an "importation" within the meaning of the MMPA. The respondent in this case was employed by a business dealing in the international trade of animals and was attempting to bring four dolphins captured off the coast of Argentina back to Japan. The respondent only landed the dolphins in New York as a stopover on their way to Tokyo, but the court found that there was no requirement of knowledge or specific intent under the MMPA to constitute civil violations. |
Case |
| UT - Dog - Consolidated Dog Laws | U.C.A. 1953 § 10-8-65; § 4-40-101 - 102; § 18-1-1 - 4; § 18-2-101; § 23A-12-204 - 205; § 23A-5-309 - 310; § 26B-7-210 - 211; § 26B-1-236; § 58-28-601 | UT ST § 10-8-65; § 4-40-101 - 102; § 18-1-1 - 4; § 18-2-101; § 23A-12-204 - 205; § 23A-5-309 - 310; § 26B-7-210 - 211; § 26B-1-236; § 58-28-601 | These Utah statutes comprise the state's dog laws. Among the provisions include municipal pound pet sterilization provisions, rabies control laws, hunting laws that impact dogs, and laws concerning injuries caused by dogs. | Statute |
| NY - Cruelty - Consolidated Cruelty Statutes | McKinney's Agriculture and Markets Law § 331 - 382; McKinney's Penal Law § 130.20 | NY AGRI & MKTS § 331 - 382; NY PENAL § 130.20 | These New York statutes comprise the state's anti-cruelty provisions. "Animal" includes every living creature except a human being. A person who overdrives, overloads, tortures or cruelly beats or unjustifiably injures, maims, mutilates or kills any animal, or deprives any animal of necessary sustenance, food or drink, is guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by imprisonment for not more than one year, or by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars, or by both. Exclusions include properly conducted scientific tests, experiments or investigations, involving the use of living animals approved by the state commissioner of health. | Statute |
| Prior Cases of the Month 2010 to 2016 | This document contains cases of the month from 2010 - 2016. | Policy | ||
| Casebook Update |
Updated material for David Favre, Animal Law, 3rd edition (2019) |
Basic page |