Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FL - Domestic Violence - 741.30. Domestic violence; injunction; powers | West's F. S. A. § 741.30 | FL ST § 741.30 | This Florida law allows petitioners to file injunctions for protection against domestic violence. Among the described incidents of domestic violence from which the petitioner may obtain protection is where the respondent has "intentionally injured or killed a family pet." The court may considers this as a factor when determining whether there is reasonable cause to believe the petitioner is in imminent danger of becoming a victim of domestic violence. In 2020, Florida added this provision to (5)(a)(4): "Awarding to the petitioner the temporary exclusive care, possession, or control of an animal that is owned, possessed, harbored, kept, or held by the petitioner, the respondent, or a minor child residing in the residence or household of the petitioner or respondent. The court may order the respondent to temporarily have no contact with the animal and prohibit the respondent from taking, transferring, encumbering, concealing, harming, or otherwise disposing of the animal. This subparagraph does not apply to an animal owned primarily for a bona fide agricultural purpose, as defined under s. 193.461, or to a service animal, as defined under s. 413.08, if the respondent is the service animal's handler." | Statute | |
| Lee v. State | 973 N.E.2d 1207 (Ind.App. 2012) | 2012 WL 3775862 (Ind.App. 2012) |
An attendant of a dog fight was convicted of a Class A misdemeanor under section 35-46-3-4 of the Indiana Code. On appeal, the defendant-appellant argued that the statute was unconstitutionally vague and that the statute invited arbitrary law enforcement, which violated the Due Process clause of the U.S. Constitution. Though the appeals court found the defendant-appellant had waived her constitutional claims by not filing a motion at the bench trial, the appeals court found her claims lacked merit. The defendant-appellant’s conviction was therefore upheld. |
Case | |
| Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n | 99 S.Ct. 3055 (1979) | 443 U.S. 658 (1979) |
The United States initiated an action seeking an interpretation of Indian fishing rights under treaties with Indian tribes of the Pacific Northwest. The Court held that the language of the treaties securing a "right of taking fish . . . in common with all citizens of the Territory" was not intended merely to guarantee the Indians access to usual and accustomed fishing sites and an "equal opportunity" for individual Indians, along with non-Indians, to try to catch fish, but instead secures to the Indian tribes a right to harvest a share of each run of anadromous fish that passes through tribal fishing areas. Thus, an equitable measure of the common right to take fish should initially divide the harvestable portion of each run that passes through a "usual and accustomed" place into approximately equal treaty and nontreaty shares, and should then reduce the treaty share if tribal needs may be satisfied by a lesser amount. The Court also held that any state-law prohibition against compliance with the District Court's decree cannot survive the command of the Supremacy Clause, and the State Game and Fisheries Departments, as parties to this litigation, may be ordered to prepare a set of rules that will implement the court's interpretation of the parties' rights even if state law withholds from them the power to do so. |
Case | |
| April in Paris v. Becerra | 494 F. Supp. 3d 756 (E.D. Cal. 2020) | Plaintiffs are a collection of businesses that distribute and sell products made from alligator and crocodile parts. They brought this suit to enjoin the provisions of a California law that would criminalize the sale and possession of alligator and crocodile parts in California. They argue that these laws would cause them to lose sales, lead to inventory liquidation, and cause job loss. The court found that the injury plaintiff were alleging was economic in nature, and that they would be likely to suffer an irreparable injury by the California law. Plaintiffs also argue that the California law is expressly preempted by the Endangered Species Act (ESA), and that trade in these species is authorized by an exemption under the regulatory "special rules" of the ESA. The court found that these exceptions applied to plaintiff's trade and possession of the animal parts, granted the injunction to enjoin California from enforcing the laws until final disposition of the case. | Case | ||
| U.S. v. Zarauskas | 814 F.3d 509 (1st Cir. 2016) | 2016 WL 524250 (1st Cir. Feb. 10, 2016) | Defendant was found guilty by a jury of illegally importing narwhal tusks under several federal laws, including the Lacey Act, the Endangered Species Act, and the Marine Mammal Protection Act, among others. On appeal, defendant contends that the district court erred by allowing and failing to cure statements by the prosecutor that allegedly violated defendant's Fifth Amendment protections. Prior to being charged, defendant met with FWS and Canadian agents where he did not proclaim his innocence when questioned on the tusks. In the process of showing inconsistency in defendant's statements, the prosecutor pointed out defendant's failure to state his innocence with the federal agents, which defendant claimed improperly burdened him at trial. Other arguments by defendant also pointed to error by the prosecution during direct examination and rebuttal argument with respect to defendant's silence during interviews with agents. The appellate court found the errors to be harmless or in response to defendant's attorney's statements. Finally, as a matter of first impression, the court found that Treasury Enforcement Communications System (TECS) reports logging date, time, and location of border crossing and license plate of the vehicle were admissible hearsay. The convictions were affirmed. | Case | |
| OK - Veterinarian Issues - Professional Conduct | OK ADC 775:10-5-30 | Okla. Admin. Code 775:10-5-30 | The following acts and/or omissions shall be considered unprofessional conduct and shall constitute grounds for disciplinary action by the Oklahoma Board of Veterinary Medical Examiners. | Administrative | |
| CT - Exotic Pets - § 26-40a. Possession of potentially dangerous animal; Chapter 490. Fisheries and Game | C. G. S. A. § 26-1, § 26-40a; § 26-54, 55, 61 | CT ST § 26-1, § 26-40a; § 26-54, 55, 61 | These Connecticut states reflect the state's laws on the keeping of wild animals. Under § 26-40a, no person shall possess a potentially dangerous animal, which includes wildlife such as the lion, leopard, cheetah, jaguar, ocelot, jaguarundi cat, puma, lynx, bobcat, wolf, coyote, all species of bears, gorilla, chimpanzee and orangutan. The Department of Environmental Protection shall issue a bill to the owner or person in illegal possession of such potentially dangerous animal for all costs of seizure, care, maintenance, relocation or disposal of such animal. Additionally, any person who violates any provision of this section shall be assessed a civil penalty not to exceed $2000, and is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. Under § 26-55, no person shall import or introduce into the state, possess or let loose, any live fish, wild bird, wild mammal, reptile, amphibian or invertebrate unless such person has obtained a permit. Again, a violator is responsible for expenses from the seizure, maintenance, and relocation of the illegally imported animal. The penalty includes a civil fine up to $1000 and results in a class C misdemeanor. | Statute | |
| LaPorte v. Associated Independents, Inc. | 163 So.2d 267 (Fla. 1964) |
Respondent was a corporation engaged in the garbage collection business. One of its employees maliciously hurled an empty garbage can at plaintiff's pet pedigreed dog, who was tethered at the time, killing it. The issue before the court was the reconsideration not of the issue of liability, but for determination only of compensatory and punitive damages. The court stated that it was obvious from the facts that the act performed by the representative of the respondent was malicious and demonstrated an extreme indifference to the rights of the petitioner. Having this view, there was no prohibition of punitive damages relative to awarding compensation for mental pain, as would be the case if there had been physical injury resulting only from simple negligence. The court went on to say that the restriction of the loss of a pet to its intrinsic value in circumstances such as the ones before us is a principle we cannot accept and that the malicious destruction of the pet provides an element of damage for which the owner should recover, irrespective of the value of the animal because of its special training. |
Case | ||
| Friends of Blackwater v. Salazar | 691 F.3d 428 (D.C. Cir. 2012) | 2012 WL 3538236 (D.C. Cir. 2012) |
In 1985, after scientists had found only 10 living squirrels, the Virginia northern flying squirrel was listed as endangered under the ESA. In 2006, after scientists had captured 1,063 squirrels, the FWS went through the procedure to delist the squirrel. Friends of Blackwater filed a complaint against the Secretary of Interior in district court, challenging the Secretary's rule to delist the squirrel. Subsequently, the Secretary of Interior appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment. The D.C. circuit court of appeals reversed the district court's decision, holding that the Secretary's determination the West Virginia Northern Flying Squirrel was no longer endangered was neither arbitrary and capricious nor in violation of the Act. |
Case | |
| NV - Eggs - Chapter 583. Eggs. Cage-Free Eggs | N.R.S. 583.211 - 251 | Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 583.211 - 251 (West) | This collection of laws are Nevada's cage-free egg provisions. Under these laws, Nevada egg producers must adopt cage-free housing systems for egg-laying hens. These housing systems must allow the hens a certain amount of usable space and the ability to do certain natural behaviors. Producers that do not comply with these provisions are subject to a civil penalty. | Statute |