|Title||Citation||Alternate Citation||Agency Citation||Summary||Type|
|How to Update Statutes||
|United States v. Kent State University||Slip Copy, 2016 WL 5107207 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 20, 2016)||
In this case, the United States Government brought an action against Kent State University alleging that the University’s failure to have any policy in place that would allow for the University to consider emotional support animals violated the Fair Housing Act. The parties resolved their differences in the form of a consent decree and asked the court to approve the decree. The court approved the consent decree but suggested that the parties make a few additions to the decree. The first suggestion that the court made was to specify what type of qualifications were necessary to make someone a “qualified third-party” for the purpose of making a statement to the University about an individuals need for an emotional support animal. Secondly, the court suggested that the University begin reviewing the logistics of how the University would manage having animals in its housing and how the animals would be properly cared for. Lastly, the court urged the University to look at whether or not the University offered sufficient break times between classes so that a student would have enough time to check on the animal and ensure that the animal was not neglected on a routine basis.
|CA - Euthanasia - § 599d. Policy of state regarding adoptable and treatable animals||West's Ann. Cal. Penal Code § 599d||CA PENAL § 599d||
This law provides that it is the policy of the state that no adoptable animal shall be euthanized.
|US - Disease - African rodents and other animals that may carry the monkeypox virus. 21 C.F.R. § 1240.63||21 C.F.R. § 1240.63 [Reserved by 73 FR 51919]||
The CDC and the FDA banned the possession, sale, and distribution of rodents suspected of spreading monkeypox. Note: this regulation has since been deleted and reserved.
|U.S. v. Top Sky||547 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1976)||
Defendant alleged that his treaty-based hunting rights incorporate a right to sell eagles. The court disagreed, finding such an interpretation of those treaty rights contrary to Indian custom and religion. Court also holds that defendant lacks standing to raise a religious challenge to the BGEPA based on the religious rights of others. Court is likewise unpersuaded by defendant's overbreadth claim. For further discussion on the abrogation of Indian treaty rights under the BGEPA, see Detailed Discussion of Eagle Act .
|WA - Gold Bar - § Sec. 6.02.019 Foster care or rescue or placement.||§ 6.02.019||This municipal code provides the provisions for foster care or rescue placement program for dogs and cats. The code requires the shelter to maintain records. The code also limits the length of fostering and the number of dogs and cats that an individual may foster at one time.||Local Ordinance|
|Tran v. Bancroft||648 So.2d 314 (Fla.App. 4 Dist.,1995)||Fla. L. Weekly D191||
In this Florida case, a tenant's next-door neighbor, who was bitten by tenant's dog when it leaped over fence and then attacked the neighbor on property not owned by landlord, brought a personal injury suit against the landlord. The appellate court upheld a motion of summary judgment in favor of the defendant non-owner. The court found that t he existence of a duty in a negligence action is a question to be decided as a matter of law. Although the so-called "dog bite" statute, section 767.04, Florida Statutes (1993) controls actions against a dog's owner, actions against a non-owner must be brought upon a theory of common law liability. Essentially, a landlord has no duty to prevent injuries to third parties caused by a tenant's dog away from leased premises.
|WA - Dangerous Dog - 16.08.090. Dangerous dogs--Requirements for restraint||West's RCWA 16.08.090||WA ST 16.08.090||
This Washington statute outlines the state and local provisions related to dangerous or potentially dangerous dogs. It first provides that it is unlawful for an owner of a dangerous dog to permit the dog to be outside the proper enclosure unless the dog is muzzled and restrained by a substantial chain or leash and under physical restraint of a responsible person. Potentially dangerous dogs shall be regulated only by local, municipal, and county ordinances and nothing in this section limits restrictions local jurisdictions may place on owners of potentially dangerous dogs.
|Coos County Board of County Com'rs v. Kempthorne||531 F.3d 792 (9th Cir., 2008)||08 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 7939, 2008 WL 2522202 (C.A.9 (Or.))||The issue here is whether FWS has an enforceable duty promptly to withdraw a threatened species from the protections of the ESA after a five-year agency review mandated by the Act found that the species does not fit into a protected population category. The species at issue here are murrelets-small, dove-sized birds that feed primarily on sea life and nest in coastal mature and old-growth forests. This Court concluded that Coos County has not alleged a failure to perform a nondiscretionary act or duty imposed by the ESA, whether premised on the petition process deadlines or on the agency's more general duty to act on its own determinations.||Case|
|Coffey v. Bureau of Land Mgmt.||249 F.Supp.3d 488 (D.D.C. Apr. 20, 2017)||2017 WL 1411465 (D.D.C. Apr. 20, 2017)||As the court here states, "Plaintiff Debbie Coffey knows a great deal about wild horses and burros—and how those animals are treated by the federal Bureau of Land Management—but she wants to learn more." As such, Plaintiff, a hose welfare advocate, filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to the BLM to obtain communications between its officials and private citizens, namely those with long-term holding contracts, involved in the Wild Horse and Burro Program. In conjunction with her request, the BLM charged plaintiff $1,680 in processing fees, but ultimately refunded her the fees a year and half later because it failed to meet FOIA statutory response deadlines. On appeal, Coffey filed a FOIA suit and both sides moved for summary judgment. Plaintiff first argues that the BLM violated FOIA when it failed to give her interest on her processing fees. The court, however, found that awarding interest here would violate the longstanding "no-interest rule," where there was no congressional intent to award interest in such cases. As to plaintiff's argument that BLM's search for records was inadequate, the court agreed with plaintiff that the words and phrases used by BLM were too limiting to meet plaintiff's request and were thus unreasonable. The court held that BLM must choose a different set of search terms (including those suggested by plaintiff) and conduct the FOIA search again. However, the court found that plaintiff's additional contentions that: (1) the search terms were too vague; (2) the database and software needed to be identified; and (3) BLM needed to also include phone records in its search to be without merit. The parties' motions for summary judgment were granted in part and denied in part.||Case|