|Title||Citation||Alternate Citation||Agency Citation||Summary||Type|
|NY - Horse Racing - Section 4002.8. Qualifications for license||9 NY ADC 4002.8||9 NYCRR 4002.8||
If the New York State Racing and Wagering Board finds that an applicant meets the criteria for financial responsibility, experience, character and fitness, then it will issue an occupational license to that person.
|Estis v. Mills||--- So.3d ----, 2019 WL 3807048 (La. App. 2 Cir. August 14, 2019)||On September 11, 2017, Plaintiffs, Catherine Estis, Samuel Estis, and Thuy Estis brought this action against the Defendants, Clifton and Kimberly Mills, seeking damages for the shooting of the Plaintiff’s ten-month-old German Shepherd puppy, Bella. The Plaintiffs alleged that the Defendants shot Bella, did not disclose to them that Bella had been shot, and dumped her body over ten miles away. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The Defendants argued that they fell within the immunity afforded by a Louisiana statute that gives immunity to anyone who kills a dog that is not on the property of the owner and is harassing, wounding, or killing livestock. The Defendants alleged that Bella, the puppy, was harassing their horses. The Plaintiffs argued that the immunity afforded by the statute needed to be affirmatively pled by the Defendants and that the Defendants waived such immunity by failing to assert the affirmative defense in their original answer or any subsequent pleading. The Plaintiffs further argued that the motion for summary judgment would not have been granted if it were not for the immunity protections. The Court ultimately held that the Defendants failed to affirmatively plead the immunity statute and, therefore, it reversed and remanded the case to the lower court.||Case|
|Florida - Initiatives - Amendment 13, Ban on Wagering on Dog Races||Amendment 13||A proposed revision relating to ending dog racing; creating new sections in Article X and Article XII of the State Constitution to prohibit the racing of, and wagering on, greyhounds and other dogs after a specified date.||Statute|
|VA - Cruelty - Article 7. Animal Control Officers and Humane Investigators. Article 8. Search, Seizure, Impounding, and Enforcem||Va. Code Ann. § 3.2-6555 - 3.2-6569||VA ST § 3.2-6555 - 3.2-6569||
These chapters relate to the qualifications and duties of animal control officers and the procedures for impounding stray animals.
|Free v. Jordan||10 S.W.2d 19 (Ark. 1928)||178 Ark. 168 (1928)||
In a replevin action to recover possession of a lost dog from its finder, the court reversed and remanded the case so a jury could determine whether the statute of limitations was tolled due to the defendant's alleged fraudulent concealment of his possession of the dog.
|CA - Research animals - Group 5. Care of Laboratory Animals||Cal. Admin. Code tit. 17, § 1150 -1159||17 CCR §§ 1150 -1159||
This set of regulations establishes certification requirements for research facilities that use live animals in experiments, sets minimum standards of care for research animals, and addresses the requirements for filing complaints with the Department of Public Health.
|Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians. 3-4-9- Cruelty to Animals.||Title III, Section 3-4-9||Under Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians code, cruelty to animals is a Class B offense. Any person who shall kill, torture, mistreat, mutilate, injure or abandon any animal shall be guilty of an offense under this section.||Statute|
|TN - Liens, Veterinary - § 63-12-134. Liens and incumbrances.||T. C. A. § 63-12-134||TN ST § 63-12-134||
This statute specifically allow vets to hold an animal until a bill is paid for treatment, board or care of an animal.
|State v. Archer||--- So.3d ----, 2018 WL 6579053 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 14, 2018)||This appeal concerns the lower court's granting of a motion to suppress evidence in an animal cruelty case. In April of 2017, a Ponce Inlet Police Department officer responded to defendant's residence after receiving a call about possible animal abuse. The caller described hearing sounds of a dog yelping and being beaten. Upon arrival, Officer Bines heard dog commands and the sounds of "striking flesh." He then knocked on defendant Archer's front door and began speaking with him on the front porch. Officer Bines told Archer that he was there to investigate a complaint of possible animal abuse to which Archer acknowledged that his dog bit him after he disciplined the dog for making a mess, so he "hit him a couple times." The officer then told Archer he had "probable cause" to enter the house or he could seek a warrant. Ultimately, Bines followed Archer to the backyard where Archer pointed to a dog in the corner that had its tongue out and was bloodied. Shortly thereafter, Bines determined the dog was dead. Archer was then cuffed and advised of his Miranda rights. After placing Archer in the police vehicle, Bines and other officers re-entered the home and yard to take pictures of the crime scene and to secure the canine's remains. After being charged with violating the cruelty to animals law (Section 828.12), Archer moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the warrantless entry of his home. The trial court granted and denied the motion in part, finding that while there were exigent circumstances to justify the warrantless entry, the exigency was over once it was determined that the dog was dead. The State of Florida appeals here. The appellate court first noted that while warrantless searches of homes are presumed illegal, an officer may enter when there are exigent circumstances including medical emergencies related to animals. Despite Archer's attempts to distinguish the instant facts from previous cases because there were no signs of blood or smells to indicate an emergency, the totality of the facts showed police received a call of animal cruelty in progress and the Officer Bines heard sounds of striking flesh. In addition, Archer advised Bines that he had struck the dog. Thus, the court found the officer "had reasonable grounds to believe that there was an urgent and immediate need to check on the safety and well-being of the dog and to connect the feared emergency to the house that they entered." As to suppression of the evidence found in plain view after entry onto the property, the appellate court also found the lower court erred in its decision. Under existing case law, once entry is allowed based on exigent circumstances, items found in plain view may be lawfully seized. The officer saw the dog in the corner before he knew the dog was dead, and thus, the exigency still existed. With respect to the photographs taken and the bodycam footage, the court held that re-entry into the home after Archer was in the patrol car did not require a warrant. Once an exigency that justified a warrantless search is over, law enforcement cannot go back and conduct further searches. However, in this case, the re-entry into Archer's house was a continuation of photographing evidence that was already found in plain view while the exigency existed (e.g., before the officers knew the dog was dead). The motion to suppress was affirmed in part and reversed in part.||Case|
|Presidential Village, LLC v. Phillips||325 Conn. 394, 397, 158 A.3d 772 (2017)||158 A.3d 772||In this case, a landlord brought a summary process action against a tenant who lived in the federally subsidized apartment, based on tenant's keeping of “emotional support dog” in violation of a pet restriction clause in the tenant's lease. The trial court entered judgment in favor of tenant, based on equity, and the landlord appealed. The appeal was transferred to the Supreme Court of Connecticut. The Court held that: 1) appeal was not rendered moot by landlord's commencement of second summary process action against tenant, which was dismissed; 2) trial court could not rely on “spirit” of Department of Housing and Urban Development in exercising equitable discretion to enter judgment in favor of tenant; 3) trial court abused its discretion in applying doctrine of equitable nonforfeiture; and 4) summary process action was “civil action” to which medical treatment report exception to hearsay rule could be applied to allow for admission of letter from physician and social worker of tenant's niece concerning dog's benefit to niece. Reversed and remanded.||Case|