Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| TX- Circus, entertainment animals - Subchapter B. Care of Animals by Circuses, Carnivals, and Zoos | 25 TX ADC § 169.41 - 169.48 | 25 TAC § 169.41 to .48 (§§ 169.41 to 169.48. Repealed eff. Nov. 13, 2016) |
This set of regulations sets license conditions and fees for circuses, carnivals, and zoos that are regulated by the Department of Health Services and establishes standards regarding the care of animals maintained by those facilities. All circuses, carnivals, and zoos that are regulated by the United States Department of Agriculture under the Federal Animal Welfare Act are exempt from these regulations. |
Administrative | |
| OR - Exotic Pets - Chapter 609. Animal Control; Exotic Animals; Dealers. | O. R. S. § 609.205 - 355 | OR ST § 609.205 - 355 |
These Oregon laws concern the regulation of exotic pets in the state. An "exotic animal" for purposes of the section means a member of the family Felidae not indigenous to Oregon (except the domestic cat), any nonhuman primate, any nonwolf member of the family Canidae not indigenous to Oregon (except the domestic dog), any bear except the black bear, and any member of the order Crocodylia. A person may not keep an exotic animal in this state unless the person possesses a valid State Department of Agriculture permit for that animal issued prior to the effective date of this 2009 Act. |
Statute | |
| MO - Ordinances - Chapter 79. Fourth Class Cities. Police and Health Regulations | V. A. M. S. 79.400 | MO ST 79.400 |
This Missouri statute provides that a local board of aldermen may tax, regulate and restrain and prohibit the running at large of dogs, and provide for their destruction when at large contrary to ordinance, and impose penalties on the owners or keepers thereof. |
Statute | |
| DeVaul v. Carvigo Inc. | 526 N.Y.S.2d 483 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept.,1988) | 138 A.D.2d 669 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept.,1988) |
This New York case involved a dog bite victim who brought an action against the owner to recover for personal injuries. The Supreme Court, Nassau County entered judgment in favor of owner. On appeal with the Supreme Court, Appellate Division, the court held that the viciousness of German shepherd dogs was not appropriate subject of judicial notice. The court found that there is no authority for the proposition that judicial notice should be taken "as to the ferocity of any particular type of domestic animal." |
Case | |
| Thorp v. District of Columbia | 319 F. Supp. 3d 1, 20 (D.D.C.), reconsideration denied, 327 F. Supp. 3d 186 (D.D.C. 2018) | Two officers were stationed in a church parking lot near the home of Plaintiff, Mark Thorp. The two officers claimed they saw and heard the plaintiff “forcefully strike” his dog. The plaintiff then took the dog inside and would not speak with the officers. The officers reported the incidence to a Washington Humane Society Law Enforcement Officer who applied for a search warrant of plaintiff’s home. The warrant was subsequently approved. The Lieutenant who led the team that executed the search warrant on the plaintiff’s home previously had a sexual relationship with the plaintiff’s ex-girlfriend. During the search, the officers secured the dog and concluded that the dog was uninjured and in good health exhibiting no signs of abuse. The search warrant was only approved for evidence of animal cruelty/neglect, however, the search continued even after the plaintiff’s dog had been found in good health. The plaintiff believes that the search continued because the officers wanted to find drugs in his home. Plaintiff believes that the search for animal cruelty was just a disguise so that the officers could search for drugs. The officers found in the plaintiff’s freezer two zip-loc bags full of capsules which turned out to be amphetamines. The plaintiff insists he had a prescription for the pills. A second warrant was issued for evidence of drugs and related materials. After the second search, the officers found additional drugs and drug paraphernalia in the house. The plaintiff was charged with animal cruelty and possession of illegal drugs, however, the prosecutor abandoned the case and all criminal charges were dismissed. Plaintiff brought this action seeking redress for his injuries against the Lieutenant who led the search and the District. Both parties filed Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff claims his fourth amendment rights were violated under section 1983. Specifically, the plaintiff claims that the first animal-cruelty warrant application was deficient and made at the behest of the Lieutenant and that false information was used on the warrant application. The Court rejects this argument because the plaintiff abandoned the fact that the two officers fabricated the warrant application at the behest of the Lieutenant. The Court, therefore, concluded that the Lieutenant played no role in preparing or submitting the warrant application. Next the plaintiff contends that the Lieutenant’s reliance on the warrant was improper. The Court concluded that since the Lieutenant had no part int the warrant application, he had no reason to distrust its contents. The warrant was facially valid and as a result, the Court cannot hold the Lieutenant responsible for executing it. Plaintiff contended that the Lieutenant exceeded the scope of the first warrant because the rummaging around in closed spaces after the search was considered finished exceeded the scope. The Court disagreed and concluded that the warrant authorized a search for animals that were dead or alive and an animal can surely fit in a freezer. The Court said that the Lieutenant’s “judgment that the scope of the warrant was supported by probable cause may have been mistaken, but it was not plainly incompetent.” Next the plaintiff argues that the second warrant was invalid. The Court reasoned that since the Lieutenant could have reasonably believed that he had authority to search the freezer, it would also be reasonable for him to obtain a warrant based on its contents. Plaintiff also contended that the pills in the freezer were not in plain sight. However, the photos that the plaintiff used to prove his point actually belies this claim because the Court could clearly make out the same clear plastic baggies with pills in both pictures. Next the plaintiff argues that the warrantless field test of the methamphetamines was improper. The Court concluded that field tests of methamphetamine are not recognized as a search and therefore do not implicate Fourth Amendment protections. Even if that were the case, qualified immunity would shield the Lieutenant from civil liability. Next the plaintiff argues that his arrest was without probable cause. The Court stated that given the amount of drug evidence that was found in the second search, there was enough probable cause to arrest the plaintiff. Next the plaintiff argues that the execution of the warrants unnecessarily cause property damage. The plaintiff failed to challenge this claim because he did not accompany it with specific points of law to support it. The Court refused to decide this matter. Finally, plaintiff argues that the officers unlawfully seized more than $53,000 in cash from the apartment. This claim also falls outside of the lawsuit because the plaintiff failed to make mention of it in his complaint. The plaintiff lastly alleges that the district negligently supervised and retained the lieutenant and he asserts a claim of abuse of process. The plaintiff failed to show that the Lieutenant engaged in behavior that should have put his employer on notice that he required additional training or that he was dangerous or otherwise incompetent. As for the abuse of process claim, plaintiff alleges two acts: Lieutenant’s arrest of him and the seizure of his property. The court held that the Lieutenant’s warrantless actions cannot sustain an abuse of process claim. The Court ultimately granted the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment and denied the Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. | Case | ||
| OR - Vehicle - Hunting or harassing animals from snowmobile or all-terrain vehicle | O.R.S. § 821.260 | OR ST § 821.260 | A person commits the offense of hunting or harassing animals from a snowmobile or an all-terrain vehicle if the person: (a) Operates a snowmobile or an all-terrain vehicle in a manner so as to run down, harass, chase or annoy any game animals or birds or domestic animals or (b) Hunts from a snowmobile or an all-terrain vehicle. In addition to other penalties, operators or owners of a snowmobile or an all-terrain vehicle may be liable as provided under ORS 821.310. | Statute | |
| Idaho Dairymen's Ass'n, Inc. v. Gooding County | 227 P.3d 907 (Idaho 2010) | 2010 WL 337939 (Idaho), 148 Idaho 653 (2010) |
After Gooding County adopted an ordinance regulating confined animal feeding operations (CAFOs), cattle ranching and dairy associations brought suit challenging the constitutionality and validity of provisions within the ordinance and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the county, and the associations appealed. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court's findings. |
Case | |
| NM - Wildlife - Article 15. Predatory Wild Animals and Rodent Pests | NMSA 1978, § 77-15-1 to 77-15-14 | NM ST §§ 77-15-1 to 77-15-14 | The New Mexico County Predatory Control Act deals with predatory wild animals and rodent pests. On federal lands, the federal government pays for rodent pest repression. On public federal or state lands, the state and federal cooperative funds pay for rodent pest repression. On private land, rodent pest repression is based on voluntary cooperation of owners, but if the owner fails, after written notice, to destroy the prairie dogs, the state rodent inspector is authorized to enter the lands and destroy the prairie dogs at the expense of the owner. Any person who interferes with the rodent inspector is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of $100 to $500. | Statute | |
| ME - Cruelty - Consolidated Cruelty Statutes | 7 M. R. S. A. § 3971 - 4041; 17 M. R. S. A. § 1011 - 1046 | ME ST Tit. 7 § 3971 - 4041; ME ST Tit. 17 § 1011 - 1046 |
These Maine statutes comprise the state's anti-cruelty and animal fighting provisions. The first section of laws occurs under Title 7, Agriculture and Animals. Under these laws, a person commits animal cruelty if he or she kills the animal of another person; kills an animal by an inhumane method; injures, overworks, tortures, torments, abandons or cruelly beats or intentionally mutilates an animal; gives drugs to an animal with an intent to harm the animal; gives poison or alcohol to an animal; or exposes a poison with intent that it be taken by an animal. The neglect component of the statute provides that a person commits cruelty if he or she deprives an animal that the person owns or possesses of necessary sustenance, necessary medical attention, proper shelter, protection from the weather or humanely clean conditions. These acts are then cross-referenced under the criminal provisions of Title 17, which describes the penalties under § 1031. Animal fighting is a class D crime under this section. |
Statute | |
| WILDEARTH GUARDIANS vs. NATIONAL PARK SERVICE | 703 F.3d 1178 (10th Cir. Ct. App.,2013) | 2013 WL 93169 (10th Cir. Ct. App.,2013) |
In this case, the WildEarth Guardians brought a suit against the National Park Service for violating the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the Rocky Mountain National Park Enabling Act (RMNP)'s ban on hunting. The district court and the appeals court, however, held that the NPS did not violate NEPA because the agency articulated reasons for excluding the natural wolf alternative from its Environmental Impact Statement. Additionally, since the National Park Service Organic Act (NPSOA)'s detrimental animal exception and the RMNP's dangerous animal exception apply to the prohibition on killing, capturing, or wounding—not the prohibition on hunting, the use of volunteers to cull the park’s elk population did not violate the RMNP or the NPSOA. |
Case |