|Title||Citation||Alternate Citation||Agency Citation||Summary||Type|
|KS - Liens - 58-207. Lien for feed and care of livestock; sale for charges and expenses; assignment of lien||K.S.A. 58-207||KS ST 58-207||Keepers of livery stables, and all others engaged in feeding horses, cattle, hogs, or other livestock, shall have a lien upon such property for the feed and care bestowed by them. If reasonable or stipulated charges for such feed and care are not paid within sixty (60) days after the charges become due, the property may be sold, provided, however, that any lien created by this act may be assigned.||Statute|
|Animal Law Index Volume 17, Part 1||
Animal Law Review, Volume 17, Issue 1 (Fall 2010)
LEGAL PERSONHOOD AND THE NONHUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT
|Colorado Wild Horse v. Jewell||130 F. Supp. 3d 205 (D.D.C. 2015)||2015 WL 5442639 (D.D.C., 2015)||Finding the number of horses too high to maintain ecological balance and sustain multipurpose land use in Colorado's White River Resource Area, the US Bureau of Land Management (BLM) invoked its authority under the Wild Free–Roaming Horses and Burros Act (“Wild Horses Act”), to declare those horses to be “excess animals” and scheduled to remove them from the land. Plaintiffs—organizations challenged BLM's “excess” determinations and its decision to remove these horses. They asked the district court to enjoin BLM's planned gather. Because the Wild Horses Act authorized BLM's excess determination and BLM appeared to have used reasonable methods to estimate the total wild-horse population, the Court found that Plaintiffs were unlikely to prevail on their Wild Horses Act claims. And because the record reflected that BLM considered the cumulative effects of the proposed gather and permissibly relied on the Environmental Assessment written for a previous East Douglas HMA gather, the Court found that Plaintiffs were also unlikely to prevail on their National Environmental Policy Act claims. The Court further found that Plaintiffs were unlikely to suffer irreparable harm as a result of the gather and that the balance of equities and the public interest weighed in favor of BLM. Accordingly, the Court denied Plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary Injunction.||Case|
|IL - Equine Liability Act - Equine Activity Liability Act||745 I.L.C.S. 47/1 - 47/999||IL ST CH 745 § 47/1 - 47/999||This act stipulates that an equine sponsor or professional, or any other person, is immune from liability for the death or injury of a participant, which resulted from the inherent risks of equine activities. However, there are exceptions to this rule; a person will be held liable for injuries of an equine activity participant if he or she displays a willful and wanton or intentional disregard for the safety of the participant and if he or she fails to make reasonable and prudent efforts in ensuring the safety of the participant. In addition, a person will also be held liable for the injury of an equine activity participant if he or she is injured on the land or at a facility due to a dangerous latent condition of which was known to the equine sponsor, professional or other person.||Statute|
|Mitchell v. State||118 So.3d 295 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)||38 Fla. L. Weekly D1641, 2013 WL 3927676||
The defendant in this case was convicted of animal cruelty for injuries his dog sustained after his dog bit him. Upon appeal, the court found that the prosecutor had erred by framing the argument in a manner that improperly shifted the burden of proof from whether the defendant had intentionally and maliciously inflicted injuries on the dog to whether the State's witnesses were lying. Since the court found this shift in burden was not harmless, the court reversed and remanded the defendant's conviction.
|Trager v. Thor||516 N.W.2d 69 (Mich.,1994)||445 Mich. 95 (Mich.,1994)||
In this Michigan case involving an action for damages after personal injury, the father of the dog’s owner was visiting his son's home when he agreed to supervise the dog while his son and daughter-in-law went shopping. The n eighbor’s child was subsequently bitten by the dog, which had been put by defendant into a bedroom. This court held that the defendant, as a temporary caretaker of the dog, could not be held to the strict liability standard of an owner keeper, but could be liable under theory of negligence. Thus, a genuine issue of material fact remained as to whether the father was negligent in fulfilling his duty of care in supervising the dog, which precluded summary judgment in a negligence action.
|Kuehl v. Sellner||2016 WL 3429679 (unpublished) (N.D. Iowa June 17, 2016)||Five Plaintiffs Tracey K. Kuehl, Lisa K. Kuehl, Kris A. Bell, Nancy A. Harvey, John T. Braumann, and the Animal Legal Defense Fund filed a complaint against Defendants Pamela Sellner, Tom Sellner, and Cricket Hollow Zoo, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The Plaintiffs claimed that the Defendants violated the Endangered Species Act (ESA), by holding captive endangered species specifically the lemurs and tigers housed at Cricket Hollow Zoo. The United States District Court, N.D. Iowa, Eastern Division ordered the Defendants, to transfer the lemurs and tigers in their possession “to an appropriate facility which is licensed by the USDA and is capable of meeting the needs of the endangered species.” The Defendants proposed transporting the lemurs to Special Memories Zoo in Hortonville, Wisconsin, and transporting the tigers to the Exotic Feline Rescue Center in Centerpoint, Indiana. The Plaintiffs claimed that the proposed placements did not comply with the Court's Order and proposed that the lemurs be placed with the Prosimian Sanctuary in Jacksonville, Florida, and the tigers be transported to the Wild Animal Sanctuary in Keenesburg, Colorado. The Court held that the Special Memories Zoo was capable of meeting the lemurs' needs and should be transported there as the Defendant’s proposed. The court reasoned that even if the Court found Special Memories incapable of meeting the lemurs' needs, the Prosimian Sanctuary as proposed by the Plaintiff's was not licensed by the USDA. The Court also held that the endangered tigers should be transferred to the Exotic Feline Rescue Center as the Defendant’s proposed. The court reasoned that the center was capable of meeting of the needs of the tigers. Therefore the Court approved the Defendants' proposed placement of the lemurs and tigers.||Case|
|US - PPIA and FMIA Regulations - Rules of Practice||9 C.F.R. 500.1 - 500.8||The following Poultry Products Inspection Act and Federal Meat Inspection act regulations detail the provisions for when the Food Safety and Inspection Service can take regulatory control.||Administrative|
|FL - Endangered Species - Chapter 379. Fish and Wildlife Conservation.||West's F. S. A. § 379.411||FL ST § 379.411 (Renumbered as 379.411 by Laws 2008, c. 2008-247, § 178, eff. July 1, 2008)||This statute prohibits the intentional killing or wounding of any animal, or the eggs or nest of any animal, listed as threatened, endangered, or of special concern, making it a Level Four violation under s. 379.401. The bald eagle has been designated under this provision.||Statute|
|In Defense of Animals v. National Institutes of Health||543 F.Supp.2d 70 (D.C.C., 2008)||
This FOIA case was brought against the National Institutes of Health ("NIH") by In Defense of Animals (“IDA”) seeking information related to approximately 260 chimpanzees located as the Alamogordo Primate Facility (“APF”) in New Mexico. Before the court now is NIH's Motion for Partial Reconsideration as to the release of records. This Court rejected NIH’s arguments that the records are not “agency records” because they belong to NIH's contractor, Charles River Laboratories, Inc. (“CRL”), a publicly held animal research company. Also, the Court was equally unconvinced that the information requested here is “essentially a blueprint of the APF facility,” and that release of such information presents a security risk to the facility.