|Title||Citation||Alternate Citation||Agency Citation||Summary||Type|
|OH - Dog - Chapter 955. Dogs (Consolidated dog laws)||RC §§ 955.01 - 99; § 9.62; § 1533.19 - 221||This is the Ohio statute that regulates dogs in general, outlining rules and regulations for dog owners. The state leash requirement appears limited to rabies quarantines (Sec. 955.26). It also gives the definition of what is considered a dangerous or vicious dog, the rules and regulations for owners of these dogs, and penalization for breaking these rules.||Statute|
|MI - Cruelty - Chapter 750. Michigan Penal Code.||M. C. L. A. 750.51||MI ST 750.51||This Michigan law provides that no railroad company shall permit the confinement of animals in railroad cars for longer than 36 consecutive hours without unloading for rest, water, and feeding of at least 5 consecutive hours unless prevented by a storm, or other "accidental causes." Any company, owner or custodian of such animals, who does not comply with the provisions of this section, can be fined between $100 and $500 for each and every such offense. However, when animals are carried in cars where they have proper food, water, space and opportunity for rest, the provisions of this section that require unloading do not apply.||Statute|
|Auster v. Norwalk United Methodist Church (Unpublished)||2004 WL 423189 (Conn.Super.,2004) (only Westlaw citation available)||
In this unpublished Connecticut opinion, the defendant-church owned property and leased a portion of the premises to one of its employees, Pedro Salinas. The plaintiff was attacked by a dog, owned by Salinas, while lawfully on the defendant's premises. The plaintiff appealed a summary judgment ruling in favor of defendant. On appeal, the court found that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether defendant-church was a "harborer" of the dog under Connecticut law. Because Salinas and the church had no formal lease agreement, dispute existed as to the exact parameters of Salinas' exclusive control of the premises where his dog roamed. There also existed a material fact regarding the church's knowledge of the dog's vicious propensities because it had twice previously attacked a person. (Note the jury trial decision in favor of plaintiff was later overturned in Auster v. Norwalk United Methodist Church , --- A.2d ----, 94 Conn.App. 617, 2006 WL 797892 (Conn.App.)).
|United States v. Charette||Slip Copy, 2017 WL 1012974 (D. Mont. Mar. 15, 2017)||
In this case, Brian F. Charette filed an appeal after he was sentenced to six months of imprisonment and ordered to pay $5,000 in restitution for shooting and killing a grizzly bear in violation of the Endangered Species Act. Charette argued three issues on appeal: (1) that the trial court's denial of a jury trial violated his constitutional rights; (2) that the trial court erred in defining the elements of his charged offense; and (3) that the trial court erred in denying Charette's Rule 29 motion for a judgment of acquittal. The court found that the trial court did not err in denying a jury trial because Charette’s offense was considered a petty offense because it carried a maximum sentence of six months. For all crimes that are considered petty offenses, the Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury is not triggered. Lastly, the court addressed Charette’s Rule 29 motion which calls for an acquittal if the essential elements of the offense are not proven beyond a reasonable doubt. In order for someone to be convicted of knowingly taking an endangered species the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt, that: (1) the defendant knowingly killed the animal; (2) the animal was engendered; (3) the defendant had no permit to kill the animal; and (4) the defendant did not act in self-defense or defense of others. Charette argued that the government failed to prove that he did not have a permit to kill the grizzly bear. The court ultimately found that the government did prove this element on the basis that Charette told officers that he did not report shooting the bear because he did not want to deal with the “hassle.” The court found that it was reasonable to believe that had Charette had a permit to kill the grizzly bear, he would not have found reporting it to be a hassle and therefore the government sufficiently established this element. As a result, the court affirmed the lower court’s decision.
|NH - Humane Slaughter - Chapter 427. Livestock and Meat Inspection. Humane Slaughter||N.H. Rev. Stat. § 427:33 - 427:37||NH ST § 427:33 - 427:37||These laws comprise New Hampshire's humane slaughter provisions. A humane method is defined as one where the animal is rendered insensible to pain by a single blow or shot of a mechanical instrument or by electrical, chemical or other means that is rapid and effective, before being shackled, hoisted, thrown, cast, or cut. Ritual slaughter required by the ritual of the Jewish faith, whereby the animal suffers loss of consciousness by anemia of the brain is also allowed. Any slaughterer who violates this subdivision shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.||Statute|
|MA - Lost Property - Chapter 134. Lost Goods and Stray Beasts||M.G.L.A. 134 § 1 - 7||MA ST 134 § 1 - 7||This section comprises Massachusetts' Lost Goods and Stray Beasts Act.||Statute|
|Barber v. Pennsylvania Dept. Agriculture||Slip Copy, 2010 WL 1816760 (W.D.Pa.)||
The plaintiffs in this Pennsylvania case are owners and operators of a non-profit animal rescue and kennel that houses housing about 500 dogs doing business in and throughout Fayette County, Pennsylvania. The current dispute stems from a series of inspections of the kennels that occurred throughout the 2007 calendar year. Plaintiffs allege that defendants conspired in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985, and that the PSPCA and the Bureau of Dog Law Enforcement (the inspection branch of the Dept. of Agriculture) failed to take reasonable steps to protect them from the conspiratorial activity in violation of 42 U.S .C. § 1986. Plaintiffs also state that the PSPCA and the Bureau violated various of their constitutional rights in contravention of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Plaintiffs also seek to hold the Defendants liable for malicious prosecution under 42 U.S .C. § 1983. Finally, other counts allege that Defendant Delenick sexually harassed Plaintiff Rachel Lappe-Biler in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; that plaintiff Pauline Gladys Bryner-Lappe was assaulted and battered in contravention of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourth Amendment; and that the defendants intentionally inflicted emotional distress. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss all claims.
|Jones v. Gordon||792 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1986)||
A permit was authorized to Sea World to capture killer whales. No environmental impact statement was prepared. Plaintiffs allege that the issuance of the permit without preparation of an environmental impact statement violated the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969. The Court holds that the permit must be reconsidered after an environmental impact statement is prepared.
|MA - Captive Wildlife - 2.12: Artificial Propagation of Birds, Mammals, Reptiles, and Amphibians||321 MA ADC 2.12||321 CMR 2.12||Massachusetts law prohibits possession of wild animals without a license. Licenses are only given out for limited reasons, none of which include the keeping of animals as pets. The classes for which licenses may be granted are propagator's licenses, public stocking licenses, dealer's licenses, possessor's licenses, and dog training licenses.||Administrative|
|MO - Assistance Animal - Assistance Animal/Guide Dog Laws||V. A. M. S. 209.150; 209.152, 209.160, 209.162, 209.190, 209.200, 209.202, 209.204; 304.080; 387.426||MO ST 209.150, 209.152, 209.160, 209.162, 209.190, 209.200, 209.202, 209.204; 304.080; 387.426||The following statutes comprise the state's relevant assistance animal and guide dog laws.||Statute|