|Title||Citation||Alternate Citation||Agency Citation||Summary||Type|
|TN - Dyer - Breed - Ordinance 2007-157 (An Ordinance To Regulate The Keeping of Pit Bulls and Other Vicious Dogs)||DYER, TN., MUNICIPAL CODE § 2007-157 (2007)||
In Dyer, Tennessee, it is unlawful to keep, harbor, own, or possess a pit bull dog, with exceptions for dogs registered as of the date this ordinance was adopted. The owners of such dogs must comply with certain requirements, such as physical restraint or proper confinement of the dog, use of a muzzle on the dog, the posting of a “Beware of Dog” sign, the keeping of $100,000) liability insurance, and the taking of photographs for identification purposes. Dogs not kept according to the requirements may be impounded.
|The Duck Shooting Case||(1997) 189 CLR 579||(1997) 146 ALR 248; (1997) 71 ALJR 837;  12 Leg Rep 14;  HCA 31||
The plaintiff was charged with being in an area set aside for hunting, during hunting season, without a licence. The plaintiff argued that he was there in order to collect dead and wounded ducks and endangered species and to draw media attention to the cruelty associated with duck shooting. The Court found that although the regulation under which the plaintiff was charged restricted the implied freedom of political communication, it was appropriate to protect the safety of persons with conflicting aims likely to be in the area.
|Ley 14346, 1954||LEY DJA: S-0410||This law seeks to protect animals against mIstreatment and cruel acts. Mistreatment are cruel acts and considered criminal offenses, which can be punished from 15 days to 1 year in prison. Article 2 of this law establishes the acts considered mistreatment, which includes not feeding domestic and captive animals with food in enough quantity and quality. Also included are the acts of forcing animals to work excessive hours without providing adequate rest according to the weather and stimulating them with drugs without pursuing therapeutic purposes, among others. Article 3 defines acts that are considered cruel. These acts include practicing vivisection for purposes that are not scientifically demonstrable, or in places or by people who are not authorized to operate on animals without anesthesia and without the title of doctor or veterinarian, except in cases of emergency. In addition, cruelty includes: mutilating any part of the body of an animal unless the action has purposes of improvement; marking of the respective animal species unless performed for reasons of mercy; performing public or private acts of animal fights, bullfights and parodies where animals are killed, injured or harassed; and other listed acts.||Statute|
|TN - Endangered Species - Nongame and Endangered or Threatened Wildlife Species Conservation Act of 1974||T. C. A. § 70-8-101 to 112||TN ST § 70-8-101 to 112||
These Tennessee statutes comprise the Tennessee Nongame and Endangered or Threatened Wildlife Species Conservation Act of 1974 and includes the legislative intent, definitions, and factors relevant to endangered species investigations. By statute, it is unlawful for any person to take, attempt to take, possess, transport, export, process, sell or offer for sale or ship nongame wildlife, or for any common or contract carrier knowingly to transport or receive for shipment nongame wildlife. Violation constitutes a Class B misdemeanor and incurs warrantless searches and seizure of the wildlife taken and the instrumentalities used in the taking.
|Ivey v. Hamlin (Unpublished)||2002 WL 1254444 (Tenn.Ct.App.)(Not reproted in S.W.3rd)||
This is an action for damages for the deliberate killing of a dog by a Deputy Sheriff that was alleging terrorizing the neighborhood. In finding for defendant-officer, the court noted that the consensus among the courts is that a vicious dog is a public nuisance and that governments and their agents have broad power to protect the public from these animals. The court thus found the officer acted reasonably under the circumstances and had a qualified immunity defense.
|Bell v. State||761 S.W.2d 847 (Tex. App. 1988)||
Defendant convicted of cruelty to animals by knowingly and intentionally torturing a puppy by amputating its ears without anesthetic or antibiotics. Defense that "veterinarians charge too much" was ineffective.
|NY - Horse Racing - Section 4002.8. Qualifications for license||9 NY ADC 4002.8||9 NYCRR 4002.8||
If the New York State Racing and Wagering Board finds that an applicant meets the criteria for financial responsibility, experience, character and fitness, then it will issue an occupational license to that person.
|People v. Panetta||--- N.Y.S.3d ----, 2018 WL 6627442, 2018 N.Y. Slip Op. 28404 (N.Y. App. Term. Dec. 13, 2018)||No. 2015-2601 OR CR||Defendant was convicted of animal cruelty, inadequate shelter, and failing to seek veterinary care for her numerous dogs. After an initial seizure of two dogs, defendant was served with a notice to comply with care and sheltering of her remaining dogs. Following inspections about a month later, inspectors found that defendant had failed to comply with this order, and dogs suffering from broken bones and other injuries (including one dog with "a large tumor hanging from its mammary gland area") were seized and subsequently euthanized. As a result, defendant was arrested and charged with 11 violations of Agriculture and Markets Law § 353 and local code violations. Defendant then moved to suppress the physical evidence and statements taken during the initial warrantless entry onto her property and the evidence obtained after that during the execution of subsequent search warrants, arguing that the initial warrantless entry tainted the evidence thereafter. At the suppression hearing, a building contractor who had visited defendant's residence testified that he contacted the Office for the Aging because he had concerns for defendant. An official at the Office for the Aging also testified that the contractor told her that he observed 6 dogs in the home and about 50-100 dogs in outdoor cages. The investigating officer who ultimately visited defendant's property reported that there were nearly 100 dogs living in "unhealthy conditions" on defendant's property. Upon encountering defendant that day, the officer testified that defendant demanded a search warrant for further investigation (which the officer obtained and executed later that day). Following this hearing, the City Court held that while the officer's entry violated defendant's legitimate expectation of privacy, his actions were justified under the emergency exception warrant requirement and, thus, denied defendant's motion to suppress. On appeal here, defendant argues that the prosecution failed to establish the officer had reasonable grounds to believe there was an immediate need to protect life or property and that all the evidence obtained thereafter should have been suppressed. Relying on previous holdings that allow the emergency exception in cases where animals are in imminent danger of health or need of protection, this court found that the prosecution failed to establish the applicability of the emergency doctrine. In particular, the court was troubled by the fact that, on the first visit, the officers crossed a chain fence that was posted with a no trespassing sign (although they testified they did not see the sign). Because the officers only knew that there were "unhealthy conditions" on defendant's property in a house that the contractor testified that he thought should be "condemned," this did not support a conclusion of a "substantial threat of imminent danger" to defendant or her dogs. While in hindsight there was an emergency with respect to the dogs, the court "cannot retroactively apply subsequently obtained facts to justify the officers' initial entry onto defendant's property." As a result, the court remitted the matter to the City Court for a determination of whether the seizures of evidence after the initial illegal entry occurred under facts that were sufficiently distinguishable from the illegal entry so to have purged the original taint.||Case|
|Sykes v. Cook Cty. Circuit Court Prob. Div.||837 F.3d 736 (7th Cir. 2016), reh'g and suggestion for reh'g en banc denied (Oct. 27, 2016)||This case dealt with the plaintiff's denial of the use of her service dog while in a courtroom to present a motion. After the denial, the plaintiff filed an Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) action, alleging that there was a violation for denial of reasonable accommodations under the ADA. The district court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction, because as a federal court, it was barred from hearing the claim under the Rooker–Feldman doctrine. The Court of Appeals agreed, and held that as a federal court, it was barred from hearing the claim under the Rooker–Feldman doctrine, which prevents lower federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over cases brought by state court losers challenging state court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced. Additionally, the district court held that it should exercise Younger abstention because the proceeding was ongoing and because the plaintiff had an adequate opportunity to raise her federal claims about her dog in state court, but the Court of Appeals held that "Younger is now a moot question because there is no ongoing state proceeding for [the Court of Appeals] to disturb." As a result, the district court's dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction was AFFIRMED.||Case|
|OR - Cruelty - Consolidated Cruelty Statutes||O. R. S. § 167.305 - 439||OR ST § 167.305 - 439||
These Oregon statutes comprise the state's anti-cruelty laws. "Animal" means any nonhuman mammal, bird, reptile, amphibian or fish. The term "assault," which is generally associated with human crimes, is used to define certain crimes against animals. Animal abuse may be elevated to a felony offense if the act was committed directly in front of a minor child or if the perpetrator was previously convicted of domestic violence.