Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| In Defense of Animals v. National Institutes of Health | 527 F.Supp.2d 23 (D.D.C., 2007) | 2007 WL 4329474 (D.D.C.) |
This FOIA case was brought against the National Institutes of Health ("NIH") by In Defense of Animals (“IDA”) seeking information related to approximately 260 chimpanzees located as the Alamogordo Primate Facility (“APF”) in New Mexico. Before the court now is NIH's Motion for Partial Reconsideration as to the release of records. This Court rejected NIH’s arguments that the records are not “agency records” because they belong to NIH's contractor, Charles River Laboratories, Inc. (“CRL”), a publicly held animal research company. Also, the Court was equally unconvinced that the information requested here is “essentially a blueprint of the APF facility,” and that release of such information presents a security risk to the facility. This Order was Superseded by In Defense of Animals v. National Institutes of Health , 543 F.Supp.2d 70 (D.D.C., 2008). |
Case | |
| LA - Rabies Immunization- Chapter 1. Anti-Rabies Vaccination Requirements for Dogs and Cats | 51 LA ADC Pt III, § 101 to 111 | La. Admin Code. tit. 51, pt. III, § 101 to 111 | These regulations are Louisiana's rabies provisions. Under the chapter, a person is prohibited from keeping a dog, cat, or ferret over the age of three months that has not been vaccinated against rabies by a licensed veterinarian. | Administrative | |
| AK - Zoo - § 09.65.180. Civil liability of zoos | AS § 09.65.180 | AK ST § 09.65.180 | The Alaska law provides that, except as provided in (b), a person who owns or operates a zoo is strictly liable for injury to a person or property if the injury is caused by an animal owned by or in the custody of the zoo. | Statute | |
| World Law |
The Animal Legal & Historical Center houses laws, cases, and scholarly discussions on animal law topics from across the globe. See the different ways to access materials from different countries and regions below. |
Policy | |||
| In re Estate of Howard Brand, Late of Essex Junction, Vermont |
This Vermont case considers the effectiveness of a clause in a testator’s will that directs his executor to destroy any animals that he owns at the time of his death. The testator, Howard Brand, was believed to have owned four horses and one mule at the time of his death. An unincorporated association entitled, “The Coalition to Save Brand’s Horses” was formed in response to this unusual post-mortem request, and sought to intervene in the lawsuit. In a clear case of first impression in Vermont, the Chittenden County Court held that the clause as set forth in Brand’s last codicil mandating the destruction of his animals is void as contrary to public policy. |
Pleading | |||
| NC - Hotels - § 72-7.1. Admittance of pets to hotel rooms | N.C.G.S.A. § 72-7.1 | N.C.G.S.A. § 72-7.1, NC ST § 72-7.1 | This North Carolina laws states that innkeepers may permit pets in rooms used for sleeping purposes and in adjoining rooms. Persons bringing pets into a room in which they are not permitted are in violation of this section and punishable according to subsection (d). All sleeping rooms in which the innkeeper permits pets must contain a sign posted in a prominent place in the room stating that pets are permitted in the room. | Statute | |
| U.S. v. Santillan | 243 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2001) |
Santillan was prosecuted under the Lacey Act for bringing ten baby parrots across the border from Tijuana. His appeal raises, among other issues, a significant question about the mens rea needed under the Lacey Act. The court held that the Lacey Act does not require knowledge of the particular law violated by the possession or predicate act, as long as the defendant knows of its unlawfulness. |
Case | ||
| Drinkhouse v. Van Ness | 260 P. 869 (1935) | 202 Cal. 359 (1935) |
Plaintiffs sued defendants to recover value of a horse that was wrongfully taken from them. The Court held that evidence was admissible to establish the value of the horse at the time of the wrongful taking to fix the damages amount. The peculiar value of the horse as a sire was established by evidence as to the horse’s racing history and to its progeny’s character and racing ability. Owners were entitled to recover damages for the reasonable value of the horse’s use during the period they were wrongfully deprived of it. |
Case | |
| State v. Chilinski | 330 P.3d 1169 (Mont. 2014) | 2014 MT 206, 2014 WL 3842953 (Mont. 2014) | After a call reporting the poor health of over 100 dogs at a large Malamute breeding operation and the recruitment of the Humane Society of the United States, including several volunteers, to help execute a warrant, defendant was charged with one misdemeanor count of cruelty to animals and 91 counts of felony cruelty to animals pursuant to § 45–8–211, MCA. Defendant was convicted by a jury of 91 counts of animal cruelty and sentenced to the Department of Corrections for a total of 30 years with 25 years suspended. A prohibition from possessing any animals while on probation was also imposed on the defendant, as well as an order to forfeit every seized dog and all puppies born after the execution of the warrant. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Montana, defendant argued the District Court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the search on Fourth Amendment grounds. The Supreme Court held, however, that the search warrant authorizing seizure of “any and all dogs” and “any and all records pertaining to dogs” was not impermissibly overbroad; that the participation by civilian volunteers and Humane Society personnel in execution the warrant was not prohibited by the Fourth Amendment or the Montana Constitution; and that the use of civilian volunteers to assist in execution of search did not violate defendant's right to privacy. The Supreme Court therefore held that the lower court did not err in denying the motion to suppress the evidence. Next, the defendant argued that the District Court abused its discretion when it improperly determined that the results of an investigation of his kennels in 2009 were irrelevant pursuant to M.R. Evid. 403. The court, however, agreed with the District Court, despite defendant's claim that 2009 inspection would show that the poor conditions of the kennels and the dogs in 2011 were justified due to economic hardship and health issues. Finally, defendant argued that the District Court was not authorized to order forfeiture of the defendant’s dogs that were not identified as victims of animal cruelty. The Supreme Court, however, held that the statute authorizing forfeiture of “any animal affected” as part of sentence for animal cruelty did not limit forfeiture of defendant's dogs to only those that served as basis for underlying charges, nor did it implicate the defendant's right to jury trial under the Apprendi case. The Supreme Court therefore held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in requiring the defendant to forfeit all of his dogs. The lower court’s decision was affirmed. | Case | |
| Canada - Manitoba Statutes. The Animal Liability Act | S.M. 1998, c. 8 [C.C.S.M., c. A95], as am. S.M. 2002, c. 24, s. 4; 2002, c. | This set of laws comprises the Manitoba Animal Liability Act. Under the Act, the owner of an animal is liable for damages resulting from harm that the animal causes to a person or to property, but the damages awarded can be reduced depending upon the contributory fault or negligence of the plaintiff. In addition, no animal may run at-large under this law. Any person who finds a dog,wild boar, or prescribed animal worrying, injuring or killing livestock on the premises of the owner or possessor of the livestock that person may destroy the dog, wild boar or prescribed animal. | Statute |