Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Mendes | 72 Cal.Rptr.3d 553 (Cal.App. 5 Dist., 2008) | 08 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 1999, 160 Cal.App.4th 136, 2008 WL 400393 (Cal.App. 5 Dist.) |
Appellants ALDF asserted causes of action for violation of Penal Code section 597t for confining calves without an “adequate exercise area,” and for commission of unfair business practices under Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq. In affirming the lower court's decision to dismiss the action, this court held that there is no private cause of action pursuant to Penal Code section 597t under the present circumstances, and none of the appellants have shown an ability to allege any facts of economic injury. |
Case | |
| ME - Humane Slaughter - Subchapter IV. Slaughter. | 22 M. R. S. A. § 2521 to 2521-C | ME ST T. 22 § 2521 to 2521C | The Maine humane slaughter provisions begin with a statement of policy that a method of slaughtering or handling in connection with slaughtering does not comply with the public policy of the State unless it is humane. A humane method is defined as one which renders animals insensible to pain by a single blow or gunshot or an electrical, chemical or other means that is rapid and effective before they are shackled, hoisted, thrown, cast or cut. Additionally, slaughtering and handling in accordance with the ritual requirements of a religious faith that prescribes a method of slaughter whereby the animal suffers loss of consciousness by anemia of the brain is allowed. The section applies only to "livestock" and does not list a penalty for noncompliance (although the associated regulations may define both). | Statute | |
| Christensen v. Lundsten | 863 N.Y.S.2d 886, 2008 WL 4118071 (N.Y.Dist.Ct.) | 2008 N.Y. Slip Op. 28320 |
In this New York case, the parent of child injured by a dog brought an action seeking to have the dog declared a “dangerous dog” under the relevant law. The Court conducted a trial of the “dangerous dog” petition filed and rendered an oral decision that declared the respondents' Chesapeake Bay Retriever “Nellie” to be a dangerous dog under New York Agricultural and Markets Law § 121. The parties contested the appropriateness of a finding of “negligence” and “strict liability” and the entry of judgment. The District Court held that the court would not resolve issue of negligence because the issue was not properly joined for disposition; however, the owners were strictly liable for child's unreimbursed medical expenses. |
Case | |
| Oregon Natural Desert Ass'n v. Kimbell | Slip Copy, 2008 WL 4186913 (D.Or.) |
After filing a complaint challenging certain decisions by the United States Forest Service and the National Marine Fisheries Service authorizing livestock grazing within a national forest, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction seeking an order prohibiting the authorization of livestock grazing on certain public lands until Plaintiffs’ claims could be heard on the merits. The United States District Court, D. Oregon granted Plaintiffs’ motion, finding that Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of at least one of its claims, and that Plaintiffs made a sufficient showing that irreparable harm would likely occur if the relief sought is not granted. |
Case | ||
| Moore v. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. | 932 N.E.2d 448 (Ill.App. 1 Dist., 2010) | 2010 WL 2266081 (Ill.App. 1 Dist.), 402 Ill.App.3d 62 |
Plaintiffs, Ami Moore and Doggie Do Right-911, Inc., aver that defendants PETA, Diane Opresnik, John Keene, and Mary DePaolo defamed them and placed them in a false light by stating that the plaintiff dog trainer placed a shock device on a dog's genitals and allegedly shocked it. Prior to this action, the claim against PETA was settled and dismissed. The defamation claims against Opresnik, Keene, and DePaolo, persisted. In dismissing the remaining claims, the court found that there was no positive factual statement of criminal animal cruelty to support a defamation per se claim. Further, another claim fell outside the statute of limitations period and was also inadequately supported by specific allegations. |
Case | |
| United States v. Bowman | 43 S.Ct. 39 (1922) | 260 U.S. 94 (1922) |
This case involves a conspiracy charge to defraud a corporation in which the United States was a stockholder. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Mitchell referred to this Supreme Court case when it found that the nature of the MMPA does not compel its application to foreign territories. |
Case | |
| US - Critical Habitat - Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Establishment of a Nonessential Experimental Population f | 50 CFR Part 17, RIN 1018-AH44, 2005 WL 779150 (F.R.) |
This final rule is a collaborative effort between the FWS and the states of Tennessee and Alabama and Conservation Fisheries, Inc. to reintroduce the boulder darter ( Etheostoma wapiti ) , an endangered fish, and the spotfin chub ( Cyprinella (= Hybopsis ) monacha ) , a threatened fish to its historical habitat in Lauderdale County Alabama and Lawrence County, Tennessee. This rule provides for Non-essential Experimental Populations (NEP) within the designated area and it establishes limited allowable legal takings in that area. Additionally, this rule also changes the scientific name of the spotfin chub from Cyprinella (= Hybopsis ) monacha to Erimonax monachus , to reflect a recent change in the scientific literature. |
Administrative | ||
| IL - Domestic Violence - Article 112A. Domestic Violence | 725 ILCS 5/112A-14 | IL ST CH 725 § 5/112A-14 | This Illinois law allows a court to issue an order of protection if the court finds that petitioner has been abused by a family or household member. It also allows for the protection of animals in domestic violence situations. Under Section (b)(11.5), the court can "[g]rant the petitioner the exclusive care, custody, or control of any animal owned, possessed, leased, kept, or held by either the petitioner or the respondent or a minor child residing in the residence or household of either the petitioner or the respondent and order the respondent to stay away from the animal and forbid the respondent from taking, transferring, encumbering, concealing, harming, or otherwise disposing of the animal." | Statute | |
| Sturgeon v. Frost | 872 F.3d 927 (9th Cir. 2017) | 2017 WL 4341742 (9th Cir. Oct. 2, 2017) | In this case, Sturgeon sought to use his hovercraft in a National Preserve to reach moose hunting grounds. Sturgeon brought action against the National Park Service (NPS), challenging NPS’s enforcement of a regulation banning operation of hovercrafts on a river that partially fell within a federal preservation area in Alaska. Alaskan law permits the use of hovercraft, NPS regulations do not; Sturgeon argued that Park Service regulations did not apply because the river was owned by the State of Alaska. Sturgeon sought both declaratory and injunctive relief preventing the Park Service from enforcing its hovercraft ban. On remand, the Court of Appeals held that regulation preventing use of hovercraft in federally managed conservation areas applied to the river in the National Preserve. While the hovercraft ban excludes "non-federally owned lands and waters" within National Park System boundaries, this court found that the waterways at issue in this case were within navigable public lands based on established precedent. The district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants was affirmed. | Case | |
| State v. Gerard | 832 N.W.2d 314 (Minn.App.,2013) | 2013 WL 3155477 (Minn.App.,2013) |
This case considers whether the trial court erred when it dismissed the felony count of unjustifiably killing an animal based on lack of probable cause. The incident stems from the killing of the neighbors' cat with a shotgun by defendant-respondent. At trial, he filed a motion to dismiss for lack of probable cause that was accompanied by a notarized affidavit of the responding police deputy stating the shooting of the cat was "justified." The trial court dismissed the complaint finding insufficient evidence that respondent had unjustifiably killed the cat. On appeal, the court found the district court's reliance on the deputy's lay opinion was improper. The court found it was within the jury's province to determine whether respondent's actions were justified or unjustified based on the evidence at trial. |
Case |