Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CT - Fisheries & Wildlife - Chapter 490. Fisheries and Game. § 26-1. Definitions | C. G. S. A. § 26-1 | CT ST § 26-1 | This law contains definitions for the Connecticut Fisheries and Wildlife Department. | Statute |
| Southeastern Community College v. Davis | 99 S.Ct. 2361 (1979) |
Applicant to nursing program brought suit against the college alleging discrimination under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act for denying her acceptance to the program based on her physical disability of being deaf. The college alleged that the applicant was not "otherwise qualified" under the statute because, even if provided accommodations for her hearing disability, she would be unable to safely participate in the clinical training program. The court held that "otherwise qualified" under the statute means that a person is qualified for the program "in spite of" the handicap, and that the applicant here was not otherwise qualified for the program. The court also held that a program authority is not required to ignore the disability of the applicant when determining eligibility for the program. Rather, the statute only requires that the disabled person not be denied the benefits of the program solely because of the disability. |
Case | |
| Stennette v. Miller | 316 Ga.App. 425, 729 S.E.2d 559 (Ga.App., 2012) | 2012 WL 2384423 (Ga.App.) |
Plaintiff Stennette was providing in-home nursing care while she was bitten multiple times by Defendant Miller's dog. Stennette appeals from the trial court's grant of summary judgment to Miller in Stennette's personal injury action. This Court affirmed that decision because Stennette failed to provide adequate evidence showing triable issues on whether the dog had a vicious propensity and whether Miller knew of that propensity. However, the Court reversed the grant of summary judgment as to Miller on Stennette's claim that Miller negligently performed a voluntarily-undertaken duty to keep the dog away from her when she was at the house, because the evidence created genuine issues of material fact as to this claim. |
Case |
| MA - Eggs - Ch. 129 Prevention of Farm Animal Cruelty Act | M.G.L.A. 129 §§ 1-1 - 1-12 | Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 129 App., §§ 1-1 - 1-12 (West) | This collection of laws was created by Massachusetts voters when they approved Question 3 and the 2016 ballot. These laws prevent the inhumane confinement of pregnant pigs, calves raised for veal, and egg-laying hens in the state of Massachusetts. These laws also prohibit the sale of products in Massachusetts made from animals confined in violation of these laws. | Statute |
| Robinson v. City of Bluefield | 764 S.E.2d 740 (W. Va. Oct. 2, 2014) | 234 W. Va. 209, 2014 WL 5032602 (W. Va. Oct. 2, 2014) | An Animal Control Officer responded to a complaint about two dogs at defendant's residence. While investigating the complaint at defendant's residence, the animal control officer was attacked by one of defendant's dogs. The officer sought medical treatment following the incident. The City of Bluefield subsequently brought charges against defendant in its municipal court, charging her with having a dangerous animal in violation of city ordinances. The municipal court ordered the dog killed. On appeal, the Circuit Court of Mercer County affirmed the municipal court's decision. Defendant then appealed the Circuit Court's decision arguing that that Circuit Court erred in concluding that the municipal court had the authority to order the destruction of her dog. After review, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia agreed with defendant and found that under the plain language of W.Va.Code § 19–20–20, the City of Bluefield was required to set forth satisfactory proof that defendant’s dog was “vicious, dangerous, or in the habit of biting or attacking other persons” before a circuit court or a magistrate, not a municipal court. The court therefore found that ordinance was void to the extent that it allowed a municipal court to order the destruction of the dog. The circuit court's order affirming the municipal court's order to kill Ms. Robinson's dog was therefore reversed. Justice Loughry dissents. | Case |
| GA - Dog - Consolidated Dog Laws | Ga. Code Ann., § 4-8-1 - 45; Ga. Code Ann., § 4-14-1 - 4-15-1; Ga. Code Ann., § 26-2-160; Ga. Code Ann., § 27-3-16 - 18; § 27-3-49; Ga. Code Ann., § 16-11-107 - 107.1; Ga. Code Ann., § 50-3-88 | GA ST § 4-8-1 to 45; GA ST § 4-14-1 to 4-15-1; GA ST § 27-3-16 to 18; § 27-3-49; GA ST § 16-11-107 - 107.1; GA ST § 50-3-88 | These Georgia statutes comprise the state's dog laws and the "Responsible Dog Ownership Law." Among the provisions of the Responsible Dog Ownership Law include a requirement for registration of dangerous dogs as well as the necessity of such owner to carry at least $50,000 in liability insurance. Owners of these dogs who do not comply with these and other provisions may have their dogs confiscated and destroyed. Any person who violates this article is guilty of a misdemeanor. | Statute |
| CA - Burro - § 4600. Killing or capturing undomesticated burro; prima facie evidence | West's Ann. Cal. Fish & G. Code § 4600 | CA FISH & G § 4600 | This section makes it unlawful to kill, wound, capture, or have in possession any undomesticated burro. An undomesticated burro is a wild burro or a burro which has not been tamed or domesticated for a period of three years after its capture. | Statute |
| IN RE: TERRY LEE HARRISON AND PAMELA SUE HARRISON, RESPONDENTS | 51 Agric. Dec. 234 (1992) | 1992 WL 17132 (U.S.D.A.) | Willful violation is defined as one where violator either intentionally does act which is prohibited, irrespective of evil motive or reliance on erroneous advice, or acts with careless disregard of statutory requirements. | Case |
| Florida Home Builders Ass'n v. Norton | 496 F.Supp.2d 1330 (M.D.Fla., 2007) | 2007 WL 2172785 (M.D.Fla.) |
The plaintiffs charge in that the Secretary of the Interior, in contravention of statutory duty, has failed to conduct the nondiscretionary, five-year status reviews of species listed as endangered or threatened in the Federal Register. Plaintiff seeks an order declaring that Defendants have violated the Endangered Species Act and that the failure to conduct the status reviews constitutes agency action “unlawfully withheld” in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act. Defendants argue that their failure to conduct the mandatory status reviews is not an agency action that is reviewable under the APA. Defendants therefore assert that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's suit to compel agency action to the extent that it arises under the APA. Although not addressed by Defendants and although there is little authority on the issue, Defendants' failure to comply with a mandatory duty falls within the first category of actions reviewable under the APA as an agency action, or inaction, “made reviewable by statute” because the ESA explicitly “provides a private right of action." Defendants assert that budgetary and resource constraints precluded the Secretary from fulfilling the obligation imposed by Congress. However, the court stated that defendants ". . . should take up such constraints with Congress rather than let mandatory deadlines expire with inaction." |
Case |
| Dirty cages where FUCEP housed night monkey | Slideshow Images |