Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| AL - Leash - When dogs permitted in areas; liability of owners of dogs at large in areas (wildlife management areas) | Ala. Code 1975 § 9-11-305 - 307 | AL ST § 9-11-305 to 307 | This Alabama statute provides that no dog shall be permitted except on leash within any wildlife management area except in accordance with the rules and regulations promulgated by the Commissioner of Conservation and Natural Resources. The owner of any dog at large within any wildlife management area shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. | Statute |
| State v. Mita | 245 P.3d 458 (Hawai', 2010) | 2010 WL 5483427 (Hawai', 2010), 124 Hawai'i 385 (2010) |
Defendant, an owner of two dogs, both boxers, was charged with animal nuisance in violation of Revised Ordinances of Honolulu section 7-2.3. Mita’s counsel objected to the oral charge at trial, arguing "that the arraignment is [not] specific enough to put the defendant specifically on notice of what part of the . . . ordinance she’s being charged with." The district court denied Mita’s motion for judgment of acquittal and sentenced her to pay a $50 fine. Mita appealed. The Intermediate Court of Appeals vacated the judgment of the district court. On certiorari, the Hawaii Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Intermediate Court of Appeals and remanded the case, finding that the definition of animal nuisance in section 7-2.2 does not create an additional essential element of the offense; and, second, the definition of "animal nuisance" is consistent with its commonly understood meaning. |
Case |
| Walker-Serrano ex rel. Walker v. Leonard | 325 F.3d 412 (C.A.3 (Pa.),2003) | 175 Ed. Law Rep. 93 |
Public school student circulated a petition during class and recess that opposed a school field trip to the circus. School officials prevented her from circulating the petition, and she complained of a violation of her First Amendment right to free speech. The Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment for the school, holding that the student's rights had not been violated because a school may regulate the times and circumstances a petition may be circulated when it interferes with educational goals or the rights of other students. |
Case |
| Solicitud de Atracción 249/2023. Caso Elefante Ely. Ciudad de Mexico | Solicitud de Atracción 249/2023 | This is a writ of Amparo on behalf of Ely, a 38-year-old female African elephant that lived in a circus before being relocated to the San Juan de Arago Zoo in 2012. In this instance, a concerned citizen and activist affiliated with the Association "Opening Cages, Opening Minds" ("Abriendo Jaulas, Abriendo Mentes") filed an Amparo petitioning the authorities in Mexico City to take necessary actions for the relocation of Ely from the zoo to a sanctuary in Brazil. The petitioner asserted that Ely had endured abuse from a young age during her 25-year tenure in a circus, and was currently experiencing deprivation of freedom at the zoo. Ely is solitary and grappling with skin and nail injuries, infections, and ailments such as dermatitis and hyperkeratosis. The petitioner further argued that Ely was suffering from issues in one of her limbs due to an old fracture and jaw problems stemming from the use of a handling hook during her circus days, among other concerns. Moreover, the elephant's confinement in a cement enclosure has compounded adverse effects on her physical and psychological well-being. Observations indicate distressing behavior including self-harm, such as eating her own feces, and striking herself with her trunk and against the fence. Ely also exhibited repetitive behavior attributed to inadequate mental, physical, social, and environmental stimulation. The treatment she has received is deemed a violation of ethical standards for animal respect and protection. The judge determined that Ely received appropriate and ample care at the zoo, where her enclosure adhered to the needs of her species. It was noted that she was receiving the necessary attention to address the chronic ailments stemming from her time in the circus. Consequently, the San Juan de Aragón Zoo fulfilled its obligation to protect and care for the elephant, addressing her physiological, behavioral, and health requirements and ensuring her overall well-being. Following the verdict, the zoo enlarged Ely's enclosure and introduced Gypsy, another elephant of similar size and age, to provide companionship for Ely. After pursuing various legal avenues without success, the complainant sought review from the Supreme Court of Justice, and the high court accepted the request. The Supreme Court will review the decision of the Fourth Administrative District court, which ruled for the zoo, finding that Ely was being kept in adequate conditions. | Case | |
| IN - Cattle Slaughter - THE ORISSA PREVENTION OF COW SLAUGHTER RULES, 1966 | 5 of 1960 | The Rules, drafted under the Orissa Prevention of Cow Slaughter Act, 1960, prescribe conditions for the issue of a certificate for slaughter. | Statute | |
| CA - Importation - Chapter 2. Of Other and Miscellaneous Offenses (653o - 653r) | West's Ann. Cal. Penal Code § 653o - 653r | CA PENAL § 653o - 653r | These California laws relate to the importation of certain animals parts for commercial purposes. Under the law, it is unlawful to import into this state for commercial purposes, to possess with intent to sell, or to sell within the state, the dead body, or any part or product thereof, of any polar bear, leopard, ocelot, tiger, cheetah, jaguar, sable antelope, wolf (Canis lupus), zebra, whale, cobra, python, sea turtle, colobus monkey, kangaroo, vicuna, sea otter, free-roaming feral horse, dolphin or porpoise (Delphinidae), Spanish lynx, or elephant. It is unlawful to import into this state for commercial purposes, to possess with intent to sell, or to sell within the state, the dead body, or any part or product thereof, of any crocodile or alligator. Commencing January 1, 2022, it is unlawful to import into this state for commercial purposes, to possess with intent to sell, or to sell within the state, the dead body, or any part or product thereof, of an iguana, skink, caiman, hippopotamus, or a Teju, Ring, or Nile lizard. Section 653p makes it unlawful to posses with the intent to sell any part or dead body of any species on the federal endangered species list or species covered under the MMPA. Section 653q makes it illegal to import for commercial purposes, to possess with intent to sell, or to sell within the state, the dead body, or any part or product thereof, of any seal. | Statute |
| EU - Farming - Council Directive concerning the protection of animals kept for farming purposes | 98/58/EC; Official Journal L 221 , 08/08/1998 P. 0023 - 0027 |
This Directive applies to animals (including fish, reptiles and amphibians) reared or kept for the production of food, wool, skin or fur or for other farming purposes. It does not apply to wild animals, animals intended for use in sporting or cultural events (shows), experimental or laboratory animals or invertebrate animals. The Member States must adopt provisions to ensure that the owners or keepers of animals look after the welfare of their animals and see that they are not caused any unnecessary pain, suffering or injury. |
Statute | |
| Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. State of Wisconsin | 740 F.Supp. 1400 (W.D.Wis. 1990) |
Action was brought to determine Indian tribe members' rights related to off-reservation hunting of white-tailed deer, fisher and other furbearing animals, and small game within the area of the state ceded to the United States by the plaintiff tribes. The Court held that Indians and non-Indians were each entitled to one half of game harvest within each harvesting area rather than as a whole territory to accommodate the longer Indian hunting season. With regard to hunting on private land in the ceded area, the Court held that plaintiffs' members have no more rights than non-Indian hunters to hunt or to trap on private lands, as tribal members who are hunting or trapping on private lands are still subject to state hunting and trapping regulations. The Court also held that the state could properly prohibit Indians from hunting deer during the summer and at night due to the safety risk to humans. |
Case | |
| Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida v. U.S. | 697 F.Supp.2d 1324 (S.D.Fla., 2010) | 2010 WL 1037962 (S.D.Fla.) |
This case examines the requirements surrounding the issuance of an Incidental Take Statement (ITS), a statement that authorizes harm to an endangered species, but that must include a trigger for reviewing the decision (known as “re-consultation”) at the point when there is a risk of jeopardizing the species. The trigger must be a numerical trigger describing the “take” (e.g., the capturing or killing of members of an endangered species) in terms of specific population data unless it is impractical to do so. Specifically, this case explores whether the Army Corps of Engineers and FTS were able to use an ecological surrogate in place of a numerical trigger in an ITS that was promulgated in the process of conservation work in the Everglades. This conservation work involved manipulating water levels in the Everglades and impacted the viability of three species protected under the Endangered Species Act (the Cape Sable seaside sparrow, the Everglade snail kite, and the wood stork), as well as the well-being of the Miccosukee Tribe of Indians. |
Case |
| Nat'l Pork Producers Council v. Ross | 598 U.S. 356, 143 S. Ct. 1142, 215 L. Ed. 2d 336 (2023) | Following the adoption of California’s Proposition 12, two organizations – the National Pork Producers Council and the American Farm Bureau Federation (Petitioners) – filed this lawsuit on behalf of the members of these organizations that are in the business of raising and processing pigs for the sale of pork meat. Petitioners allege that Proposition 12, which forbids the sale of whole pork meat in California that is made from breeding pigs (or their immediate offspring) that are confined in a cruel manner, violates the dormant Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution by placing an impermissible burden on interstate commerce. Under Proposition 12, confinement of pigs is cruel if it prevents a pig from lying down, standing up, fully extending its limbs, or turning around freely. Petitioners allege that the cost of compliance with Proposition 12 will increase production costs, but concede that those costs will fall on both California and out-of-state pork producers. Petitioners also allege that, because California imports most of the pork it consumes, the cost of compliance with Proposition 12 will be dealt to mostly out-of-state producers. The district court concluded that petitioners’ complaint failed to state a claim as a matter of law and dismissed the case, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit, rejecting petitioners’ arguments that Proposition 12 violates the dormant Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The Court found no violation of the dormant Commerce Clause because: (1) petitioners concede that Proposition 12 did not implicate the antidiscrimination principle, because it imposes the same burdens on in-state pork producers that it imposes on out-of-state pork producers, and (2) petitioners’ reliance on the Pike line of cases to prevent a state from regulating the sale of a consumer good within its borders on nondiscriminatory terms was rejected, as that line of cases had never yielded such a result. The judgment of the Ninth Circuit was affirmed. | Case |